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Abstract 
 
o 
 
This thesis argues that photographs enhance the repertoire of seeing the way eyeglasses, 
microscopes and telescopes do. This kinship is based on these devices sharing a feature 
called transparency. Transparent devices facilitate visual information about objects without 
interrupting the causal link between the object and our eyes, and do so by maintaining a 
belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual dependence on that object. 
Handmade pictures also offer visual information about objects, but because handmade 
pictures depend on the perceptual experiences of their makers, they interrupt the causal 
link between the object represented and our eyes. Consider how a drawing can represent 
the misperceptions and hallucinations of its illustrator, but in contrast, photographs do not 
reproduce the contents of hallucinations or misperceptions had by their photographers. I 
use transparency to map the epistemic province of photographs, arguing that photographs 
are not just ontologically similar to microscopes and telescopes, but also epistemically akin 
to them, –perhaps even more than they are like other picture types. This is illustrated by 
two further comparisons. The first is technological: while cameras define the information 
scope of photographs, handmade pictures are not subject to pre-sets that strictly limit their 
representational scope in the same way. The second comparison shows how photographs 
and handmade pictures are subject to different sceptical hypotheses: handmade pictures 
are susceptible to scepticism about their illustrator, –i.e., as we might question the 
credibility of someone giving testimony– but photographs are not beholden to scepticism 
about their photographer. I conclude with a proposal on the epistemology of photography, 
where contrary to the character of other picture types, photographs provide genuine 
perceptual knowledge about objects.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
o 
 
Thesis Scope, History, Definition, Chapters 
 
The philosophy of photography is still in its adolescence. Cameras, inclusive of a variety of 
their prototypes and photographic devices, only began to take form in the early 19th 
century, let alone be available for everyday snapshooting. Obviously, only after their 
relatively recent invention could theories about photographs begin to shape. Now 
philosophy of photography is gaining interest in tandem with the development of the 
technology it circumnavigates. We learn, make decisions, and expand our horizons from 
looking at photographs all the time. This thesis is dedicated to that special province of 
knowledge we gain from looking at photographs. 
 
Philosophical theories of photography emerge from a variety of problems that stem from the 
following issues and their cousins. Some (but not all) of the concerns that motivate 
philosophy of photography may address photography’s place in the arts (aesthetics), the 
nature of photography and film (ontology), and the extent of photographic information, or 
their function as evidence (epistemology), amongst many other issues. The provenance for 
this thesis can be sourced to these latter two types of philosophical concerns, somewhat in 
tandem. To illustrate, this section provides some prototypical questions for the philosophy 
of photography, later specifying the most relevant questions to my research. These include: 
 
1. Can photographs be artworks?  
2. Why are they so powerful?  
3. In what sense are they realistic? 
4. How are they like and unlike paintings? 
5. Why do we trust them for evidence? 
6. How are they objective?  
7. How are they truth-bearing? 
8. What distinctive problems, if any, do digital photographs generate? 
9. What is their so-called ‘mechanical’ nature? 
10. What is a photograph?  
 9 
 
Some of these questions can be investigated in combination, and some individually with 
equal respect to the aesthetics, ontology and epistemology of photography. The first four 
can be understood as aesthetic questions because they are concerned with what constitutes 
an artwork: whether photographs are artworks in virtue of similarity to other artistic 
pictures; what an artistic medium can or cannot be; what aesthetic realism consists of and 
how photographs might manifest in accord with the genre; and so on. With respect to 
these questions, one attends to the features of photographs that decide their aesthetic 
merit, and I will not be attending to the aesthetic questions about photographs in this 
thesis. Nonetheless, versions of the 3rd and 4th questions are important for an epistemic 
analysis too, as we will see shortly.  
 
The following four questions have a more explicitly epistemic tone as these pay particular 
attention to the way photographs are informative: how do we obtain knowledge from 
photographs (e.g., learning from textbooks and making judgements from advertisements); 
why do we trust them as evidence of something (e.g. crime scenes, celebrity scandals, etc.) 
and moreover, to document special events in our lives (e.g. the growth of our children, 
weddings of loved ones, meeting David Bowie, etc.); and do digital pictures undermine 
that trust because of the prevalence of their manipulation?  
 
Lastly, the bottom two questions from the above list are most obviously related to the 
ontology of photographs. Defining what constitutes a photograph, –i.e., what it is, where it 
comes from, what distinguished it from other things– can tell us something about what we 
learn from them. Nonetheless, there is some discrepancy on the definition of a photograph: 
even if we are in consensus about what the best dictionaries have to say, a more complex 
definition proves more difficult to agree upon. More on this will be discussed in §2, and 
reinforced in later chapters. Because of the relatively sparse scholarship on philosophy of 
photography, there is a lot of space for growth in all directions. Thus, the main function of 
this introduction is to map out how the thesis will chart the epistemic province of 
photography.  
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§1 A brief history 
Legend has it that the introduction of still and moving photographic pictures to public eyes 
produced startling effects on their viewers. Without the understanding of the technology 
what they beheld, audiences were struck by the uncanniness of the photographic image, 
still and moving alike. One remarkable story is the famous 1896 screening of the Lumiére 
brothers film, The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station, in Paris: the film depicted a train 
approaching and the sight of the film in effect, made the audience panic and scramble to 
get out of the way.1 As ridiculous as this may seem at first, one must keep in mind its 
plausibility: without having any previous acquaintance with film, and unwitting as to the 
nature of what would appear before them, the audience would not have the background 
knowledge to psychologically prepare them for the train scene. Whether this story is fact 
or folklore, anyone who has tried film viewing with the 3-dimensional effect, or 
experienced an Omni-max cinema, can attest to the power of the film experience even with 
the knowledge of the fact that the sensations caused are only by some illusion or special 
effect. Moreover, we can attest to the fact that film experiences generate genuine somatic 
responses in their audience, such as nausea, terror, gasping for air, shirking from 
oncoming objects, and this further speaks to the power of film.  
 
Likewise, in the early days of photography, looking at photographs sometimes made its 
viewers feel unsettled for a variety of reasons, often because the content itself was 
grotesque, but not always. Such an intimacy with the grotesque was, and still is, unsettling 
– consider for example, the photojournalism documenting the casualties from raids on 
Gaza, or those from Typhoon Yolanda. Such images can haunt one’s thoughts for years. 
Another cause for disturbance was the eeriness with which photographs realistically 
captured images of people: while on principle viewers would have liked to reacquaint 
themselves with their late relatives, such intimacy with the dead was simply more than 
they were prepared for. Various forms of photographs have even been rejected for 
religious reasons, as they were (and still are) feared to hold mystical powers. In cultures 
where mirrors are believed to bind or confuse unattached spirits, photographic processes 
like the daguerreotype (where one’s image is imprinted on a mirror plate) were considered 
                                                
1 Lumiére 1896.   
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invasive to one’s soul. In some superstitions, being photographed was something to be 
afraid of, as it facilitated the robbery of one’s soul.2  
 
That was then. Now we know a little more about how photographs are made and their 
presence in daily life is commonplace. We know at least enough to understand that we are 
not dealing with a creature of magic, but nonetheless, the photograph is powerful. So 
much so that we generally believe in photographic content in ways we do not believe of 
other pictures, like paintings and drawings. Enough so we can make choices according to 
photographs we see –e.g., to choose one item on the picture menu over another, pick a 
travel destination in a brochure, or even to select a house for purchase on the Internet. 
And so much so, that photographic technologies like Skype™ and FaceTime™ make us 
feel closer to far away loved ones.  
 
So why do photographs have such power? Much of it can be explained by the realistic 
capacity of photographs in documenting events but then, what exactly is the nature of this 
realistic capacity? Panofsky said (of moving pictures) that they presented us with physical 
reality itself.3 Bazin likewise claimed that photographs weren’t representations but rather 
they “re-presented” things out of their time and space.4 He also held that photographs were 
akin to mirrors, except that photographic images are fixed on paper. These may sound like 
poetic descriptions but there is more literal substance to them than that.  
 
Much scholarship has been dedicated to clarifying these claims. Stanley Cavell for 
example, explains that “[w]hat Panofsky and Bazin have in mind is…that photography is 
of reality or nature”5 presumably meaning that photography is always factual, or rather 
that is, that they convey truths about the world. And later we will see in some detail how 
Kendall Walton has likened the photograph to other sight-enhancing devices like 
eyeglasses, and microscopes.6  
 
                                                
2 Marr 1989, 1990. 
3 Panofsky 1974. 
4 Bazin 1960: 8. 
5 Cavell 1971: 16. 
6 Walton 1984. 
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One can further see that the character of photographic realism is special when bearing in 
mind how it differs from paintings. Again, the early investigation on these matters can be 
sourced to Bazin, particularly in his seminal essay, “The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image.” Bazin laid out several important differences between paintings and photographs, 
which, aside from being ontological distinctions, are particularly informative on how 
painting and photographs differ in depicting realistically. Some of the differences between 
them are attributed to how they are made: the mechanical, automatic and objective nature 
of photographic production on one hand, in contrast with the subjective and handmade 
production of paintings on the other. The results of this distinction preface later theories 
that distinguish the realism of photographs and of paintings by their difference in kind –by 
virtue of their differences in generation.7  
 
Bazin claimed the work of realistic representation was taken away from paintings with the 
onset of photography. He suggests, however, that when paintings were bound to realistic 
representations, or ‘resemblances’ or ‘illusions,’ they were not free to explore other 
avenues:  
 
[P]hotography has freed the plastic arts from their obsession with likeness. 
Painting was forced, as it turned out, to offer us illusion and this illusion was 
reckoned sufficient unto art. Photography and cinema on the other hand are 
discoveries that satisfy, once and for all and in its very essence, our obsession with 
realism.8  
So, in a way, the advent of photographs can be said to have factored heavily into changing 
the trends in the handmade arts since photographs did a better job at realistic 
documentation than paintings did. And consequently, paintings could excel at other things 
–e.g., the modern art phenomena may have exploded by the spark of this very liberation 
from realism.  
 
But Bazin’s analysis of photographic realism is a little more radical than photographs just 
being really great at realistic representation. On the contrary, while he claimed that at best 
paintings offered resemblances to their depicta, or an illusion by tricking the eye, 
                                                
7 Bazin 1960. 
8 Bazin 1960: 7. 
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photographs were neither illusory nor representational in the traditional sense. 
Photographs re-presented their depicta, or in other words, made these things present again. 
In The World Viewed, Cavell tries to re-express Bazin’s claim: 
 
[A] n immediate fact about the medium of the photograph (still or moving) is that 
it is not painting. What does this mean––not painting? A photograph does not 
present us with ‘likenesses’ of things; it presents us, we want to say, with the things 
themselves. But wanting to say that may well make us ontologically restless.9 
  
And in fact, it does: while our intuitions might agree on the difference between paintings 
and photographs, sourcing their difference to the nature of their realism doesn’t, thus far 
in our story, adequately explain their difference in kind. And there is some initial 
discomfort with the idea that photographs present us, as Cavell puts it, “with the things 
themselves.”10 After all, how could we be in the presence of long gone relatives or 
volcanoes on the other side of the world? Something doesn’t fit. And yet, despite the 
controversial aspect of Bazin’s claim, there is something fundamentally appealing about it 
and as I will argue, accurate. A more convincing (though still controversial) exposition of 
Bazin’s proto-theory, can be found in Kendall Walton’s essay, “Transparent Photographs: 
On the Nature of Photographic Realism,” which offers a compelling analysis on the 
difference between photographs and paintings.11 
 
Walton claims that photographs differ from paintings because they are transparent, which 
is to say that we see through photographs like we do mirrors, eyeglasses, telescopes. 
Transparent devices like mirrors, eyeglasses and telescopes have in common that they 
enhance our vision without interrupting the natural course of seeing.  A device is 
transparent if it preserves a belief-independent and similarity-preserving counterfactual link to 
the object of sight. When we look at objects through mirrors, eyeglasses, telescopes, the 
object’s appearance is preserved without representing the beliefs of others. Photographs 
too. One certainly sees objects in paintings as well, some with the most masterful capturing 
of likeness, but paintings are nonetheless counterfactually linked to the beliefs of the 
                                                
9 Cavell 1971: 17. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Walton 1984. 
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painter. This interrupts the natural link between the viewer and the objects seen in 
paintings, and thus, paintings are generally not transparent. As Walton illustrates, we do 
not literally see Henry VIII by looking at his painted portrait.12 Perhaps this is because, as 
Bazin aptly put it: 
 
No matter how skilful the painter, his work was always in fee to inescapable 
subjectivity. The fact that a human hand intervened cast a shadow of doubt over 
the image.13 
 
Painters can undoubtedly reproduce what they see with perfect accuracy and steadfast 
honesty, but when we look at a painting what we see depends on what the painter has 
seen. Subsequently we depend on their beliefs about what they saw, and what is 
represented is subject to sceptical hypotheses regarding their beliefs and perceptions. In 
contrast, as Roger Scruton has put it, a photograph of x entails the prior existence of x, of 
which the same cannot be guaranteed by paintings.14 Photographs are not subject to those 
sceptical hypotheses regarding beliefs and perceptions, as what they depict does not 
depend on someone else’s experience. It is in this way that the transparency thesis explains 
the difference in the realist capacities of these respective mediums.15  
 
Walton’s view is the foundation for my thesis, and as such, it will receive substantial 
attention in Chapter 1, where I will describe the criteria of transparency in more detail. 
But it should come as no surprise that the claim of photographic transparency is 
uncomfortable for many philosophers, most significantly because in accepting the grounds 
for the distinction between paintings and photographs, one must accept that in literally 
seeing through photographs, one literally sees into the past. I don’t find this the least bit 
troubling, and I will handle the critics of the transparency thesis in the next chapter. These 
critics include Berys Gaut, Greg Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, who all 
argue, though for different reasons, that the transparency thesis is too liberal and has in 
one way or another neglected other necessary features of seeing. Their varying criticisms 
                                                
12 Walton 1984: 253-54. 
13 Bazin 1960: 7. 
14 Scruton 1981: 579. 
15 Walton 1984: 261. 
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of transparency and my steadfastness in defending it, will also resurface frequently in later 
chapters.16  
§2 What is a photograph? 
I believe it will help at this point to provide a preliminary definition of what a photograph 
is as I have mentioned, this is will show itself to be of some importance later on. The 
Oxford English Dictionary (Online) defines the photograph as: 
 
1. A picture or image obtained by photography; (originally) a picture made using a 
camera in which an image is focused on to sensitive material and then made visible 
and permanent by chemical treatment; (later also) a picture made by focusing an 
image and then storing it digitally.17 
 
We can treat this entry in a variety of ways, but I find it fairly accurate. There are, 
however, ways to reproduce a photographic process without cameras, such as for example, 
with photograms or rayograms. Photograms and rayograms are made by putting objects 
on photosensitive paper and exposing it to light to create shadows and profiles of those 
objects. A technique using photo-emulsion fluid is also used in printmaking, to develop a 
kind of photographic image onto a silkscreen, which is then used to print onto other 
materials. Berys Gaut has also offered an example of the possibility of naturally occurring 
photographs where photographic salt pools in a cave with a crystal dome to function as the 
lens.18 Despite these examples, it has never been clear to me if photograms or rayograms 
were considered photographs, even though they use some photographic techniques. I can 
say that the output of the screen-printing technique was never in my time as an art student 
referred to as a photograph. And if Gaut’s crystal cavern of pictures is like a primitive 
camera, then so is the image from it a photographic one. But there is something to be said 
about the standardization of cameras. Consider for example, whether we would call a 
curved ice sheet on a lake that magnifies the matter below the same as a microscope.   
 
                                                
16 Currie 1991, 1995; Gaut 2008, 2010; Cohen and Meskin 2004, 2008. 
17 “photograph” [def. 1] OED Online 2013. 
18 Gaut 2010: 28. 
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Using some of the same materials or a similar process is not enough. Suppose I bake a 
chocolate cake with x-set of ingredients and employ m-method, for the best results. X-set 
definitely involves chocolate and m-method definitely involves wildly beating butter and 
eggs. When I offer this recipe to a friend and they take these two crucial aspects and make 
a chocolate merengue, we don’t then conclude that meringues are cakes and can represent 
cakes enough to be a counterexample to what my cake is defined to be.  
  
So, I want us to resist taking this similarity in materials or process, as enough to make 
these all the same things. Using photosensitive materials is not sufficient grounds for 
making a photogram equivalent to a photograph especially when we consider other images 
of this kind, –e.g. shadows left from nuclear blasts and tan-lines are pretty close but 
certainly not photographs. I will grant that photograms and other pictures that use 
photosensitive materials are cousins of photographs, but strictly speaking, a photograph is 
the product of a camera (at least, per the current state of technology that produces 
photographs).  
 
I am also not limiting my discussion to a particular genre of photography. While the 
epistemological virtues of photographs might be more readily available in documentary 
photographs than in art photography, say, I am devoted to the claim that photographs are 
transparent. Certainly not all photographs are equally informative, as that virtue depends 
in part on what one can read from a photograph; sometimes a photograph is badly taken, 
underexposed, and its content undetectable. Failing to document a timeslice is always 
possible, but consistently good quality of information isn’t always found across all 
instruments for observation. One has to refocus telescopes and microscopes to get the 
image right, and sometimes it is still unclear. Ordinary perception itself can have its good 
and bad days, so to speak. So, I am not willing to limit the discussion to only photographs 
that provide information in the most accurate representation of a timeslice. This would 
lead to the trivial claim like the following: only informative photographs are informative.  
 
Let me offer an example posed to me by Barbara Sattler and Dawn Wilson about the 
following photograph by Simon Prosser:  
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figure 0.2: St Andrews from the north at sunset, by Simon Prosser. 
 
What is special about this photograph is that Prosser left the shutter open for 30 seconds 
thus creating an artistic effect of blurred lights and water waves that look like fog. One 
might want to say that this is not transparent because the technique Prosser used 
produced an inaccurate picture of that moment in time. But I would disagree. This 
photograph is basically the equivalent of a 30 second film collapsed into a single picture. 
While this is not what seeing the St Andrews coastline looked like first hand, I have no 
reservations about saying this is within the range of things I consider a photograph, and 
that we see through it. If I stipulate a photograph to represent reality (by being 
transparent) at time t1, there is no quantification of t1 as one second or ten. One could call 
this particular photograph, an especially thick timeslice.  
 
There are going to have to be allowances for photographs to vary from first hand seeing to 
some extent, and this is because there are always differences between seeing first hand and 
seeing through instruments. Transparent instruments after all, are meant to enhance or 
extend the repertoire of vision, and to do so they must essentially offer something new to 
the eye. That is the point of them. So perhaps in the Prosser photograph one can see in an 
extra special way because the image encompasses a 30 second window, but that is to be 
expected in seeing through.  
 18 
   
Furthermore, this definition of photographs applies to both the film and digital varieties of 
photographs. Berys Gaut has offered a description of photographs from both kinds of 
cameras that is helpful to mention here. In his book Cinematic Art, he describes the 
similarity of the way mechanical and digital images are produced explaining that the only 
difference between film and digital cameras is that the image of the former is imprinted by 
a photochemical process that has been replaced with an electronic sensor in digital 
cameras. The rest of the apparatus is nearly the same. As both kinds of images are 
generated in the same way, both are photographic images.19 As I am endorsing the camera-
borne picture definition of photographs, pictures borne from digital cameras are obviously 
also photographs in my view.  
 
This definition of a photograph will of course need further qualification. I will offer more 
substantial elements as the thesis progresses. Part of the definition lends itself to a variety 
of special and unique elements of photographs, as their being borne from cameras is part 
of why they are transparent pictures, and part of what specifies their information scope. 
Thus, we will need to attend to the controversial transparency thesis in detail. In 
particular, the notion of belief dependence has been shown to be problematic because it 
seems to conflate a wide range of intentional states and perhaps excludes the possibility 
that perceptions generate proto-beliefs. I will offer an alternative expression of this 
condition that will prove to be useful in the subsequent chapters: this is the hallucination 
test, echoing the illustrations we have discussed so far. In Chapter 1, I will show how the 
hallucination test highlights the crucial difference between photographs and paintings, and 
that it is an equivalent operation for the belief independence condition, while also an 
efficient way to sidestep the issues attached to defining beliefs or intentions.  
 
In the following sections (§§3-6) I give primers for the subsequent chapters of this thesis: 
respectively, I discuss the epistemology of photography discussed in Chapter 2, the 
technological provenance of photographs discussed in Chapter 3, digital photographs in 
Chapter 4; and the appropriate sceptical hypotheses for photographs versus handmade 
pictures in Chapter 5.   
                                                
19 Gaut 2010: 48. 
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§3 Evidence and epistemic value  
I treat Walton’s view that photographs are transparent as the foundation for an 
epistemology of photography, and thereby I will show that theories that attempt to operate 
without transparency in its foundation are unstable. Although Walton remains neutral on 
any claim about the epistemic value of photographs,20 his transparency thesis offers, in my 
view, the best explanation for a distinction between photographs and paintings and that 
distinction has epistemic import. I will use transparency to help explain the epistemic 
difference between photographs and paintings, for as we have begun to see in the previous 
section, this strategy can be quite fruitful not only in distinguishing the kinds of pictures 
but also in highlighting the special province of photography. (In the following chapters, I 
will highlight the differences between them with more detail.) This in turn will help to 
illuminate what warrants our trust in photographs and offer insight on the nature of 
photographic information. 
 
In general, we have some intuitions about the epistemic differences between photographs 
and handmade pictures; most simply put, despite some scepticism that comes with the 
potential for forgery, photographs can give a kind of information that paintings cannot. 
Both kinds of pictures show us things but in very different ways, and by different criteria 
of credibility. Incidentally, I will never deny that paintings and drawings can provide 
evidence too, but of a different sort. For example, a drawing of a crime scene will not 
convince us that the event it depicts actually occurred, but it can be quite useful as a 
diagram of that scene and object relations within it. On the other hand, a genuine 
photograph of that scene can be looked at again and again to gather clues after the fact.  
 
The distinguishing features offered by the transparency thesis help to explain why we trust 
photographs for evidentiary purposes of a certain kind in a way we would not trust 
paintings. The evidence provided by photographs is such that a photograph connects us 
with the objects we see in the same way we are connected to things seen through 
eyeglasses and microscopes and so forth.   
 
                                                
20 Walton 1984: 93, 95; and most explicitly, in the postscript of the 2008 edition of 
“Transparent Photographs”: 113. 
 20 
However, as noted above, many dispute the transparency of photographs. For example, 
Greg Currie, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin claim that photographs fail to carry 
information about our egocentric relation to the objects photographed, otherwise known 
as e-information. When one looks at a photograph of an apple, we have no idea where that 
apple is in relation to us, while when we look through devices like telescopes and 
microscopes, we know where the things we are looking at are in relation to ourselves. 
However, Cohen and Meskin argue that this does not diminish the epistemic value of 
photography but just helps establish it, and this is because seeing also involves the transfer 
of information about the visually accessible properties of an object (v-information) and 
this kind of information is typically only available when e-information is also available. On 
their view, the epistemic value of photographs is then, in part, that photographs are 
spatially agnostic sources of v-information.  
 
On this view, paintings do not reliably provide v-information and that is why we do not 
trust them for factual evidence. This mistrust also partially rests on our attitudes about the 
picture types, that is, people in general trust photograph-type pictures to furnish this kind 
of evidence but not paintings. So, on Cohen and Meskin’s view, photographs are not 
trusted sources of evidence in virtue of being transparent but rather, because they reliably 
offer information about the visually accessible properties of objects.21 Despite being a 
plausible alternative, there is a question as to why e-information is a requirement for 
prostheses or enhancements for seeing, and I will challenge this in Chapter 2. There, I 
offer what I call the defect hypothesis as an explanation for why photographs lack certain 
information. Because they lack e-information, which is usually involved in ordinary vision, 
photographs can only provide a defective sort of vision, but they are nonetheless 
transparent because most instruments of observation lack something from the natural 
range of vision. The defect hypothesis is a precursor to unpacking the technological 
dimension of photographs, which itself is a defining feature of photographic information. 
§4 Photographs, technology and instruments of science 
One significant reason I find the lack of e-information is not to the detriment of 
photographic transparency is that it has been intentionally excluded in the engineering of 
                                                
21 Cohen and Meskin 2004, 2008. 
 21 
cameras. When a device is engineered, there is a process of discrimination that decides 
what privileged set of information is to be prioritized, and the other information is done 
away with. This applies to most transparent instruments (though not of their naturally 
occurring counterparts), and would thus apply to photographic pictures in virtue of their 
coming from cameras. Engineering protocol partially defines the epistemic value of 
photographs for there it is decided what information photographs will furnish and what is 
to be expended to highlight the photograph’s virtues. And in contrast, handmade pictures 
are not subject to this limitation. This is not only a strong reply to why photographs don’t 
bear e-information – as not only are their limits set by the cameras that produce them, but 
more significantly, the photograph's virtues depend on those limits– but it adds another 
dimension to the province of photographic information. This tells us what the scope is and 
why. 
 
Patrick Maynard can be credited with making a substantial contribution to analysing the 
technological dimension of photographs in his book, The Engine of Visualization.22 He placed 
special emphasis on the epistemic salience of a photograph in its being able to provide 
information by facilitating both depiction and detection, in a relation where depiction can 
be to the benefit of detection. This is special because most handmade pictures tend to offer 
the former to the detriment of the latter, and most scientific instruments tend to the 
opposite exclusion. Though I will not be attending to Maynard in particular in Chapter 3, 
I do owe that analysis to his findings, and while not directly connected, I believe the 
distinctions I offer at the end are complimentary to his.  
 
For technological instruments and devices, there are conventions in place that govern the 
appropriate design and production practices. In N.P. Suh’s Axiomatic Design, he describes 
technological design as motivated by an idealized product, that is, devices that will 
function with efficiency and grace. He describes the design process as a three-stage 
protocol. In the first stage, a potential device is considered with respect to its functional 
requirements. That is analysed according to the needs of a customer (hypothetical or 
actual) in order to determine what the thing must do to meet those needs. This defines the 
task of making that device, creates the parameters of its functions, and creates a best-fit 
scenario. Secondly, these functional requirements are translated into specifications for the 
                                                
22 Maynard 1997. 
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design of that device in order to define the exact physical components and their 
interaction. At this stage, decisions are made about what information is essential and what 
information needs to be done away with in order to make the device function at its best. 
Some information is at cross-purposes with the best-fit scenario, and that information must 
be eliminated. This is followed by the third and final stage of blueprinting, which more or 
less gives the recipe for making the device by offering a list of instructions and schematics 
for producing and reproducing the device.23 As a result of such a protocol, we can expect 
that instruments of observation are designed to offer a specific information set, and that set 
is exclusive.  
 
Given that technological devices have undergone such a systematized route to production, 
and cameras are under the wing of engineering, an epistemology of photography should be 
considerate of that connection. In evaluating what is special about photographic pictures, 
one has to remember the fact that they are borne from cameras and that the photographic 
image is directly dependent on that camera. The design stage in the camera’s engineering 
specifies what information is to be furnished and which information is expendable for the 
device to function optimally. Thereby, the camera offers a privileged set of information, –
information further made available by the photographic image it produces– and thus it 
should not be surprising that the photograph’s range of information does not include all 
information normally available to seeing. E-information is one example of information that 
would undermine the virtues of photographs: since e-information requires a real-time 
object-seeing relation, it is at cross-purposes with the photograph’s ability to capture a 
moment in time to be looked at later. 
 
It is true that other kinds of pictures are the products of technology, but not all have such 
a direct limit placed on them by the technology. There may be an intuition to claim that 
handmade pictures like paintings are also technological, though that technology might be 
of an old variety. However, while the materials may be the products of technology or a 
technology in their own right, a technological device neither directly nor necessarily 
produces a painted image. The paintings and drawings that are made with the technology 
of paints and charcoal require additional components to complete the image-making 
                                                
23 Suh 2001: 11. 
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process. They require an agent of some kind to generate the image using the technology of 
paints, boards, brushes, etc. At best, they are indirectly made from these technologies. 
 
How we come to know by a variety of instruments and devices is partially determined by 
their functions and uses but also, how they come to be made. After all, the development of 
our instruments is quite often related to what we want to know more about. In Chapter 3, 
I will examine this dimension of photography by considering them alongside scientific 
devices like telescopes, microscopes, etc., on the one hand, while drawing contrast to 
scientific pictures like schematics, maps, and such, on the other.  
 
There I will also describe a view that challenges the objectivity of scientific devices 
because of the technological protocol they undergo: Bas van Fraassen’s book Scientific 
Representations argues that scientific tools are all representational devices.24 After all, if 
microscopes and telescopes are designed to look at specific things, and those designs are 
based on theories, which initially depend on beliefs, then how can any of these instruments 
be belief-independent? At first glance, this will appear to contend with transparency and 
yet, attending to this kind of analysis is crucial for understanding why we trust some 
representations (in van Fraassen, a more broadly construed sense of the word) over 
others. The answer is once again found in the principles of transparency, with the help of 
my refit called the hallucination test. 
§5 Are photographs still reliable with digitals around? 
In Chapter 4, we will look more closely at the problem of digital photographs, which 
presents their own problems for the epistemology of photography. I believe we generally 
trust photographs. However, considering that we trust photographs on the basis that they 
are more likely to be genuine articles than not, we might find it troubling that the 
widespread use of digital photography, and the easy manipulation of their content, 
threatens these views. Subsequently, that may threaten to undermine the warrant we carry 
over from photographs before Photoshop™. We then have to ask: On what grounds do we 
continue to trust photographs when doctored photographs are so commonplace? 
 
                                                
24 van Fraassen 2008. 
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One strategy is to deny that digital photographs are photographs at all. On W.J. 
Mitchell’s view, digitals are only nominally photographs but actually not photographs at 
all. While they act as photographs do, or rather, perform the same functional role, we will 
over time be able to recognize the vast difference between digital images and traditional 
photographs. This is much like we now recognize the vast difference between automobiles 
and horse drawn carriages, which also have the same function and in previous times, the 
shared terminology.25  
 
However, as mentioned in §2, Gaut suggests the differences between them do not 
distinguish them in kind. Even though some of the differences between traditional 
photographs and digital ones allow more opportunities for manipulation in the latter sort, 
this does not mean that when those opportunities are not taken, that digitals are not 
photographs. Traditional photographs and digital photographs are produced almost the 
same way and as I mentioned in §2, Gaut shows that this is the more relevant comparison: 
The crucial difference between a digital camera and a traditional camera is the 
replacement of a photochemical film with an electronic sensor […]; the lenses, 
optical systems, shutter mechanisms, and so on, can be identical. Given the 
similarity of generative methods, it is implausible to claim that one is a photograph 
and the other not.26  
 
While Gaut does not maintain that photographs must come from cameras,27 I maintain the 
camera-borne picture definition, and so, pictures borne from digital cameras are 
photographs. But they still pose an epistemic problem for the general category of 
photographs. As Barbara Savedoff has argued, the ease of manipulation of digital 
photographs threatens to undermine the trustworthiness of photographs in general.28 
However, knowledge of the fact that digital images are often manipulated does little harm 
to our general trust in them perhaps because even traditional photographs can be 
manipulated.29 
                                                
25 Mitchell 1992. 
26 Gaut 2010: 48. 
27 Gaut offers the example of photograms, in 2010: 28; and in conversation. 
28 Savedoff 1997, 2008. 
29 Gaut 2010: 67-71. 
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However, I do think it is important to offer a distinction between digital photographs and 
digital paintings so as to demarcate which images are transparent and which are opaque. 
Not all digital images come from cameras, and thus, on my view those images are not 
photographs. We might then want to say that some digital photographs are actually digital 
paintings in disguise, so the line between a photograph and painting is now unclear. But 
some analogue photographs are fakes too, using techniques to falsify the content somehow.  
 
The problem is in pinpointing when the transformation of a picture from photograph to 
painting has happened. This difficulty is made apparent when trying to come up with a 
principle for which modifications are acceptable and which not. The problem with offering 
the strictest principle –i.e., that once a digital photograph has been doctored in any way it 
becomes a digital painting– is that some manipulation is relatively benign. For example, 
using a common feature like red-eye reduction does not then render the image into a 
digital painting, does it? That seems to be too strong, and perhaps misses the problem. 
There are certainly limits to what is acceptable to modify of a photograph, digital or 
analogue. The problem that digital photography leaves for us then is where to draw this 
very line between digital photographs and digital paintings. I will not provide a full theory 
but I will classify these modifications in Chapter 4 and then offer a suggestion for how to 
go about making a demarcation. 
§6 Sceptical hypotheses and a comparison with testimony 
I mentioned earlier that paintings are subject to sceptical hypotheses that photographs are 
not. In Chapter 5, I will explore that further in order to highlight a fundamental difference 
between them, that is at least an epistemic distinction. I will offer an analysis of different 
kinds of belief sources to highlight different kinds of evidence, and from that draw a 
comparison between testimonial-based beliefs and experience-based beliefs. In this 
analysis, handmade pictures will be likened with testimony because both share a necessary 
feature of belief dependence.  
 
However, photographs are not belief-dependent and are thereby not subject to the same 
sceptical problems as testimonial artefacts.  When we look at what kind of scepticism 
applies to a photograph, we will see that it is the same as that which applies to perception. 
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The beliefs formed by way of photographs are thereby susceptible to scepticism about 
perception. Since the kind of sceptical hypothesis that photographs are susceptible to 
differs from that of handmade pictures, we have good reason to consider photographs a 
different kind of belief source altogether. The evidentiary role of photographs then is not 
that it tells us something about the world or represents some fact of the matter, but rather, 
their epistemic value lies in their provision of perceptual knowledge.  
§7 Thesis contributions 
A note about strategy: I will constantly compare photographs to handmade pictures on one 
hand, and to a lesser extent, other transparent instruments on the other hand. As we have 
begun to see, paintings are vulnerable to representing the beliefs of their makers and 
photographs are not. Photographs cannot reproduce the contents of hallucinations or 
misperceptions, distinguishing them from handmade pictures as well as from other kinds 
of pictures that may not preserve similarity, like schematics.  
 
Meanwhile, some tools, while independent of beliefs, represent the information they 
provide without preserving similarity relations: for example, thermometers offer a 
measurement of temperature that fluctuates according to temperature changes, but we 
don’t literally see temperature through thermometers. Thus, they represent temperature in 
a way that does not preserve similarity. Photographs maintain similarity relations to their 
objects. 
 
The theory that results from my research is as follows: Photographs are transparent and 
thereby furnish perceptual information indirectly, like other lens based devices including 
microscopes and telescopes. As they offer perceptual information, the kind of knowledge 
they offer is experiential knowledge, unlike other kinds of pictures, which offer depictions 
equivalent to testimony. And further still, while they share the feature of transparency 
with other instruments of observation, photographs stand apart from these devices in their 
being externalized pictures, –that is to say, that the photographic image is detached from 
the camera. This is part of why photographs are special, and why they are the focus of this 
thesis. 
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Note: One might wonder why I have not designated a section to the aesthetic questions I 
offered earlier. I feel that a chapter on the aesthetics of photography would detract 
attention from my main project and cause some confusion. But it is an important domain in 
the philosophy of photography so, as a compromise, I offer some discussion in an 
Afterword of how my findings might work with aesthetic theories of photography.   
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TRANSPARENT PHOTOGRAPHS 
Walton’s Thesis, Cons & Pros 
 
Walton is to be credited for the thesis that photographs are transparent, which is to say, that 
we literally see the objects of a photograph through photographic pictures.30 A preliminary 
undertaking of this chapter is to give a detailed account of what this really means. Then, in 
the latter half we will look at some criticisms and respective theories, namely, those offered 
by Berys Gaut, Gregory Currie, and Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin. I will audit how 
they fail and succeed, handling the issues raised for the transparency thesis in this chapter, 
and in Chapter 2, handle the responses pertaining more specifically to the epistemology of 
photography.  
 
§1 The Transparency thesis 
Transparency applies to a wide range of instruments that we use to see the world. It is 
helpful to note from the outset that ultimately, the main comparison is not between 
photographs and ordinary seeing, but rather in the photograph’s alignment with a certain 
class of instruments. The claim is thus, that we see through photographs in the same way 
we see ourselves through mirrors, see clearer through eyeglasses, see paramecia through 
microscopes, see the stars through telescopes, and so on.31  
 
Now, there are many devices that come between our eyes and the objects we see, and not 
all of them are transparent. Opaque instruments, in contrast to transparent ones, can be 
said to interrupt vision rather than enhance it. For example, when we look at a drawing of 
the Eiffel Tower, we see a representation of the tower by an illustrator. We do not see the 
tower itself through the drawing the way we would see the Eiffel Tower, say, through the 
window of a café on the Champs Élysées. The drawing depends on the perception of the 
                                                
30 Walton 1984: 251. 
31 Walton 1984: 252. 
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artist, as it comes to exist through his representation of his visual experiences. Thus, the 
drawing acts as an interruption in the causal chain between object drawn and our eyes. On 
the other hand, a thermometer does not represent the perceptions of others but is not 
transparent either. Thermometers fail to exhibit a similarity with temperature itself. We 
see a representation of a measurement of temperature, but we do not see temperature itself 
through a thermometer.  The drawing and thermometer examples highlight two 
fundamental features of object seeing that the transparency thesis is picks out. 
 
Walton describes a kind of causal theory of perception: “to see something is to have visual 
experiences which are caused, in a certain manner, by what is seen.” 32 That “certain 
manner” is explained to be a counterfactual dependence on the object of sight that is both 
1) belief-independent and 2) similarity preserving. These are the characteristics missing 
from the drawing of the Champs Élysées and the thermometer, respectively. This 
description is not a provision for a theory of seeing, but it is intended to highlight the 
conditions of ordinary seeing that are important markers for transparent devices. Walton 
is particularly reluctant to claim these conditions are sufficient for seeing as well, while he is 
more favourable to their being necessary features.33 In any case, one should expect 
transparent instruments to obtain both of these conditions, if not perhaps more.  
 
Now, to better understand these conditions. Concerning 1) belief-independence: When we 
see, a counterfactual link is, as it were, formed between the content of our visual 
experience and the objects in the world that act as the cause for that content. We see the 
trees on the horizon because, under normal conditions, there are trees on the horizon to 
see. Had there not been any trees, the visual experience would’ve represented a treeless 
horizon. Of course, there are some abnormal situations where this link isn’t preserved, as 
is the case with hallucinations. However, we can expect that on ordinary occasions normal 
conditions will be in place for seeing.  Furthermore, under normal conditions, seeing those 
trees is a belief-independent affair,  which is to say that no one else’s beliefs have caused 
those trees to appear in our visual experiences.34 
 
                                                
32 Walton 1984: 261. 
33 Walton 1986: 128 fn. 36. 
34 Walton 1984: 263-265. 
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We can better understand the significance of belief independence by looking at one of 
Walton’s thought experiments: Helen is blind but has visual experiences through direct 
stimulation of her brain, which is managed by a neurosurgeon. However, the surgeon 
stimulates the neurons according to his own visual experiences, which means that her 
visual experiences correspond to what the surgeon sees, or rather, what he believes he sees. 
As such, her visual experiences are vulnerable to his mistaken beliefs: if the surgeon 
misperceives or hallucinates something, the content of the hallucination would be in 
Helen’s experience. 35   
 
We can imagine that if the surgeon has taken psychedelic drugs and sees a gnome climbing 
onto his shoulder, Helen’s visual experiences will correspond.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Blind Helen, Ines. de Asis, Feb 2015.  
                                                
35 Walton 1984: 265. 
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In such instances, Helen may have a visual experience that represents those hallucinations, 
but she cannot be said to see gnomes on her shoulder any more than the surgeon does (and 
he does not). This system of seeing is unreliable. However, if Helen’s visual experiences 
were caused by a process that did not depend on the beliefs of others, –such as, an 
unmanned elaborate machine or a prosthetic eye– then she could genuinely be seeing.  
 
The belief independence criterion has caused a great deal of confusion because belief itself 
is not the clearest concept, and ‘belief’ here can actually apply to a variety of intentional 
states. Further still, depending on one’s theoretical commitments, not all perceptual events 
require an intentional state. I believe Walton’s expression of “belief independence” is a 
truncation of a longer description, perhaps like, ‘independent of a range of intentional 
states, characterised by beliefs about what one has seen but not limited to proper beliefs’ 
and so on. This includes those that some might call proto-beliefs.36 I also believe that trying 
to impose or use a concocted definition of belief yields unnecessarily complicated results so 
instead, I suggest we find an equivalent expression of the criterion.  
 
Bearing in mind the hallucination illustration that Walton offers to differentiate 
transparent and opaque pictures, one can take note of the following: Opaque devices can 
represent the surgeon’s hallucinations, even if they do not normally do so; and transparent 
ones cannot, even if one wants them to. Thus, I suggest that what one should really ask of 
a device is whether the hallucinations of others can be represented by it.  
 
Call this the hallucination test:  
For any candidate instrument of observation, if the device’s process is vulnerable 
to representing hallucinations (of others), then it counterfactually  
depends on at least proto-beliefs, if not explicitly representing any number from a 
range of intentional states.  
 
Belief dependence then amounts to being able to represent the content of hallucinations. 
Conversely, one can ascertain whether a candidate device is invulnerable to representing 
                                                
36 Walton 1984: 264. 
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hallucinatory experiences of others. A device that cannot represent the hallucinations of 
others is thus belief independent.  
 
In Image and Mind, Gregory Currie offers the following case as a counterexample to 
Walton’s thesis: suppose that Blind Helen’s surgeon was not any ordinary surgeon but 
godlike. Similarly, imagine a world like that of Malebranche where God mediates 
everything we perceive: Since one sees nonetheless in Malebranchia, doesn’t this 
undermine the belief-independence criterion for perception? Currie suggests that belief-
independence is not necessary for seeing after all. 37 However, this example is problematic. 
Because gods don’t have beliefs (they simply know everything), seeing through a god’s 
eyes would not count as belief-dependent seeing. Furthermore, a god would not be subject 
to failing the hallucination test that is tantamount to the belief-independence condition.  
 
We have strong intuitions about the role of external intentional states interfering with our 
senses. This is why thought experiments like Blind Helen and Malebranche’s cosmology 
are so troubling: some major deceptive factor has interfered with the natural order of 
observation, and in the end, with our contact with the truth. The lesson we can gather 
from the Blind Helen experiment, and those like it, is that what other people believe they 
have seen should not factor into what we perceive. Furthermore, this standard of belief 
independence, or hallucination invulnerability, is to be held to devices that are 
intermediary.  And that is precisely Walton’s point: that devices that mediate vision should 
preserve some belief independent counterfactual dependence on the objects seen if it is to 
be considered an enhancement to seeing. Otherwise, we do not see through it. 
 
To illustrate, when we see using bifocals or telescopes, we do not face a problem like Blind 
Helen’s. Furthermore, we don’t deny that we see through eyeglasses, nor does it represent 
the world to us through someone else’s eyes. The content available via these instruments is 
not vulnerable to representing the hallucinations of others. (If we are hallucinating 
ourselves, this is another matter that first hand seeing is also vulnerable to.) In virtue of 
being invulnerable to hallucinatory content, eyeglasses, telescopes and a number of other 
devices, preserve that belief-independent counterfactual link. Thus, these instruments 
meet part of the standard under which they can be said to enhance the repertoire of vision.  
                                                
37 Currie 1995: 62-63.  
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Photographs also preserve this belief-independent counterfactual link to their depicta. 
That is to say, they are not vulnerable to representing hallucinations. In contrast, paintings 
do have this vulnerability. Even paintings that are realistically depicted by the most 
reliable painters are nonetheless vulnerable to representing hallucinations as their mode of 
depiction is causally linked to the beliefs of the painter. Imagine a person who is 
compromised by psychedelic drugs, and this causes him to hallucinate a gnome sitting in a 
tree. If that person were to attempt to document his visual experience by painting it, the 
content of the hallucination could translate into his painting. He believes he sees a gnome, 
he represents what he sees in painting his picture, and his painting thus depicts a gnome in 
the tree. The painting can thus represent the content of his hallucination.  
 
However, if instead he attempted to document that experience with photographs, his 
efforts would not be successful: what he sees, or rather, what he believes he sees, will have 
no bearing on the photograph. Photographs do not bear this necessary correlation to 
photographers' beliefs because their mode of generation is causally linked to depicta in a 
different way. Photographs are causally linked to what lies before the camera. Quite often, 
the photographic content can easily fail to represent the beliefs of the photographer. And, 
more often than is the case with paintings and painters, photographs can be produced 
without a photographer, –e.g., speed cameras on the motorway. Thus, causal links to their 
respective depicta differ significantly for photographs and paintings, and this has to do 
with the way the images counterfactually depend on their depicta.  
 
As we have seen above, the beliefs of painters inform paintings but moreover, paintings 
counterfactually depend on those beliefs. For paintings then, the objects depicted would 
have differed depending on whether they were seen differently by the painter, sourcing the 
counterfactual dependence to the content of the painter’s perception. But photographic 
pictures are not so linked with someone’s perceptual content and are actually rather poor 
at representing it. Instead, the content of a photograph depends on what was there for the 
camera to photograph. For photographs, had the object been different when the 
photograph was taken, the image presented by the photograph would have also differed. 
Photographs can, in effect, bypass the counterfactual dependence on beliefs.  
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Indeed, there are exceptions in either case: It is not normally the case that paintings 
represent hallucinations, nor even that all paintings depend on painters’ beliefs. Normally, 
hallucinations are not a factor in painting but they are nonetheless vulnerable to 
representing them. Also, one can imagine paintings generated by computer, or by machine 
and one can buy a variety of painting-like decorations at Ikea and so on. These types of 
painted pictures are not made by artists, so here belief dependence does not factor in. 
However, such cases are not counterexamples either. Insofar as a painting is of the type 
that represents something in the world by having some connection to its depicta, that 
connection is vulnerable to representing the content of hallucinations. Meanwhile, under 
normal conditions photographs succeed in corresponding to what we see. There may even 
be cases where one takes a photograph while in a state of hallucination and there is a 
correspondence, just by sheer accident. But then the link between depicta and image is 
dubious. Nonetheless, photographs are immune to representing hallucinatory content 
because photographic images do not, and cannot counterfactually depend on hallucinatory 
experiences.  
 
The belief independence of photographs does not mean that a photograph cannot be 
expressive of thoughts, convey aesthetic intentions, or meet the aesthetic goals of 
photographers. On the contrary, this is what is remarkable about photographs that 
succeed in doing so. Capturing those features is difficult, usually taking time to master. 
One cannot expect a photograph to do what one wants in the same way as one can 
manipulate paintings to one’s vision. But as in all good art, some mastery over how to 
manipulate and stretch the parameters of a medium is part of the process, and the most 
impressive artistic photographs are those that can challenge what we know of those limits.  
Photographs can also include information that is in some way dependent on the 
photographer, such as which objects were chosen for the picture, level of light saturation, 
angles of objects, perspective, etc. But a photograph cannot convey that information if it is 
not already there to be photographed, within the range of the camera’s capabilities, or 
within the range of techniques for printing a photograph. Some of those techniques can 
even be used to convey fictions, but that is not the same as being invulnerable to 
hallucinatory content. Yet, more often than not, despite the correlation being an accidental 
one, the photographer’s eyes and the camera both see the same thing. The resulting 
photograph comes out as expected because, after all, the camera has been designed to 
reproduce the sights we see. 
 35 
 
Condition 2) is preservation of similarity. I mentioned thermometers early in this chapter 
to illustrate a kind of device that preserves a belief independent counterfactual link but 
that we nonetheless fail to see through. What is missing in the thermometer is a reasonable 
likeness to temperature. It isn’t the thermometer’s fault that we do not see temperature 
through it, as we could not see temperature in a way that is meaningful for our purposes. 
Thermometers are informative by other means; particularly by acting as a visual 
measurement of the temperature they represent, and to which the measurement function is 
counterfactually linked. It is important though, for enhancements of vision to maintain a 
visual likeness that thermometers do not, hence the second condition of transparency.  
 
Walton illustrates the importance of similarity preservation by distinguishing between 
depictions on the one hand, and descriptions on the other. After all, descriptions can also 
have a belief independent counterfactually dependent link to what they describe. Take 
Walton’s example of a computer-generated description that can accurately and perfectly 
describe all the features of, say, a scene of trees on the horizon. Intuitively, despite being 
belief independent, such descriptions would fail to constitute instances of seeing because, 
while they offer quite a lot to the imagination, the visual information they provide of those 
trees is not given in a visual mode.38 A program that could take the image of a gnome and 
describe it to Helen perfectly may give her visual information about the gnome, but only in 
the way novels do when describing landscapes. The description does not give Helen visual 
information only had visually about the gnome’s visible properties; it does not present her 
with the gnome’s likeness; and ultimately, Helen does not see the gnome by it’s 
description. 
 
Getting information visually about objects can take many forms, including paintings and 
photographs, as well as first-hand seeing. However, these have in common that one must 
see the information about an object to obtain a specific kind of information only available 
to seeing objects. Similarity then, should be understood as not only content specific,  
–because content can vary in kind, can be pictorial or descriptive–  but as a resemblance 
that is based on a common kind of information. In this particular case, the similarity is 
found in a privileged set of sight-specific resemblances to the object.  
                                                
38 Walton 1984: 270. 
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One can further distinguish depictions from descriptions by an appeal to the notion of 
perspective, which is a feature of the former but not the latter. Resemblances between 
pictures and what they depict are distinguished from descriptions of those objects by the 
way pictures offer a resemblance that bears perspectival features. A picture of cake will 
show it to have a round shape made oblong in two dimensions, fluffy frosting texture that 
becomes less detailed in the background, and from one particular angle rather than 
another. Perspective yields the feature of occlusion, that is, only one perspective of an 
object is made available at a time, often occluding the aspects of the object that might be 
available to other perspectives.39 A description of cake cannot offer visual perspective.  
 
Walton describes these strictly visual similarity conditions by comparing the kinds of 
mistakes one can make between depicta. The type of mistakes one makes with 
photographs and other pictures are akin to those mistakes made in seeing. That is because 
the information is given by a similar set of resemblance properties, and similarity between 
the way things look can lead to confusing the two. But that confusion between resembling 
parties involves different sets of resemblance properties for, respectively, depictive and 
descriptive similarities. In read or heard descriptions we easily confuse words like horse 
with hearse, either because they sound similar or appear similar as words. There are visual 
resemblances in how the words appear, and there are auditory resemblances in how the 
words sound. Yet, what these words describe, do not resemble each other. When we see 
horses and hearses, there is never cause for confusion between them because they do not 
look very much alike. Nor would we ever confuse a picture of a horse with a picture of a 
hearse.40 In pictures, as well as in ordinary seeing, horses might be confused with ponies, 
donkeys and mules, rather than hearses. Hearses could be confused with station wagons, 
el Caminos and so on.  
 
Now, it is true that one gets the information in a visual way by reading text, as reading is 
an activity that requires seeing words, but the properties of the things described can be 
offered in a variety of modes. There is clearly a kind of visual resemblance between the 
                                                
39 Occlusion from Hyman 2000 and 1992; also, perspective from Hyman 1992; Lopes 1996: 
118; Van Fraassen 2008: 36-39.  
40 Walton 1984: 270-272. 
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text horses and hearses, especially when they are in the same font. However, this comes from 
another set of resemblance relations that are not perspectival.41  
 
§1.3 What transparency does not claim 
It is now important to mention that photographic transparency does not amount to 
synonymy with any of the following claims, which I take one by one:  
 
1) agent-free  
2) aesthetic deficit  
3) paragon accuracy  
4) authenticity 
5) epistemic superiority to handmade pictures 
 
1) Belief independence in photographs is not equivalent to being free of an agent. People 
take photographs, and many people use cameras on a daily basis. There is no denial of the 
fact that photographers decide how to frame the photograph, when to take the picture, 
how to adjust certain aspects of the image, how to crop it, and a number of other things.  
When photographers are involved in the making of photographs, they make decisions that 
inform the final product, even if the limitations of this differ significantly from the 
limitations in making paintings, and this is compatible with the transparency thesis.42 
Agency can take on different routes and one should be considerate of the distinction 
between at least two kinds of agency. A painter's agency in the creation of art is necessary 
to the painting’s existence. Without her experiences, and her active use of techniques to 
transpose the experiences into a picture, the painting cannot represent something in the 
world. The painter’s agency in the method of production is relative to her beliefs. On the 
other hand, there is a kind of agency that does not depend on the beliefs of that agent, 
even though his presence may be integral to whatever the project is. Scott Walden’s paper 
“Objectivity in Philosophy” makes this distinction specific to philosophy of photography. 
                                                
41 There may be reason to consider text/font art to be an exception to this but I leave this 
aside for another project.  
42 Walton 1984: 261-262. 
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He explains that mental states involved in photographs are belief neutral or objective, as 
opposed to belief dependent.43 While the production of a photograph is a belief neutral 
causal affair, agents are nonetheless involved in making photographs. Yet, while a 
photographer is an agent of picture making, his experiences are not imperative to 
producing a photograph of something in the world. His perspective and compositional 
choices will inevitably inform the outcome of the photograph but it remains relatively 
neutral to his beliefs, in that, it cannot represent his hallucinations.  
 
2) Transparency is also far from synonymous with any claim about the aesthetic deficit of 
photographs. Photographic transparency does not preclude photographs from being 
genuine candidates for artworks, and should not be confused with a challenge put forth by 
Roger Scruton in his article ‘‘Photography and Representation.” The aesthetics of 
photography can source one of its major problems to Scruton’s article in which he argues 
that photographs do not meet the criteria required for being a representational art. This is 
partially because, as he argues, photographs can only present objects to be looked at, in 
virtue of having a merely causal relation to those objects. Thereby, they are not 
representational for being representational involves an intentional relation to the objects 
depicted. Consequently, attributing aesthetic properties to photographs actually amounts 
to evaluating the objects they present and not any feature of the photograph itself. 
Photographs qua photographs cannot in their own right be aesthetic objects.44 
 
The Scruton-like scepticism about the aesthetic possibility of photographs, that is, that 
photographs lack the ability to express thoughts in virtue of their belief independent 
production, does not necessarily apply. There are many ways for photographers to be 
involved in the outcome of their photographs that can result in expressive photographs, 
some of which I listed above regarding agency. These ways of being involved with the final 
outcome suffice to give photographers ample opportunities to make creative and artistic 
decisions so, there is no lack of choices for a photographer to execute in order to create an 
artwork through photography, nor lack of control of the device as an aesthetic medium.45 
In short, there are many things a photographer can do to make art by photographs and 
                                                
43 Walden 2005. 
44 Scruton 1981: §8.  
45 More on aesthetics and transparency in Lopes 2003. 
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this is compatible with transparency. (Note: a more extensive discussion of the aesthetics 
of photography is in the Afterword of this thesis.) 
 
3) It seems possible to misconstrue the criterion of similarity preservation as in equivalent 
to accuracy. However, there is also no claim being made about the accuracy of a 
photograph when providing information about objects. Of course they could be especially 
accurate, but there really needn’t be such an expectation for photographs because ordinary 
seeing is often inaccurate, and so are other transparent devices. In any case, whether such 
a standard can be met by photographs or not, and how they might achieve such paragon 
accuracy, is not to be confused with the claims of transparency.46 Photographs need only 
be as relatively accurate as ordinary seeing, however that may be.  
 
4) The authenticity of a photograph is naturally a cause for doubt in a world where 
counterfeits exist. Yet, it can be said that if a photographic picture is not authentic, then it 
is not expected to meet the conditions of transparency. This is not only because its 
generation might be ambiguous (making it difficult to determine whether it is transparent, 
what its epistemic value is and so on) but mostly this is because it isn’t even a photograph. 
We expect that genuine photographs are normally generated under certain conditions that 
help to secure the objective value they preserve, and that is how they can be held to the 
conditions of transparency.  
 
Now, on the other hand, the problem of telling apart the genuine photographs from their 
fake counterparts is another matter. Knowledge of that fact about a great many things is 
often unavailable to us, but it should be said that we cannot expect assurances of this kind 
in ordinary seeing either. Consider, for example, the thought experiment about False 
Barns: When we see barns in the distance, we have good reason to believe there are barns 
before us but as it turns out, we cannot be sure whether we are seeing genuine barns or 
barns façades.47 Deceptions like these can occur in ordinary seeing and also through 
transparent devices, so there is no expectation that photographs be immune to them. 
 
                                                
46 Walton 1984: 258, 266; and 2008: 92-95. 
47 Credited to Carl Ginet in Alvin Goldman 1976. 
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There is another important distinction to make about the epistemic value of photographs, 
which is after all the focus of my thesis. One will not find a necessary transition from the 
transparency thesis to a claim about 5) the epistemic superiority of photographs over 
hand-made pictures. Walton’s view on the matter is somewhat agnostic: while the 
transparency claim is synonymous with saying photographs are like seeing through a 
prosthesis, and seeing is a source of knowledge, he does not make any claims about the 
value of photographic information in relation to other kinds of pictures. He holds, –and I 
agree with this, – that other pictures can furnish information that perhaps photographs 
cannot.48 One can hand-draw a picture of a suspect based on a description provided by the 
victim resulting in a depiction that resembles them or provide a diagram for how to 
assemble a piece of furniture. These sorts of functions are difficult to achieve with 
photographs.  
 
However, I do wish to provide a further exploration and evaluation of this difference in 
epistemic value between photographs and paintings. While a defence of the claim that 
photographs are genuine prostheses for seeing does, in my view, help establish what kind 
of information they provide, I do not mean to say their epistemic value is superior to 
paintings by virtue of that. Like Walton, I will make no claim about epistemic superiority 
in photographic pictures. However, unlike Walton, I do wish to offer something of the 
special province of photographic information. I think handmade pictures are invaluable in 
ways that photographs are not, and vice versa, and that if we attend to their respective 
specialties, this will illuminate on what differentiates them in kind. In Chapter 5, I will 
provide a distinction between information carried by photographs in contrast to that had 
by hand-made pictures and will ultimately provide for an analysis of the difference in 
epistemic values between them because of differences in their appropriate sceptical 
hypotheses.   
§2 Resistance to transparency 
This section will begin to reply to some of the major criticisms of transparency. A 
substantial portion of issues against transparency have developed from the 
counterexamples initially suggested by Gregory Currie. Generally speaking, Currie argues 
                                                
48 Walton 1984: 259; and 2008: 113. 
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that transparency is too broad, citing a number of conditions that are normally available to 
seeing, which are absent in the transparency account, –in particular, our being present to 
the objects we see so that we can understand our relationship to them in space is an 
important feature of seeing neglected by the transparency account.49 I will examine this 
claim in §2.1. Aside from the egospatial condition, Gregory Currie and Berys Gaut both 
provide other problem cases for transparency. These cases involve moulds and replicas of 
objects that maintain the belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual link 
but nonetheless, do not put us in perceptual contact with the original object. Instead, we 
have a sort of type identical perceptual experience with the object of sight. We will look at 
this more closely in §2.2. Gaut also offers an optical theory as an alternative to 
transparency: he argues that an account of seeing should attend to the essential 
involvement of light rays, and for transparent devices, the same light rays will make the 
journey between objects and eyes. But this link is not preserved in photographs and so 
photographs are opaque. In §2.3, we will look at this proposal alongside a parallel account 
of sound waves. Finally, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin offer a revised version of 
Currie’s proviso that we should be able to track where we stand in relation to the objects 
we see. They instead argue that tracking is not required per se, but that egocentric spatial 
information should be available in devices for seeing. 50  We will look at whether this 
amendment salvages the condition in §2.4. (Since this condition ultimately informs Cohen 
and Meskin’s theory on the epistemology of photography, I will pay special attention to 
their view in the next chapter.)  
§2.1 Currie’s criticisms and the function of seeing  
Gregory Currie offers multiple critical points in Chapter 2 of his book Image and Mind. We 
have already addressed one, namely, the Malebranche counterexample in §1 of this 
chapter. In this section we will begin to address his account of the function of seeing, to be 
continued in the next chapter.  
 
When we look at photographs, a fact is clear: we often do not know where the objects 
photographed are now, and often would not be able to trace their location in relation to 
                                                
49 Currie 1995: Ch. 2. 
50 Currie 1991: Ch. 2; Gaut 2019: 91-92; Cohen and Meskin 2004.  
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where we are. So why must one be present to the objects we see? Well, for one, not being 
present to the objects of photographs means we cannot trace where they are in time or in 
space, and this is something one can do with other transparent devices. We can tell where 
the paramecium is when we look through a microscope, where the constellation is when 
we look through a telescope and so forth. The photographic image doesn’t offer such 
direction and may picture someone who no longer exists or is impossible to locate. In fact, 
Walton did mention something about photographs putting one in contact with long-gone 
relatives, didn’t he?51 
 
Currie argues that our presentness to the object is a necessary requirement because this 
contributes to another condition of visual perception, particularly being able to track the 
objects we see in relation to where we are. In ordinary seeing, what we see is often 
traceable in relation to ourselves. If we see a carnation, we can draw an imaginary line 
between our eyes and the flower. How we move around that flower will change that line 
and change its place in our field of vision. For example, if one first looks at the carnation in 
front of one and then turns one’s head 90 degrees to the right, the carnation will appear in 
the leftmost perimeter of one’s field of vision. This egocentric spatial tracking is not 
possible with photographs.52 I want to highlight that Currie’s analysis is to be understood 
as a doxastic requirement –that is, that one can make a judgment about the location of that 
object relative to oneself.53 We will be looking at a nondoxastic version in §2.4. 
 
Additionally, Currie insists that seeing not only allows us to track an object egocentrically 
but this tracking principle is an operation of the function of seeing as the fact that “seeing 
provides us with egocentric information [which] is connected to the fact that seeing is 
perspectival.”54 Now, this particular account of function is to be understood in terms of the 
biological theory that the proper function of a thing is what it is supposed to do, and when 
it cannot do this, is malfunctioning. Furthermore, on this account of function one can 
determine if a trait is necessary to the function of something according to whether it would 
continue to exist without the trait. One can immediately see why Currie thinks tracking e-
                                                
51 Walton 1984: 252. 
52 Currie 1991: §4. 
53 From Cohen and Meskin 2004. 
54 Currie 1995: 53. 
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information to objects is crucial –our being able to judge the location of objects 
egocentrically has its biological benefits. Knowing where things are and how to navigate 
with respect to our field of vision helps us avoid oncoming traffic, falling objects and 
tripping over cables.55  
 
Currie thus stipulates that e-information tracking is the function of seeing, and that its 
absence must mean a malfunction of seeing. It is thereby, on his view, a necessary 
condition for seeing. And as a necessary condition for seeing first hand, one must then 
require it of seeing second-hand. Since it is not possible to track one’s egocentric spatial 
relation to objects in photographs, we do not see through them. Mirrors, eyeglasses and 
telescopes allow us to see objects because the objects are present to us when we see them, 
but photographs do not allow us to track the objects photographed.56 Photographs are just 
another sort of representation of those objects and as representations, Currie contends, 
photographs cannot be considered transparent.57 
 
However, it is clear that photographs are different from paintings and other handmade 
pictures, and Currie explains their difference to be that photographs are natural 
representations, whereas hand-made pictures are intentional representations. Photographs are 
natural representations in the sense that they represent what is there to photograph and do 
not depend on human intervention (even though photographers are often involved in the 
process), whereas hand-made pictures depend on the intentional states of painters and 
illustrators in order for their content to come to fruition. Nonetheless, Currie explains that 
representations in general do not give perceptual access to the objects they represent and 
that thereby photographs are not transparent. 58 However, though Currie’s analysis of 
what kind of representation photographs are is an interesting one, Walton suggests that 
while the account successfully distinguishes photographs from paintings and the like, there 
is no reason why the schism Currie presents in distinguishing intentional from natural 
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57 Currie 1991: 27.  
58 Currie 1995: 55. 
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representations, cannot amount to the same distinction offered by the transparency thesis. 
Walton explains that he never denies that photographs are representations of some kind.59  
 
Walton also provides a number of counterexamples to show that Currie’s account is too 
demanding. For one, if the presence of an object were really necessary to seeing, we would 
not see stars –which have often long ceased to exist when we are looking at them and 
thereby cannot be said to be present.60 Additionally, it is not difficult to generate cases 
where tracking objects is difficult or impossible in ordinary seeing and in uncontroversial 
examples of enhanced seeing. For one, take Walton’s example that, when faced with an 
elaborate series of mirrors reflecting a carnation, one cannot easily track the carnation's 
relation to oneself. Mirrors can easily be arranged to confound the tracking function and 
since it becomes difficult or even impossible to track our location to the carnation, Currie 
would have to bite the bullet and claim we do not see the carnation in the reflection. 61 
 
I want to point out that Currie is also committed to the claim that disabled tracking in 
ordinary hearing amounts to not hearing. What is true of seeing per Currie’s argument 
would have to be true of hearing because his function principle applies to hearing as well. 
But there are many occasions where tracking one’s location relative to what we hear is 
difficult. For example, we would not hear the multitude of honking horns of New York 
City traffic because we could not determine where the sounds were coming from. We also 
lose track of where airplanes are in the sky, where low hisses are coming from and so 
forth. In general, we would not hear when sounds are too loud or too many. Currie does 
not want to say we track objects in any trivial sense, –e.g., that with the mirrors and traffic 
cases one can state the carnation and honking is somewhere– so, making a judgment of a 
very general location is not sufficient for seeing and hearing. 
 
There is something appealing about describing the function of a sense organ in terms of 
how it benefits the body, but it is not enough to make this condition a necessary one? First 
of all, the story of how a function is determined for an organ to survive is a different one 
from what we are trying to establish. We are trying to understand how an artificial device 
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60 Walton 1984: 252; Currie 1995: 57. 
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works. The claim that the eyes would not exist without being able to track what we see is 
different from an analysis of various artificial devices that may not need to preserve all 
conditions of natural seeing. This may explain why some species had certain physiognomic 
virtues, but not why some devices carry x information and not y. The Currie version also 
imposes the tracking feature as the main purpose our sense of sight, suggesting that we 
would not exist without this feature in operation.62 However, babies and toddlers, as well 
as the vast animal kingdom share the ability to see and yet, lack the cognitive function of 
tracking objects egocentrically, not for lack of optical ability when that applies, but 
because of an unsophisticated sense of ego.  
 
Since there are many animals that can be said to see without making a judgement about 
the location of the objects in relation to themselves, tracking may well be only a function of 
seeing without being the function of seeing. Additionally, the entailment relation Currie 
must postulate for his theory –that is, that necessity is posited by function– is not 
explained. Seeing could amount to a cluster concept in which there are many functions, 
none of which are individually necessary. In short, Currie is right to highlight the regular 
attendance of e-information but his view faces a lot of problems. In the next chapter, I will 
give a more substantial criticism about his function thesis.  
§2.2 A tale of two clocks, et al 
Currie does offer another troubling counterexample that, along with some variations 
offered by Berys Gaut, generates another kind of problem for transparency. Walton 
himself brings this problem to the table when in a footnote he mentions that fossils might 
be considered transparent. Fossils after all, preserve similarity to the critters imprinted on 
them and uphold a belief independent counterfactual dependent link. So, when we look at 
a fossil it is like looking through the stone to the critter. But in the fossil case he is willing 
to accept that, when we look at fossils, we have something like a causal presence to the 
creature.63 However, I find that this case becomes the prototype for a number of similarly 
difficult counterexamples that can perhaps be avoided. In this section, we will look at some 
                                                
62 Currie 1995: 65-66.  
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of the cases inspired by the fossil problem and then I will offer a brief suggestion that will 
be expanded on in Chapter 3.  
 
One of the problem cases is that offered by Currie. To illustrate that transparency is too 
broad, Currie shows how, based on the criteria outlined by transparency, one must accept 
the following as transparent: Imagine two identical clocks where clock A directly feeds the 
time to clock B so that they are always telling the same time. Since clock B is identical to 
clock A and because it has a belief independent counterfactual dependence on A, Walton 
would have to claim that one sees clock A through clock B.64  
 
Walton’s reply is that the link is not counterfactually rich enough because only some 
features of clock A are shared with clock B.65 However, other cases that provide a richer 
counterfactual link can easily be generated. But the two clock case shares in common with 
the fossil case, the appearance of meeting the conditions of transparency while clearly 
being an instance of something else –seeing a replica or mould of some object.  
 
And, Berys Gaut offers two more of such cases that are counterfactually richer than 
Currie’s: the first example points out the replicas of Trajan’s Column at the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, London, at the University of Zurich, in Bucharest and elsewhere. In this 
case, the original column was cast in plaster for identical reproductions to displayed at 
different locations without having to remove the original. Since they were cast in this way, 
they were produced in a belief independent and similarity-preserving manner. They 
counterfactually depend on the original in Rome, and look identical to it, so by the 
principles of transparency, we see the original column when we look at the replica.66  
 
In Gaut’s second case he describes seeing a band of robot gorillas that are modelled after, 
and also electronically programmed to display the behaviour of, a band of real gorillas a 
mile away. Individuals from the robot group make the same noises and gestures as their 
real counterparts and also interact with each other in behaviour that is identical and 
isomorphic to the real group. Again, as these preserve the belief independent and 
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65 Walton 1997: n. 47. 
66 Gaut 2010: 89. 
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similarity-preserving counterfactual link to the original gorillas, we must see through the 
robot band.67  
 
One should automatically have reservations about considering these cases as instances of 
transparency because, for example, even identical twins that are wired to behave the same 
in two different rooms is clearly a case of seeing a type identical situation rather than 
seeing twin 1 through twin 2. Nor do we see Harpo Marx when Lucille Ball dresses as him 
and imitates his every move. But transparency does not appear to make provisions for the 
replica problem and so that is what needs to be amended here.   
 
First we must note that in all these cases we have a twinning problem: the clocks, fossils 
and plaster casts are moulds of their originals and the robot gorillas are replicas of the real 
gorillas a mile away so, in all these cases, original things are replicated with identical twins 
or more. What we in the end see is a replica of some object x, that could be called x1 but it 
is not x itself. One must first ask about the counterfactual link that twinned objects share 
that is meant to be the same kind specified by the transparency thesis.  
 
However, replicas have already taken this extra step. By being identical reproductions of 
their originals, replicas literally add to the numbers of the objects sharing type identity 
with the original. They produce the original again (or, in the case of biological twins, are 
issued from the same cause). Yet, when we look at twins and the like, we would be 
reluctant to say that we see twin A when looking at twin B even if one twin’s behaviour 
was counterfactually linked to the other. Furthermore, it is part of the concept of a replica 
that one is necessarily not seeing its original when looking at a replication of it; that is, to 
see a replica is to see one among a number of type identical objects and not any others of 
that type. One does not see x by seeing a type-identical object x1, but only sees x1. 
Transparency makes a different claim: we see that particular object x, through a 
transparent device, and not a duplicate of that object as no object is being replicated.  
 
Photographs are tricky. They are not replicas of the objects we see through them for there 
are clear differences between an object and the photographic paper that bears its image –
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e.g., the object is three-dimensional but the photograph of it is two-dimensional. 
Photographs make no pretence to be those objects either. It is furthermore unclear what 
photographs reproduce, if anything. It doesn’t reproduce the sense data of the object or we 
wouldn’t be able to tell them apart. Stanley Cavell has remarked that, “the objects are too 
close to their sights to give them up for reproducing.” One would have to reproduce the 
object itself to reproduce the sight of it, as it were.68  
 
But despite these distinctions, the replicas and moulds seem to meet the conditions for 
transparency. So it seems clear that for these purposes Walton’s conditions need to specify 
the particular identity rather than a more general one so that one can say that, in looking 
through photographs, one has perceptual access to some specific object x and not just any 
object that looks like it. One might also argue that the causal link is different because the 
only object that we are counterfactually linked to is the replica, which in turn is linked to 
the original, but that this second link is not necessarily a transparent one. I will not 
attempt to refine that view here. Finally, another strategy is to reanalyse transparency in a 
manner that attends to the fact that transparent devices are supposed to do what eyes do, 
that is, provide a kind of prosthesis for seeing. Cameras are supposed to do this too, but it 
is not the case that moulding and replicating has a process that simulates vision for they 
instead simulate instances of seeing by replicating objects that cause those visual 
experiences.  
 
Another strategy for the fossil problem is to attend to the technological dimension of 
photographs as the distinguishing feature, and as something it shares with other 
transparent devices. The fact that photographs come from cameras, which are made 
according to a design specification like microscopes and telescopes, is an important factor 
in its identity and will require some attention (in Chapter 3).  
§2.3 Gaut and light waves 
Another problem for transparency can be found in Berys Gaut’s optical view. Gaut 
characterizes transparency as a challenge to define seeing, and particularly seeing through 
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devices in a way that can handle Walton’s slippery slope.69 For example, if one accepts that 
one sees through eyeglasses, mirrors, and microscopes, what kind of principle can act as 
the brake between these non controversial devices and devices like photographs or even 
more controversially, paintings? One must assume that most paintings and drawings are 
not candidates for transparency, even if some future or rare occurrences may offer 
evidence to the contrary, but the jury on photographs is still divided. In a way, part of the 
challenge is whether there is another way to divide these devices if one wants to contend 
that photographs are not transparent.70 
 
With this in mind, Gaut gives an answer to Walton’s challenge: his account draws 
attention to the fact that for humans, and other animals, seeing necessarily involves light 
and so, an analysis of seeing should be sensitive to that fact. Gaut proposes that light rays 
are necessary for seeing and while light rays are also involved in cameras and the 
photographs they make, the distinction can be made according to how the light rays travel 
from object to eye. The distinction that he draws between seeing through and looking at a 
photograph is made by how the light rays are intercepted between the eye and the 
photographed object. This will be explained further in a moment.  
 
In Gaut’s view, to see is to have a visual experience that is caused by light rays reflecting 
off an object and to the eye. When we look at objects through eyeglasses, mirrors, 
telescopes and such, the light rays may change course and bounce through lenses but those 
same light rays travel from the object to the eye through those devices. That is why those 
devices are transparent and why photographs are not: since seeing always involves light, 
and the same light rays are available when seeing through mirrors and microscopes, it 
follows that photographs would only be transparent if the same light rays that bounced off 
the object photographed made their way to our eyes. But since the light rays involved in 
looking at a photograph of an apple are not the very same light rays that the photographer 
or camera, as it were, saw that apple with, one does not see through photographs. Those 
light rays were in fact, interrupted by the camera process.71  
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Currie on the other hand, is not convinced that light is a necessary condition for seeing 
and this is because he considers processes like echolocation to be a kind of seeing but one 
that is lightless.72 However, Gaut argues that it is controversial to claim that echolocation 
is seeing in the sense that we are discussing because echolocation carries very limited 
properties of seeing. Even though it carries what Currie considers to be an important 
feature of seeing, namely, egocentric spatial information, it misses information that is 
special to seeing like texture and colour. Nonetheless, I agree that light is not a necessary 
condition. Night vision or heat vision technologies do not send the same light waves to the 
eye. In particular, we might consider heat sensitive glasses, aka night vision goggles, which 
allow one to see objects by temperature variations rather than the natural light course. As 
these are clearly designed so that one can see in the dark amongst other things, it would be 
counterintuitive to suggest that since the light wave trail is missing here, that we do not see 
through night vision goggles. 
 
While Gaut’s proposal is a strong and intuitive one, one can discount it in an analogy to 
sounds and prostheses for hearing. Now there are good reasons to call the analogy to 
sound an illegitimate one, but I would suggest resisting that. There are differences between 
light and sound waves. Light waves are transverse and can travel through a vacuum, while 
sound waves are longitudinal and require matter in some form to transmit. Furthermore, 
one can say there are different object relations between them: where light waves connect 
eyes to objects, sounds can be argued to be events, not objects.73 So one does not hear a bell, 
per se, but the event of the bell being rung, the ensuing compression, impact on the 
environment and those sound waves reaching the ear. This chain of events describes an 
instance of hearing quite differently from the story of seeing. Still, with reference to the 
object of perception, one can locate where sounds are coming from, and thus designate the 
locus of sound whether to the object that causes it, or the site of compression.   
 
Regardless, these differences do not matter for this purpose because we are not talking 
about perceptions of either kind in vacuums. Whatever the wave-object relation is like in 
their respective physical theories is only partially relevant here. We are concerned with the 
physics only in so far as it generates the phenomena of seeing and hearing. In those 
                                                
72 Currie 1995: 58-59. 
73 More of the event theory of audition in O’Callaghan 2007. 
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respects, they are quite similar: both kinds of waves can refract, reflect, diffract and 
interfere. Both light and sound waves become objects seen or sounds heard when they are 
received in their respective organs. Most importantly, both waves are the media by which 
seeing and hearing happens. Now, on Gaut’s view the requirement for seeing is based on 
the essential property of light waves, and so, why would we not postulate sound waves as 
the essential medium of hearing? Insofar as light waves are essential to seeing because they 
are the medium for sight, sound waves are essential to hearing for the same reason. 
 
Now, the sound analogy poses a problem for Gaut’s view when one thinks about 
prostheses for hearing. If transparency is delegated to devices that mediate the passage of 
the very same light rays between object and eye, then the same must be true of sound. The 
same sound wave must travel from the sound source to the ear. In many cases, this link is 
preserved such as when one hears first-hand or through a number of devices. In some 
cases, the same sound waves that travelled from a bell reach our ears through transparent 
devices like megaphones or cans on a string. However, does this mean that the sound wave 
cannot undergo any changes in its travel through a device? If it cannot undergo changes, 
say, become digitized or translated into electronic frequencies, then one does not hear 
through most modern devices like microphones, or cellular telephones. These devices, at 
least in their present state of design, alter the sound waves by way of digitizing them. 
Hearing aides, the very exemplar of a hearing prosthesis, use digital technologies. In these 
cases, and many others, the original sound waves have been digitized and digitization 
changes the waves into a stream of numbers. That is then processed into the same sound 
for the ear. But those same waves are no longer in contact with the ear. 
 
In an analogous case for seeing, the current technology for enhancing vision works quite 
similarly. The Argus II, the most notable model, is a retinal implant that improves sight 
that has been degraded by a disease called retinitis pigmentosa. This disease affects the 
light-sensing photoreceptors and the prosthesis improves the condition by artificially 
producing the light in one’s vision field. In order to do this, the device has two co-
dependent elements: 1) images are captured by a video processing unit, sent to the 
spectacles on which they are mounted, which then wirelessly sends the corresponding 
signals to 2) a chip which is implanted near the retina as a receiver. The implant is 
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outfitted with a 60-electrode array that stimulates the healthy photoreceptors and in turn, 
the optic nerve to the brain.74 
 
This device causes a problem for Gaut’s optical theory. This is a genuine prosthesis for 
seeing that does not preserve the stream of the same light wave from object to eye. That 
stream is interrupted by a video camera that transmits the light information on to be 
wirelessly transmitted. That transmission has been modified into signals, and then sent 
wirelessly to the implant only to be modified again by the electrode array into pulses of 
electricity, and so on. The light wave has changed at every stage but this is integral to the 
function of the retinal prosthesis.   
 
Having analogous instruments shows that, for our purposes the sound analogy obtains and 
that furthermore, that for both kinds of prosthesis the same-wave requirement appears to 
be too strong. And thus, this reopens the question for photographs: if on the one hand, the 
sound and light waves cannot undergo changes along the way, then the requirement is too 
strong, because there are real life examples of prostheses that depend on a variety of signal 
modifications to function properly. But if these respective waves can undergo such 
changes along the way, then it should follow that light rays can undergo a variety of other 
changes, such as being digitized, and then we can surely see through photographs. 
 
§2.4 Egocentric spatial information again 
We previously examined Currie’s proposal that the function of seeing is being able to track 
one’s location relative to objects we see and subsequently found that it had some 
significant problems. Cohen and Meskin share this intuition with Currie and a number of 
other philosophers of perception,75 and agree with Currie insofar as they hold seeing 
necessarily involves egocentric spatial information (henceforth e-information), that is, 
information about where one stands in relation to the object seen. However, they sidestep 
one of Currie’s major problems by removing the doxastic constraint, that is, that one does 
                                                
74 Steenhuysen 2013; Graham-Rowe 2011; Second Sight accessed 2014. 
75 Gareth Evans 1992, 1985; Alva Noë 2004, 2006; Christopher Peacocke 1992: Ch. 3; 
Robert Briscoe 2009; Breuer 1997; Campbell 1994; Grush 1998, 2000, et al.  
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not need to make a judgment about one’s egocentric spatial relation to the object.76 In effect, 
being able to track the objects of sight is important but not necessary in all cases of seeing. 
It suffices to define seeing as carrying information about where we stand relative to the 
objects we see without out necessarily being able to track or judge according to that 
information. When looking at a complex series of mirrors that would confuse the tracking 
function, one still sees the carnation simply because mirrors carry e-information regardless 
of whether we can make a judgment on the matter or not. 
 
By making this amendment, Cohen and Meskin can avoid cases like that above and others 
that plagued Currie’s account, such as the sound analogues or the example of other 
animals that have less sophisticated sight-related cognitive functions. Cohen and Meskin 
thus have preserved the condition of e-information and use this analysis as a basis for what 
they consider to be the epistemic value of photography. In the next chapter, I will look at 
their theory with greater detail and show how they must face a host of other problems to 
preserve the condition of e-information as a necessary one. This consequently shakes the 
foundation for their theory on the epistemic value of photographs. In light of this, and with 
a mind to preserve transparency, I will offer an alternative. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
76 Cohen and Meskin 2004. 
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II 
 
o 
 
EPISTEMIC VALUE OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
Transparency, E-Information & A Defect Hypothesis 
 
In the last chapter, I introduced Cohen and Meskin’s attempt to salvage the egocentric 
spatial information condition for seeing but left the criticisms for this chapter because their 
proposal is linked to what they consider the epistemic value of photography. In this 
chapter, we will look at their thesis more closely to show how their account has significant 
foundational problems, which I believe justifies my provision for an alternative theory. 
 
Cohen and Meskin believe the epistemic value of photographs cannot be founded on what 
they consider to be the mistaken proposals of Bazin and Walton.77 Walton insists that 
transparency does not mark his position on how informative photographs are, nor 
subsequently does it comment on their epistemic value.78 I will here show that 
transparency is an important foundation to stabilize the epistemology of photography per 
Cohen and Meskin, and that this is compatible with their claim that photographs do not 
carry e-information. That is to say, that despite Cohen and Meskin’s compelling account of 
photographs being unique in their being spatially agnostic informants about the visually 
accessible properties of objects, their proposal mistakenly jumps to the conclusion that 
photographs are thereby opaque.  
 
Before I proceed, I should offer a strategy for this chapter: I will start by showing that 
Cohen and Meskin’s account has two distinguishable goals: first, to undercut the 
transparency thesis and second, to offer an account of the epistemic value of photographs. 
Moreover, I will show that the latter is independent of the former. Regarding their first 
goal, they dispute the transparency of photographs on the basis that photographs do not 
carry e-information. But they are wrong in assuming that because e-information is a 
necessary condition for seeing that thereby it must be available in prostheses of seeing.  
                                                
77 Cohen and Meskin 2004, 2008. 
78 Walton 2008: 113. 
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I will show other fatal problems with the general e-information claim, and since key 
conditions of Cohen and Meskin’s account fail to secure their thesis, the epistemic value of 
photographs cannot be explained by way of their account. In the end, I hope to once and 
for all extinguish the thesis that e-information is a necessary condition for prosthetic seeing 
and perhaps not even be necessary for ordinary seeing. However, I am in agreement with 
Cohen and Meskin that the epistemic value of photographs rests in their being spatially 
agnostic informants about objects, because that feature is what gives the long observation-
time photographs can offer. That is indicative of the nature of knowledge had by 
photographs.  
 
So, in short, I will reconcile two claims about photographs extracted from these two 
conflicting accounts:  
 
1) that photographs are transparent, thereby like other enhancements for seeing  
2) that photographs do not carry all the information typically available to seeing –
particularly, egocentric spatial information (e-information).  
 
In reconciling these two claims, another epistemology of photographs will emerge. I will 
argue that the crucial difference between photographs and paintings is that we maintain 
perceptual contact with the objects of photographs but not with objects of paintings and 
this points to their distinctive epistemic values.  
§1 Cohen and Meskin’s view 
Before proceeding, I will here give a detailed account of Cohen and Meskin’s view. The 
first and most crucial proposal is what they offer to revise Currie’s function thesis that the 
function of seeing is to track one’s location relative to what one sees. In Currie’s view, 
egocentric spatial information, aka e-information, is a doxastic condition, which is to say, 
one can make a judgment about the object’s relative location to oneself.79 To avoid examples 
of confounded locating of objects, Cohen and Meskin’s view is a non-doxastic one: one need 
not make a judgment about the location of the objects one sees. Instead, it suffices if the 
                                                
79 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §II. 
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device one sees through is such that it reliably carries e-information about objects seen 
through them.80  
§1.1 carrying e-information nondoxastically 
As a preliminary step, Cohen and Meskin stipulate e-information is necessary to seeing 
and thereby, that transparent devices must carry e-information. Then, in order to establish 
that some devices carry e-information, and others not, Cohen and Meskin explain that a 
transparent device will be disposed to carry some information, here namely e-information, 
and do so reliably by virtue of an appropriate transmission of that information. First, we 
need to understand what it means for something to be disposed to carry some sort of 
information. Then, we need to look into their notion of reliability, which involves an audit 
of the process of the device.  
 
The basis for the non-doxastic account is based on Fred Dretske’s compelling theory of 
knowledge and perception in Knowledge and the Flow of Information, where knowledge is 
analysed in terms of the transmission of information. Cohen and Meskin have adopted the 
Dretskean view and for their purposes analysed the reliability of a device (at carrying x 
information) as based on an objective probabilistic link that is counterfactual-supporting. 
To illustrate what is meant by a counterfactual-supporting probabilistic link, consider an 
everyday instrument we trust, like the thermometer. We believe the thermometer to be 
reliable at representing temperature and it is in fact reliable, in part, because the 
counterfactual link between temperature and its representation on the thermometer is 
preserved. The temperature reading on the thermometer depends on the temperature and 
would have differed had the temperature differed. That is the counterfactual-supporting 
aspect of the equation. The probabilistic part can be described as follows: the probability 
of a thermometer reading r (as being dependent on temperature t) is such that the 
probability of r successfully representing t outweighs the probability that r will not 
represent t. Thermometers are more likely to represent temperature accurately than not. 
In short, thermometers depend on temperature to represent it, and this link is preserved 
more often than not.81 
                                                
80 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 198-199, 202.  
81 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §IV; 2008: 2-3. 
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Thus we can say that a positive probabilistic result, however that gets cashed out, and in 
combination with the preserved counterfactual link, indicates that devices like 
thermometers are disposed to representing information like temperature reliably and it is 
because of this disposition that thermometers are considered reliable when it comes to 
carrying that information. Moreover, this positive probability result is indicative of the 
reliability of a process-type rather than simply a test of individual tokens. The process by 
which a thermometer provides a reading of temperature is reliable and can thus be 
considered reliable in, say, other devices. And if a device has been determined as reliable at 
carrying x-information –that is, more likely to carry information than not carry it– it is a 
reliable carrier of that information even if individual tokens sometimes fail to carry that 
information. Hence, thermometers that are broken, calibrated wrong, and so on, do not 
pose a challenge to the whole of thermometer-type instruments.82 
 
Additionally, we can understand two ways to cash out the analysis of types in terms of its 
tokens. On one hand, a process type carries some x-information if its tokens typically do, 
or to put it in dispositional terms, if the tokens are disposed to carry that information. 
Most thermometers are reliable according to these conditions, since most thermometers 
are reliable representations of temperature, so the category of thermometer can be treated 
thus. The other way is also true: the tokens of the type in question are disposed to carry x-
information if the type has been determined as a reliable one, by virtue of being more 
likely to carry that information than not carry it. If all the thermometers in the world 
vanished except for a few that work perfectly, and these become the prototype for a 
second generation of thermometers, that generation would be reliable on the basis of the 
prototypical few.83  
 
Contrariwise, a negative probabilistic result renders the process-type of a device 
unreliable. Had the billions of thermometers tended towards mis-information in some way, 
thermometers would have no currency. While not made explicit in Cohen and Meskin’s 
account, one can infer that they mean to say that if a device is more likely not to carry x-
information than carry it, then it is not a reliable source of that information even if it 
                                                
82 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 200. 
83 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 201. 
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carries that information occasionally. So that on the rare occasion that some device, like 
one of the photographic variety, carried information like e-information, the whole type 
would still not be a reliable source of that information.  
 
This part of Cohen and Meskin’s analysis functions in part to fortify the e-information 
condition against fluke cases where photographic devices might meet the condition. This 
way, some token instances of photographic devices carrying e-information would not 
render the device type reliable at carrying e-information. Even if photographs could on 
occasion carry e-information, the photograph-type depictions are not so disposed as, on 
their view, photographs fail more often than not to carry e-information and so, they are 
not reliable sources of e-information. And since Cohen and Meskin stipulate that e-
information is necessary for seeing, and also thereby required of prostheses for seeing, 
photographs are not transparent.84  
§1.2 Photograph types and paintings types 
Photographs are thereby distinguished on the one hand, from devices like mirrors, 
telescopes, microscopes etc., because they fail to carry e-information –information that is 
typically carried by genuine prostheses for seeing. On the other hand, what remains to be 
seen of Cohen and Meskin’s view is how it distinguishes between photographs and 
paintings since a consequence of rendering photographs opaque is that transparency no 
longer distinguishes them from paintings.  
 
Cohen and Meskin propose that the distinction is found in their process types and 
subsequently offer an analysis of the information that photographs carry. Although 
photographs fail to carry e-information, they do successfully carry information about the 
visually accessible properties of objects, also called v-information.85 More specifically, v-
information is information about objects observed by sight such as the appearance of 
colour, texture and shape. The features of objects may be experienced in a variety of other 
sensory modes: for example, an orange feels rough, smells piny, tastes sweet, and so on. 
However, the fact that an orange looks orange is a property that is exclusively observed by 
                                                
84 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 203-204. 
85 The term is coined in Cohen and Meskin 2008: 4. 
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seeing. The shape and texture of an orange can also be seen, while also observed by touch. 
But seeing the shape and texture bears visual information about the orange, rather than 
tactile information.86  
 
In contrast, paintings may provide v-information but they fail to do so in virtue of a 
counterfactual-supporting objective probabilistic link. Paintings after all, require a 
subjective link. Paintings may occasionally succeed in carrying v-information but the 
process type of paintings precludes that they do so reliably. Thus, photographs differ from 
handmade pictures like paintings because they are disposed to furnishing v-information 
about their objects, whereas handmade pictures are not so disposed. Moreover, it is 
usually the case that devices carry v-information and e-information in tandem. This is part 
of what makes photographs special: they carry v-information sans carrying e-information. 
Cohen and Meskin conclude that what is epistemically salient about photographs is that 
they are spatially agnostic carriers of v-information.87 
  
Let us take a moment to describe v-information better. V-information is to be understood 
as information that is uniquely visual such as colours, textures and shapes of things as they 
are seen. Texture and shape are available, for example, to the sense of touch as well but 
the feel of texture or shape is distinct from the sight of these features. For example, the 
texture of a sisal rug has a distinctive visual appearance from that of linoleum; it has a 
certain colour, pattern, texture, etc. all of which informs the visual experience of that rug. 
But furthermore, this is a different kind of information from, say, what sisal feels or smells 
like, as being rough to the touch or grassy are information types read by another sense. 
One can also get visual information from a description of a sisal rug but this is, again, not 
v-information, which is specified to be available visually, rather than audibly by 
description. So, v-information about sisal is only available in visual experiences of sisal and 
can only be accessed visually, just as there are tactile-specific, olfactory-specific 
experiences and so forth. 
 
A major problem regarding the v-information analysis will have its own dedicated section 
below but for now, I will call attention to another one: photographs are a reliable source of 
                                                
86 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 204; Cohen and Meskin 2008: 4. 
87 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §V; 2008: 3-5. 
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v-information, but why wouldn’t paintings qualify? Cohen and Meskin pre-empt this 
difficulty as posed by the example of veridical paintings –i.e., paintings made to represent 
actual events, and which, in effect carry v-information about the objects they depict. By 
Cohen and Meskin’s criteria, veridical paintings thus also provide information about the 
visually accessible properties of objects (v-information) in the appropriate way and are 
also spatially agnostic carriers of v-information. What then differentiates photographs 
from veridical paintings?88  
 
To handle this, Cohen and Meskin suggest that viewers bear certain attitudes towards the 
reliability of certain categories of devices based on the type of processes they are. The fact 
that photographs belong to a process type that reliably furnishes v-information about their 
objects in principle, and so they are more likely to carry v-information than not in practice, 
means viewers keep this in mind and find photograph-type devices reliable at furnishing v-
information. On the other hand, in general the process type of paintings does not reliably 
furnish v-information despite the exception of veridical paintings. As such, a veridical 
painting will not be treated like a photograph but as member of the less reliable type that 
they belong to. 89 
 
This explains why viewers of photographs consider devices of the photographic category 
to be reliable sources of v-information but do not bear the same attitudes about paintings. 
The epistemic value of photographs is then that photographs are spatially agnostic sources 
of v-information and additionally, this is buttressed by viewer attitudes about the 
reliability of the device type.90  
 
Another main function of this attitude condition is to disarm scenarios offered where 
photographs might fall into a category of ambiguous evidentiary devices –i.e., those which 
sometimes carry reliable information and sometimes not. While the process-type account 
that Cohen and Meskin offer is relevant to making a distinction between photographs and 
paintings, the distinction they make is dubious: what seems to distinguish the process type 
of photographs from paintings are the background beliefs that viewers have about their 
                                                
88 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 205. 
89 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 205. 
90 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §VI. 
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respective process types. Simply put, what is different about paintings and photographs is 
that people have different attitudes about how paintings are made and how photographs 
are made, putting more credence on the latter. Here Cohen and Meskin make provisions 
for contingency: they admit that the schism between these device types partially depends 
on what the general public knows about them, and that this can change over time.91   
 
However that cashes out, it remains problematic to claim that background beliefs about 
the processes offer a justified distinction between them because background beliefs about 
the process-type may be wrong. Take, for example, navigational equipment in a world 
whose inhabitants believe it to be flat but which is actually spherical. The equipment 
reliably confirms information as per a flat world and is found reliable by users of that 
equipment on the basis that they hold the false belief that the world is flat. Alternatively, 
suppose the equipment furnishes reliable information true to the spherical shape of their 
world but the inhabitants believe this information to be false. In both cases, viewers hold 
background beliefs about the flatness-preserving and roundness-preserving process-types, 
but in neither case is the equipment any more or less reliable just because these users bear 
certain attitudes about the process type. This attitude condition then cannot account for 
the difference between veridical paintings and photographs. Cohen and Meskin admit that 
their account is based on contingent rather than necessary features of photographs, based 
on the current attitudes.92 But if there were a better reason to differentiate the two types of 
pictures, it would be preferable. Their account misses a difference that I believe to be more 
substantial than the attitudes of viewers being as they are: Photographs do not have the 
vulnerability to represent hallucinations that paintings do. That is a far more convincing 
explanation for why viewers’ attitudes differ, but for which their theory makes no 
provision.  
§2 Problems for e-information accounts 
Let us review the main body of Cohen and Meskin’s account. They suppose that the 
process of seeing carries e-information and that photographs do not carry this information. 
On this basis, photographs cannot be genuine prostheses for seeing. Cohen and Meskin 
                                                
91 Cohen and Meskin 2004: 206-207. 
92 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §VII. 
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additionally argue that this does not diminish the epistemic value of photography but in 
fact illuminates what that value is.  Seeing also involves the transfer of information about 
the visually accessible properties of an object (v-information), such as information about 
the object’s shape, colour and texture. This kind of information is typically only available 
alongside e-information and devices that carry v-information usually do so in virtue of 
carrying e-information, so this peculiarity offers up the epistemic value of photographs.  
 
There are a number of problems with this view. The foremost problem is the mystery 
around the necessity of e-information, which will prove to be problematic. In light of this, 
the following sections will show how e-information is not a necessary condition for seeing 
through prostheses, and questionably necessary for ordinary seeing. I offer four major 
problems for Cohen and Meskin’s theory (and in effect, also Currie’s) that support my 
hypothesis. In §2.1, I will simply analyse on what grounds the belief that e-information is 
necessary for seeing is founded to show that the grounds are dubious; in §2.2, I will 
conduct further investigation into what v-information really amounts to in order to call 
into question whether it couldn’t suffice for seeing on its own; in §2.3, I revisit the analogy 
to sound prostheses, where e-information is not carried in non-controversial devices for 
hearing, thereby challenging that e-information is necessary for visual prostheses. Finally, 
in §2.4, I will show how photographic equipment can be made to furnish e-information, 
but that ultimately this illustrates how to devalue the technology. Because such a redesign 
would be useless, one must consider the lack of e-information to be an important deficit 
that should not be ignored when auditing the epistemic value of photographs. This last 
section will entitle me to defend the claim that what is special about photographs is that 
they are, as Cohen and Meskin were right to suppose, spatially agnostic informants but 
that also, contra Cohen and Meskin, that the reliability of that information rests on their 
being transparent.  
§2.1 Motives for E-information 
It is an important first step to look into what motivates Currie’s and Cohen and Meskin’s 
commitment to the belief that e-information is necessary for seeing. This is because the e-
information condition is central to their proposals, and has been central to many accounts 
of seeing. Yet the grounds on which Currie, Cohen and Meskin base the necessity claim is 
rather mysterious. Currie states that tracking one’s location in relation to objects of sight is 
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the function of seeing. But why that amounts to e-information being a necessary condition 
in all cases will be investigated. And, since tracking has been shown to be too stringent a 
requirement for seeing, Cohen and Meskin stipulate that it suffices if e-information is 
simply carried by the device, and by virtue of the device being disposed to carry it. 
However, it remains unclear why e-information must be carried by any prosthesis for 
seeing. Both versions insist on the necessity of e-information because it is available to 
ordinary seeing, but how that becomes a necessary condition for prostheses for seeing is 
remains to be seen.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that the claim Walton offered, and that I defend, that 
photographs are transparent, is not a claim about the identity of photographic seeing with 
ordinary seeing. It is rather that photographs are equivalent to genuine prostheses for 
seeing, –i.e., devices that are commonly used to enhance vision. So it is not necessary that 
photographs meet all the conditions for seeing anyway, but that they meet the conditions 
for seeing with prostheses. I will later show an important difference between these. 
Whether the function of seeing is object-tracking, or a disposition to carrying some 
information by which tracking might be possible, there is still not enough to justify the 
inference that a genuine prosthesis must also preserve this information.  
a) Necessity by function  
Let us begin with Currie’s claim that tracking e-information is the function of seeing. 
Currie’s thesis rests on the premise that e-information is bound up in the function of seeing 
and that function entails necessity. Using the standard view of functions, –i.e., that the 
function of x is y, if x would not exist without y– Currie understands e-information to be a 
trait integral in some way to preserving the biological item.93 For example, the function of 
the brain is to regulate impulses in the body and without the brain doing just that, the 
body would fail and in the end, so would the brain. It is easy to see that being able to see 
where things are, and what things are coming, is beneficial to our survival. This allows us 
to trace predators or keeps us from getting hit by buses. 
 
                                                
93 Currie 1995: Ch. 2.  
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But it is not clear how the transmission of e-information is the function of seeing by this 
account because not only are many other kinds of information available in seeing, but 
tracking objects can happen in a variety of ways that are not sight specific. There are a 
number of ways we use our senses to orient ourselves in our environment: We use touch to 
feel our surroundings in dark places, and listen to sounds to locate their sources as well as 
to identify their causes. Depending on what the situation calls for, one might favour one 
sense over another to track e-information, just as it is more efficient for dolphins to track 
objects under water with sonar than with vision because there sound travels better than 
light. If e-information is the function of seeing, it is not exclusively so. And if it is not 
exclusive to vision, one may ask if its functional role to most of the senses entails a 
necessary occurrence in every instance of perception. I would like to suggest that as the 
function of perceptions not exclusive to vision, the activation of tracking e-information 
could occur in any sense without necessarily occurring in all senses. 
 
Consider the following example: You have entered a place like Walton’s funhouse of 
mirrors and begin to hear a sound in the distance. As a Hitchcock fan, your mind quickly 
suggests you should perhaps worry if you are in danger. Then you find yourself in a room 
with mirrors all around. There you are terrified at the sight of multiple reflections of 
someone that resembles Peter Lorre. You cannot determine where he is in relation to you 
with the mirrors so you strain your ears to determine that he to your right somewhere but 
not particularly close. You use this opportunity to study his face in the mirrors to see if 
you can gauge whether his intentions are sinister or not. To your relief, you are able to see 
that he smiles and waves at you, and then picks up his walkie-talkie to announce your 
person has been located in the Hall of Utter Confusion.  
 
Here it appears that there are cases where e-information might manifest in only one of the 
senses, and it need not be seeing. So, a function does not seem to entail the presence of that 
feature in all instances of individual senses. It should follow that even if tracking e-
information is the function of seeing, it does not entail that all instances of seeing would 
carry e-information.  
 
Furthermore, there is room to argue that vision that never carries e-information may be 
considered defective in some way, but it would nonetheless be a stretch to claim a defect of 
this kind means the optical apparatus has ceased to function. It seems entirely plausible 
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that one can see the colours and shapes of things without a sense of their place in relation 
to oneself. Hence, defective vision might still be informative in a visual way. 
 
Now, many genuine prostheses for seeing are in a sense defective in some way –e.g., 
microscopes are defective in providing macroscopic information, near-sighted glasses 
cannot provide clarity of close range objects, and so on.  In short, those devices fall short 
of the normal range of visual information in order to offer another sort of visual 
information. Subsequently, a device’s defects are not enough to undo its candidacy as a 
genuine prosthesis: this is because some defects from ordinary seeing –in the form of 
missing information– are essential to enhancing other information. This means that one 
can see even when that information is missing because it is replaced. There may in fact be 
information that cannot be replaced and in that case, when it is missing, one fails to see. 
But so far, the fact that e-information is crucial to seeing has not yet been proven. 
b) Necessity by disposition  
Cohen and Meskin on the other hand, while they might be motivated by the function 
thesis, defend the necessity of e-information to seeing on the grounds that seeing is more 
likely to carry it than not, in other words, by their dispositional analysis. In contrast to 
Currie’s view, where tracking e-information is the function of seeing, the Cohen and 
Meskin view claims that the process of seeing is simply disposed to carrying e-information. 
Consequently, since the process of seeing is disposed to carrying this information, genuine 
prosthetic devices for seeing will need to preserve the disposition to carry e-information 
too. Furthermore, even though some devices will on occasion fail to carry e-information –
and really, they are only meant to carry it more often than not, rather than always– they 
may still be qualified genuine prostheses for seeing in principle, if their process-type has 
proven to be disposed to carrying that information. Inversely, one can suppose that some 
devices will occasionally succeed at carrying the appropriate information but are not 
genuine prostheses for seeing because their occasional success does not qualify them to be 
reliable carriers of e-information.  This means that not all instances of seeing need to carry 
e-information.  
 
However, some of the inferences made and that one can make are rather spurious. In 
particular, how do we make the inference from establishing said disposition of natural 
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seeing to necessity for prosthetic seeing? In other words, we should not presume that if the 
process of seeing is disposed to performing in a way that carries e-information that this 
alone explains how e-information is a necessary condition for seeing, or that this carries 
through for genuine prostheses for seeing. In short, many of the steps from disposition to 
the conclusion of necessity are questionable on their own. 
 
For one, what if the disposition of something is simply systematically blocked? For 
example, one’s being disposed to having psychotic episodes might be blocked by the 
appropriate sort of medication but this does not undo the disposition to having psychotic 
episodes. However, the medication tips the probabilistic scales so that it is more likely that 
the episodes will not manifest. So one has to ask, under what conditions is a feature of 
something making an appearance or not. In the case of natural organs, dispositions might 
be altered by external causes, some of which are intentional, like administering medication 
for the betterment of a patient.  
 
In the case of man-made devices, systematic blocking might have a significant motive too, 
and this might inform the very design of a device. As we have already noted in response to 
the function claim, the lack of e-information might just be a necessary by-product of 
eliminating one kind of information that seeing is typically disposed to carry in favour of 
enhancing some other visual information that may, as it were, naturally be unavailable (as 
with the microscope example). So even here, there is a suspicious inference made; that the 
disposition of ordinary seeing to carry e-information gives sufficient reason for being a 
necessary feature in prosthetic seeing. 
 
In granting that Cohen and Meskin’s account side-steps this particular problem, the 
dispositional analysis still fails to adequately qualify the e-information thesis because 
disposition does not entail necessity. For example, the disposition of a human is to perform 
rational acts, but it is not the case that when they fail to do so, they are not human. So 
again, what qualifies as the relevant kind of information? A prosthetic hand will still act as 
a prosthetic for a hand even though it fails to carry tactile information. So a dispositional 
account does not offer enough to substantiate the claim of necessity. 
 
It seems that the intuition Currie, Cohen and Meskin want to build on is based on the 
inference that remains unclear, undermining the very basis for claiming the necessity of e-
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information. Meanwhile, Cohen and Meskin’s second condition is suspicious as well, 
leaving their proposal of epistemic value of photographs in need of repair. Without an 
explanation for the necessity of e-information, neither account is sufficient for excluding 
photographic devices from the class of genuine prosthesis for seeing.  
§2.2 Robustness of v-information 
In this section, I will put emphasis on the second feature of seeing that Cohen and Meskin 
offer, called v-information, that is, visual information about objects given visually. I want 
to show that in general, where v-information is present without e-information, one should 
really be more reluctant to deny these as instances of seeing. This is because the very 
definition of v-information describes it as visually acquired information.   
 
In a real life example, a disorder called Balint syndrome has been pointed out to Cohen 
and Meskin, as an example of seeing without e-information. It is not clear whether it is 
that Balint syndrome patients simply cannot articulate their experience of spatial 
information or if it is an inability to cognize that spatial information, though they are 
probably able to perceive it. But Cohen and Meskin admit that if there was a disorder 
similar to Balint syndrome, such as what they name Schmalint syndrome, where the defect 
is in fact in vision, so that no spatial information is carried, and thereby neither egocentric-
spatial information, they would have to bite the bullet and say Schmalint patients do not 
see.94 But why shouldn’t v-information be rich enough to suffice for seeing? 
 
Perhaps we need a better diagnosis of v-information so let us take a moment for further 
analysis here. Cohen and Meskin say that v-information is information about the visually 
accessible properties of objects that is not always accessed but always available. This is in 
keeping with the nondoxastic principle they offer, that one needn’t be able to make a 
judgment regarding said information. It is also understood to be veridical information, 
rather than perhaps fictional information about objects. V-information is to be understood 
as not simply visual information about objects, but more specifically, this is visual 
information had visually. This is to be contrasted with visual information one might get 
from a heard description of a landscape, which generates visual imagery for the 
                                                
94 Cohen and Meskin 2008: 7-9. 
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imagination but by an auditory route. One can get information about the colours, lines, 
shapes and textures of objects from descriptions, and one can get some of these features 
from other sensory modes. One can hear a rough texture, feel shapes of objects, and so on. 
But it is quite another thing to get this information about objects from the eye. So, v-
information by contrast, is information about colour, line, shape and even texture of 
objects specifically available in a visual mode.  
 
What is odd about Cohen and Meskin’s account becomes apparent here: according to 
them, when v-information is accessed it may or may not count as seeing, and this depends 
on whether it comes along with e-information. However, if accessing v-information means 
having an experience of the visually accessible properties of an object, and more 
significantly, accessing those properties in a visual way, then we must have a visual 
experience of the object’s properties. It is otherwise nonsense to claim that we get visual 
information visually but fail to have a visual experience. And, if v-information provides 
sufficient information for counting as a visual experience, but does not amount to seeing, 
then of course some account of the difference between visual experiences and seeing is 
required.  
 
Now this difference doesn’t promise to offer an answer either: having a visual experience 
can be a variety of things, but for our purposes, can fall under the category of 
hallucinations, illusions, or seeing (which includes seeing through a prosthesis). In other 
words, a visual experience can mean, respectively, seeing something that is not really 
there, seeing something in a tweaked way and seeing something that is really there, 
perhaps through a device. There are nonveridical visual experiences and veridical ones, 
the latter of the two is where genuine seeing and seeing through accepted prosthesis for 
seeing belong. Now surely a photograph is not like a hallucination, nor an illusion, (though 
it might be said that it gives the illusion of literally seeing an object). Regardless, Cohen 
and Meskin do not want to claim that upon accessing v-information through photographs 
we are having an experience of something that is not really there. In fact, if they 
considered the experience of v-information through photographs a hallucination-type 
experience, it would undermine any claims they make about their epistemic value and they 
do trust that photographs usually carry veridical information about objects. Denying this 
is ultimately antithetical to their project: Why trust a photograph for visual evidence about 
objects if it is like a hallucination or an illusion?  
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So the upshot here is that if v-information is not as rich as I had first described it –that is, 
as being sufficient for generating visual experiences about object-properties– then it seems 
that the account of v-information is trivial and thereby diminishes the thesis about what 
the epistemic value of photographs is, as per Cohen and Meskin’s account. However, if it 
is as rich as I have described, then visual experiences are tantamount to seeing and v-
information is thereby sufficient for seeing. Consequently, the account of e-information is 
unnecessary and photographs no longer need to meet that condition to count as a genuine 
prosthesis for seeing. 
§2.3 Sound analogy again  
As it stands we already have good reasons to think that e-information is a dubious, if not 
expendable, condition for prosthetic seeing if not for ordinary seeing, especially if 1) the 
gains are another set of information otherwise not readily available to seeing or if 2) v-
information is sufficient for seeing. However, a more conclusive test of the necessity of e-
information can be made by an analogue to sound. Hearing is a natural candidate for an 
analogy and this is because hearing can also perform the function of tracking one’s relation 
to sound sources. For example, the sound of falling pots and pans can be sourced as 
coming from behind. For Currie’s view, where it is expected that one can track one’s 
location with respect to the objects perceived, we showed how a problem arose when we 
imported sound for the doxastic version. While tracking is possible in many cases of 
hearing, and there are even more developed processes for tracking e-information such as 
echolocation and sonar, being able to source sounds is not always possible. The source of 
very loud, very many and very quiet sounds may simply elude us and quite often they in 
fact, do. For example, we cannot track where the sound of a loud explosion comes from.  
 
On the other hand, the nondoxastic version of e-information offered by Cohen and Meskin, 
which doesn’t require that one can make a judgment about one’s orientation with respect 
to the objects of perception, can sidestep this problem. This is because it is only required 
that e-information about sounds would be carried from source to hearer. One need not 
track the location of sound objects and so the theory is not subject to the problem of 
elusive sound objects. To take the analogy further, for the nondoxastic view recordings of 
sounds are equivalent to photographs, which are, as it were, recordings of sights. Like a 
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photograph, a sound recording preserves information to be transmitted, which is 
accessible sense-specifically and most importantly, fails to carry e-information about the 
source of the sound. For example, a sound recording of The Who performing at the Isle of 
Wight does not per the sound recording tell us where The Who stand in relation to us as we 
are hearing it –they are not now at the Isle of Wight (or even The Who anymore). So, 
Cohen and Meskin contend that as photographs provide visually accessible information 
about objects (v-information), sound recordings maintain audibly accessible information (a-
information) without offering any information about the location of what was recorded. 
Like photographs, sound recordings are spatially agnostic informants and not genuine 
prostheses for hearing. Now I think it seems far less intuitive to claim that one does not 
hear The Who when listening to a sound recording but I am willing to accept the sound 
recording account that Cohen and Meskin provide for the moment. 95 
 
However, while proponents of the e-information thesis might accept that we do not 
literally hear The Who in sound recordings, on the basis that e-information is not made 
available, one must also consider other spatially agnostic devices that transmit sounds. 
One especially troubling example is the telephone: when having a conversation on a 
telephone, the location of the speaker on the other end is not available. There might be an 
urge to claim that the sound carries that information through the complex network of 
telephone lines, but it seems impossible to defend that telephone lines carry spatial 
information in this way. Furthermore, this is also not the case with mobile telephones to 
which we categorize under the same class of devices, as these receive sound information as 
signalled through any number of towers. Are we willing to say that we do not hear our 
interlocutor on the other end of the telephone line?  
 
It seems to me that either we are hearing through a telephone and this obtains despite the 
lack of e-information, or Cohen and Meskin will hold that we do not literally hear through 
telephones, or other similar spatially agnostic devices like baby monitors, karaoke 
machines, microphones, and megaphones. But this seems to suggest that hearing can take 
several forms, some of which are enough like hearing to be comfortably called hearing, 
even if not technically literally hearing. In this case, one has to wonder why photographs 
would not fit into the seeing equivalent of this intermediate position. Examples like these 
                                                
95 Cohen and Meskin 2008: §4. 
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render the move that Cohen and Meskin made less convincing, though perhaps Currie, 
Cohen and Meskin will still want to make a bullet biting claim that what happens by way 
of these types of devices is not hearing at all. But then, it seems as though what counts as 
hearing becomes even less intuitive than the claim of seeing through photographs. 
 
Another possible objection that Currie, Cohen and Meskin could make is that the analogy 
to sound is inappropriate, and there are two ways for this move to go: on the one hand, 
they could argue that e-information is exclusively necessary to seeing and only seeing 
while not the case for hearing. This option has its appeal because at face value, there are 
salient differences between seeing and hearing and one expects this to point to their 
respective epistemic salience. To investigate this, one must step back and look again at 
what motivates the e-information condition to begin with: the apparent basis for necessity 
is that seeing is disposed to carrying it, which means seeing carries it more often than not. 
As such, this condition would apply to hearing only if hearing was disposed to carrying e-
information as well, –and, as it so happens, hearing does.  
 
Examples include echolocation, sonar, and even blind humans are known to have an 
enhanced auditory tracking ability. In cases like echolocation and sonar, it seems a matter 
of genuine necessity to those kinds of perceptions that e-information is available, because if 
tracking is a function of the process-type, it seems to obviously contribute to the overall 
biological fitness of bats and dolphins. Unlike with human seeing, failure to carry e-
information significantly diminishes any spatial information that would be available to 
creatures that depend on this for navigating space and it is in any case, available to hearing 
as well. Then, insofar as one wants to claim e-information is a necessary condition for 
seeing on the basis that it is usually available to seeing (or the function of seeing) one must 
accept analogies to other kinds of perception for which e-information is usually available 
(or the function of). 
 
(Note: When I describe e-information to be available because one can track it, I am not 
ignoring the nondoxastic version. These examples apply to both e-information versions 
since if the more stringent doxastic condition is met, it follows that for the less stringent 
version, the condition obtains. It is a precondition of being trackable that the information 
is available.)  
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The second route to disanalogy is in distinguishing seeing and hearing in special way. 
While differences can always be found in analogies, this analogy obtains because what is 
relevant is whether the similarities are of the appropriate kind. We have already observed 
that neither disposition nor function is enough to differentiate seeing and hearing, and in 
response to Gaut’s optic theory in Ch. 1, I have also shown that the physics of seeing and 
hearing, particularly in relation to perception, are sufficiently the same.  
 
Had there been sufficient grounds to consider e-information a necessary condition for 
ordinary seeing, some grey area would have remained as to whether one could import that 
necessity for prosthetic seeing anyway. However, the point is now moot: there seems to be 
no reason for preserving the necessity of e-information (for ordinary seeing or hearing) 
and subsequently, e-information cannot thus be held a necessary condition for prosthetic 
seeing.   
§2.4 Two cases of e-information in photographic devices 
In this section, I want to show how photographic equipment can be made to furnish e-
information in order to examine what conditions make these successful occasions a rarity. 
I offered two cases to Cohen and Meskin in another paper illustrating how the process-
type of photographs, as products of a camera, can furnish e-information and how 
photographic devices can furnish e-information if they needed to. However, I will review 
these here for a different goal, paying particular attention to the second case. The first case 
gives an everyday example of e-information had by cameras, but the second case is of a 
modified camera-based device that is somewhat useless in comparison to spatially agnostic 
counterparts. This allows me to illustrate that photographic devices, with still or moving 
images, offer the best information they can, based on what information we need most. The 
kind of information we need has a direct effect on the design constraints and subsequent 
virtues of a photograph and this helps to highlight other problems with Cohen and 
Meskin’s view.96  
 
The first case involves a faulty digital camera that does not display an image on the screen 
until the picture is taken (as opposed to a properly functioning display screen that works 
                                                
96 de Asis 2008. 
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as a viewfinder for digital cameras). Once the picture is taken however, the image is fixed 
on the display screen. This sort of defect is commonplace with digital cameras that have 
been dropped a couple of times. The case I offer involves using the camera in a particular 
situation. When one is in a room that is too dark for the naked eye, one can use this 
camera to take pictures, which in turn appear on the display screen and these images can 
subsequently be used to navigate the room towards the exit. Being able to do so means the 
picture meets the stronger doxastic requirement for seeing offered by Currie’s account of 
e-information –that is, that one can track one’s location with respect to the objects one 
sees. While we’ve established that doxastic e-information is too strong a requirement in 
general, if it is met, one can expect that the nondoxastic condition obtains, which is to say 
that e-information is carried. So, here we have an everyday occasion where a photograph 
equivalent can carry e-information though the camera and the photographs are produced 
were not intended for this purpose.   
 
The second case, which I call the helmetcam, is more elaborate and involves another kind 
of camera device that is mounted onto a helmet that is meant to enclose a person’s head. 
The helmet has an interior screen showing the recordings of the exterior mounted camera, 
presenting a real-time stereoscopic panorama of what is outside the camera, in a way that 
is indiscriminable from ordinary seeing. (See figure 2.1)  
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Figure 2.1: Helmetcam, I. de Asis, Feb 2013. 
 
By being in real time, this helmetcam allows interaction with objects outside as if seen 
directly. The camera thus conveys e-information about one’s environment –e.g., if the 
person wearing it stands in front of a tree and then turns 90 degrees to the right, this 
would change the egocentric location of the tree. The internal screen would show the tree 
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to be to the side of the viewer. In this example, a hypothetical but plausible photographic 
device carries e-information and so, at the very least, the process type can be said to on 
occasion successfully carry e-information if adjusted to the right specifications. 
 
The reply Cohen and Meskin would offer to these examples is not unlike their answer to 
the aforementioned veridical painting problem: as paintings are not typically reliable 
sources of v-information, photographs are not typically reliable sources of e-information. 
On their view, a genuine prosthesis for seeing will belong to a process-type that reliably 
carries e-information and photograph-type devices still fail to do this because these cases 
only show that they occasionally do so. So while photographic tokens may on occasion 
carry e-information, they still do not belong to a device process-type that carries the 
appropriate information reliably. 
 
On the surface, such a reply is sufficient, but while Cohen and Meskin are right to point to 
the fact that photographs are not known to reliably carry e-information, there is further 
significance to photographs occasionally succeeding at carrying this information. One 
main reason for offering these cases here is to show how photograph-type devices can 
carry e-information and then to ask why they don’t normally do this. One needs to 
consider whether or not there may be other conditions that inhibit device possibilities that 
ought to be accounted for alongside their probabilistic performance. As we have 
mentioned in a previous section, §2.1.2, the disposition of a device might be systematically 
blocked for some reason. So, what are conditions for blocking this kind of information 
from photographic devices? 
 
One consideration that has been neglected it seems to me, is that the failure or success of a 
photographic device at carrying e-information depends on technological factors in a non-
trivial way; one factor being that the device is designed to certain specifications. The 
design of a camera is made to succeed in performing some practical function, which is in 
turn determined by what people need. The parameters of the information photographs are 
designed to carry is then dependent on, and operates in direct proportion to, not only what 
information they can carry but given this, what informational needs there are by potential 
users and which are not readily available. This means that their design specifications 
should be a significant consideration for an epistemological account. Because photographs 
are configured in this way, with respect to the above etiquette of technological design, an 
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account of their epistemic value ought to remember the fact that the mechanism for 
making photographic pictures is built to fill in an epistemic gap. (Motivations for the 
design of such inventions do offer some insight on their epistemic value as well.)  
 
Two consequences of this: firstly, the value of photographs is indeed bound up in their 
being able to fix images, and for an analysis of their epistemic value fixing the image is an 
important feature to consider. Photography got the job of fixing images for later 
investigation because this was something we could put to better use, say, so we could 
review the contents of those images. And this is per their design specification, as decided 
because they are not as useful in other ways –e.g., the helmetcam is useful to a very select 
few, if any. (There are very similar devices to the helmetcam, like night vision goggles, that 
are useful because they provide information that is not readily available such as object-
seeing in a lightless environment.) So, it is not because photographic devices are 
essentially spatially agnostic that they fail to furnish e-information. It is because they are 
not particularly useful that way –the helmetcam example shows just how useless a spatially 
rich photographic process can be. But, as a matter of fact, preserving e-information in 
photographic devices would be at cross-purposes with its desired function. The virtues of a 
photographic device rest on their provision of information about objects at a timeslice, to 
be observed later without the constraints of time. This means, carrying e-information 
would be to their detriment.  
 
Secondly, the probabilistic evaluation of photographic information cannot really be done 
on objective terms. This is because the disposition of photographs cannot be determined 
objectively when given the fact that the design process has systematically blocked certain 
possibilities. Photographs are made to perform a certain way for the purposes of increasing 
the kind of visual information we can gather, and so it seems that calculating whether they 
can carry e-information might just be irrelevant. Photographic devices as they are 
designed, as a matter of fact, do not carry e-information. However, this is common to 
prostheses for seeing as the other devices we use to enhance our portfolio of visual 
information all make information available that is not available to ordinary seeing, at the 
expense of some regular features of seeing. Microscopes and telescopes offer views into 
miniscule and distant objects at the expense of the normal scale of vision offered by the 
natural eye. Photographs then, are rightly deemed valuable for their spatially agnostic 
window to v-information but this does not null and void their transparency. 
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§3 Conclusions  
Cohen and Meskin initially dispute the transparency thesis on the basis that photographs 
do not carry e-information but it was never clear why e-information should be a necessary 
condition for prostheses for seeing. Had there been sufficient grounds to consider e-
information a necessary condition for ordinary seeing, some grey area would remain as to 
whether one could import that necessity for prosthetic seeing and there has been enough 
work to show otherwise in this chapter. While I agree that e-information is a regular 
feature of seeing, I argue that it is a contingent condition by what I call the defect 
hypothesis –that is to say, that a lack of e-information can simply be a defect of prosthetic 
seeing but that defective seeing can still count as seeing. 
 
Undermining the necessity of e-information renders Cohen and Meskin’s account of the 
epistemic value of photographs in need of repair. This is because now it is not clear what 
distinguishes process types like photographs from painting-types. To recapitulate Cohen 
and Meskin’s proposal, the epistemic value of photographs is that they are spatially 
agnostic sources of v-information about their objects. Additionally, Cohen and Meskin 
also propose that viewers have certain attitudes towards the reliability of certain devices 
based on the type of process. They do this in order to accommodate some odd examples of 
veridical paintings –i.e., realistic and fact-based paintings, – which may also provide v-
information without e-information. Since photographs belong to a process type that 
reliably furnishes v-information about their objects, while the category of paintings fails to, 
this explains why viewers of photographs consider devices of this category to be reliable 
sources of v-information, but do not have the same attitudes about paintings.97 However, 
this analysis had its problems as shown in §1.2 by the flat-world navigation equipment 
examples: viewer attitudes could in fact be false.  
Goal 1: Transparency by the defect hypothesis 
 
Recall the case of Balint syndrome offered to Cohen and Meskin and mentioned in §2.2, 
where patients seem to be detached from the spatial perspective of their visual 
experiences. While it wasn’t clear whether the defect was in the processing of visual 
                                                
97 Cohen and Meskin 2004: §IV. 
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information or articulation of it, Cohen and Meskin offered that if there where instead a 
Schmalint syndrome, where the defect was clearly a matter of lacking e-information, they 
would hold Schmalint patients do not see. But it seems difficult to accept that a defect in 
visual information, where still so much visual information is preserved, in particular, v-
information, amounts to not seeing. This is part of what motivates the defect hypothesis: if 
enough information is preserved, and that information is of a salient visual variety, then it 
should be sufficient for seeing even if that seeing is considered defective as a consequence. 
 
I’ve explored how generally perceptual aids give up some of the typical features of seeing 
in order to provide others –e.g., give up macroscopic views for microscopic ones and vice 
versa, and so forth. We have scopes and probes and lenses of all varieties, which are all 
meant to provide, and often enhance, the repertoire of visual information but all at the 
expense of the normal range of our eyes. These are non-controversial genuine prostheses for 
seeing and so, there is good reason to claim that lacking information that is normally 
available to seeing, is part of the story for all prostheses for seeing.  
 
Thus, part of the nature of photographic information significantly consists in photographs' 
enhancing the normal repertoire of sight in virtue of giving up e-information in order to 
gain prolonged access to v-information. And there should be no incompatibility with 
claiming on the one hand, that they are lacking some information typically available in 
seeing and on the other, that they are genuine prostheses for seeing. Having looked at 
cases where photographs could carry e-information it became clear that their epistemic 
value as a device-type was diminished by not fixing objects –which is to say, they lose 
epistemic virtues that way. However novel and entertaining (qualities that are not at stake 
here), the helmet-cam would be a rather useless device. I then show how it is not 
uncommon to gain richness in some kind of information at the expense of another kind –
e.g., microscopes are at a loss for macroscopic information and we maintain that they are 
transparent despite a lack of information typically available to seeing.  
 
The defect hypothesis even points us towards the epistemic salience of the device by 
highlighting the kind of information that, by virtue of that defect, constitutes the device’s 
salience. Since e-information is not a necessary condition for seeing, we do maintain 
perceptual contact with the objects of photographs despite their being fixed and it is by 
fixing objects that we get the richness of that object information that we do. This is why 
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we find it more valuable to have photographs than helmet cams. But if Cohen and Meskin 
were wrong about the role of e-information in their theory, what grounds do they have for 
the epistemic value of photographs they proposed? 
Goal 2: What is the epistemic value of photographs?  
 
I argued that Cohen and Meskin were wrong in asserting 1) that e-information is a 
necessary condition for seeing through prostheses (even in the nondoxastic construal) and 
tacitly supposing 2) that rejecting the transparency is necessary to establishing the 
epistemic value of photographs.98 With regards to 1), it was easy to come up with cases of 
photographic devices carrying e-information and of ordinary seeing not carrying e-
information or, with even greater ease, cases of hearing without the carriage of e-
information, as well as a number of other difficulties. So while I agree that e-information is 
a regular feature of seeing, I’ve argued that it is not a necessary condition for seeing with 
prosthetics. However, another consequence of undermining the necessity of e-information 
is that this allows a revival of the transparency option. If the transparency of photographs 
is no longer discredited on the basis of being spatially agnostic, –i.e., that spatial 
agnosticism is compatible with being a genuine prosthesis for seeing, – then the process 
type of photographs can be reliable because it is transparent. 
 
From this analysis there is now room to agree with Cohen and Meskin that the epistemic 
value of photography rests in photographs being spatially agnostic informants about 
objects and accept that the lack of e-information is what makes photographs special. The 
very fixing of visual information afforded by photographic technology is part of what 
demarcates its epistemic value and we have some enhancement of visual-information made 
available by the fact that photographs fix their objects. Photographs are then belief 
independent, counterfactual-supporting and similarity- preserving sources of v-
information. This in turn successfully handles the problems in Cohen and Meskin’s 
account. The amendment attests to the reliability of photographs on the one hand, in virtue 
of the photographic process-type being transparent, and successfully makes the distinction 
between photographs and paintings on the other, –the distinction between photographs 
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and paintings being that the process-type of photographic devices is transparent but the 
process-type of paintings is not.  
 
We can also agree that the attitudes people bear with respect to photographs and to 
paintings are quite different but there is a more substantial basis for this difference. 
Transparency is one such basis for trusting knowledge had by photographs over by 
paintings. Of course, photographs and paintings are both sources of evidence and both 
have epistemic value. Both kinds of pictures are, for example, used in trials, –e.g., 
drawings and paintings can be used in cases to generate rough accounts of what an 
attacker may have looked like, to illustrate possible relations between parties involved in 
the scene of the crime, to assess the most likely scenario, and so forth. So they are both 
informative pictures. While they are alike in this way, they still differ in epistemic value, 
which can be illustrated by the fact that they have different results under the hallucination 
test I proposed in Chapter 1: Photographs are not vulnerable to representing 
hallucinations, while paintings are. 
 
These results have further implications for their differences in kind. In virtue of this, 
photographs and paintings are subject to different sceptical hypotheses. My hypothesis is 
that paintings are beholden to the same kind of scepticism as knowledge from testimony 
and photographs subject to scepticism from perceptual experience. In Chapter 5, I will 
show how photographs are not vulnerable to the same sceptical hypotheses as paintings, in 
order to solidify their epistemic differences, and to reinforce the claim that knowledge 
obtained from photographs is a perceptual kind.  
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III 
 
o  
THE TECHNOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
Billboards, family albums, travel brochures, and shopping catalogues are but a few 
examples of where we get information from photographs in our daily lives. But 
photographs are also entrusted to provide information in more demanding provinces of 
evidence, e.g. as evidence in trials, in identification documents, or for a variety of purposes 
in the sciences. (These are at least more important than whether a Big Mac really looks as 
tasty as it does on the billboard –which, incidentally, it does not.)  
 
In the Introduction, I have described the process of developing devices that are meant to 
facilitate preservation and detection of information: they have a special procedure that sets 
the limits of their informational capacities to the benefit of their virtues. There are a variety 
of stages along the way to ensure that these devices must adhere to stricter conventions 
than (at least) the everyday snapshot. Cameras and photographs are amongst the devices 
that are of special importance to the sciences, thus among other things, they are subject to 
the design protocol to ensure that they are rather robust. (This is not to say that 
photographs and cameras always meet those expectations.) Whether they produce satellite 
pictures of the earth, videography of internal organs by scopes, or deep-sea footage, 
regulations are in place to preserve a good code of conduct, but also, design protocols 
govern the very information scientific cameras will produce. Consequently, there are pre-
sets in place on the repertoire of these instruments –i.e., the type of information they 
furnish and the range of distortion under which they can accomplish that are limited by 
virtue of their design. This pre-specified range enhances a device’s virtues because too 
much information would be like clutter to detection and because some information is at 
cross-purposes.  
 
Because the range of information afforded by cameras is pre-specified, it is no accident 
that the images borne from cameras are also limited in the information they furnish. The 
photographic picture is itself limited to a range of information by virtue of the camera’s 
design. In the last chapter, we assessed the lack of egocentric spatial information as one of 
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the photograph’s limitations. Focusing on the design process offers a response to a variety 
of objections to photographic transparency, like those in the last chapters that rely on 
counterexamples that illustrate what photographs lack, –i.e., objections that hold 
photographs do not preserve all the information necessarily available to ordinary seeing 
and are thereby opaque. If photographs are defective in this way, that is, lacking certain 
information that is typical of seeing, we need to look at whether other devices carry all the 
information typical of seeing. Microscopes, telescopes, and so on are amongst those meant 
to enhance the repertoire of vision, but they are all in the same sense, defective. 
Microscopes, telescopes, and so on, all lack some information to the benefit of enhancing 
another sort. Furthermore, as their limited range of information is pre-set by design 
specifications, the technological dimension in turn becomes a crucial aspect of the unique 
identity of a device. Thus, the technological lineage of photographs not only provides 
insight on how they differ from many other kinds of pictures, including but not limited to 
handmade scientific pictures, but also how they resemble other scientific instruments 
which also offer images via lenses.  
 
On the one hand, technological protocols can be one reason we trust some instruments 
over others, as that engineering process reinforces their reliability somehow. However, 
this procedure of contriving information by design scheme also gives a reason to draw a 
sceptical eye to their objectivity: if these instruments are made under engineering 
protocols, which amongst other things operate on a theoretical basis for design, and 
theories depend on belief systems, how can any technological instrument be belief-
independent? Theories are certainly not the same as beliefs but beliefs factor into theory 
building. Moreover, the beliefs on which theory building is based are certainly not the 
same as personal beliefs (or proto-beliefs) attached to having perceptual experiences –e.g., 
when one believes one sees a snake in the grass.  
 
Yet, theoretical systems are not intention-neutral either, and the resulting difficulty is that 
these engineered devices cannot be considered merely ‘windows of observation.’ At face 
value, one might suggest that neither can they be transparent, for in some sense, they 
could all be considered representational of beliefs. I will use this chapter to examine this 
possible tension – first between the notions of belief dependence in the more extreme 
theory of representation and in transparency; and later, by re-examination of the views, I 
explain how transparency still provides a relevant distinction. This undertaking will not 
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only attend to the technological dimension of photographs, but it will also offer up a 
unique epistemic identity of photographic pictures –namely, that they are scopic pictures. 
§1. Representations 
I must preface this chapter by offering an exegesis of representation, as where we put 
various pictures and instruments depends on it, and so does the final goal –coordination of 
transparency with the view that all scientific instrumentation is representational. This will 
not in the end yield a definition, as that is not particularly useful for our purposes. 
Furthermore, the scope of representations is vast. We will see that somewhere along the 
way photographs get lost or misplaced in this expanse. Thus, I will instead offer only 
parameters of the concept, and the more specific criteria for pictorial representations. 
 
As we know, Walton and Currie are at odds on where photographs belong: Walton 
believes photographs are transparent so that, as it were, photographs do not represent 
objects the way handmade pictures do, as handmade pictures can represent the picture-
makers’ beliefs about that object. Currie on the other hand, describes photographs as a 
kind of natural representation in contrast to, say, intentional representations like handmade 
pictures, but holds they are not transparent like microscopes, etc., by virtue of being some 
sort of representation.99 I should note that Walton does not find these incompatible.100 
Meanwhile, I have hinted at an extreme view of representation, where it is suggested that 
all scientific instruments are representational because they depend on beliefs in some way, 
and that is inclusive of even microscopes and telescopes. Thus, this suggests the widest 
range of what counts as representational of beliefs. I have been referring to Bas van 
Fraassen’s project in his stunning book, Scientific Representations. I engage this text because 
it provides various platforms I require for my analysis (note that there may be others that 
could suit this purpose), in particular providing the following three-fold function:  
 
1) Van Fraassen offers a cluster of features of representation that provide the foundation 
for a mostly uncontroversial conceptual scheme of representation. Forerunners on the 
topic of representation with special attention to the pictorial varieties, particularly Nelson 
                                                
99 Walton 1984, Currie 1995. 
100 Walton 1997: 68. 
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Goodman and Dominic Lopes, are also encompassed in this account.101 This account does 
not present a definition but instead highlights the success (and failure) conditions for any 
given representation and the role resemblance plays in representing.102  
 
2) On van Fraassen’s view all scientific tools are representational because they are not 
theory-neutral. This sets up that aforementioned tension with transparency: if 
technological devices are all representational because of the theory-dependence of 
engineering, then transparency seems to be irrelevant. That extends to other devices like 
microscopes and binoculars. However, I will take this tension as an opportunity to show 
that further distinctions are still required, especially between devices that represent per 
theoretical commitments in their design history, and those that represent personal beliefs 
(or proto-beliefs).  
 
3) Analysing the notion of representation in a way that is considerate of Walton, Currie’s 
and van Fraassen’s varying commitments, allows me to show common distinctions, which I 
use to triangulate an appropriate space for photographs. While they may differ in their 
stances on where photographs belong within theories of representation, they can also be 
shown to agree on the fact that photographs are special. I argue that this comes down to 
the fact that photographs are not vulnerable to representing hallucinations.  
 
I should mention a caveat: van Fraassen’s project has a scope that spans far beyond the 
area that I will be attending to. His project looks at a much wider range of representational 
artefacts, which include both the physical and mathematical variety, and all for the 
purpose of rebuilding a theory of science. What he describes as ‘representations’ include a 
far broader range of objects and beyond; not only scopic devices as we have mentioned 
above, but also other tools like maps, schematics and diagrams; more complex machines 
like DNA sequencers and computational devices; an inexhaustible list of physical 
equipment, as well as abstract representations, and his most significant claim, that 
measurement itself is representational.103104  Here I will focus most attention on those 
representations that are pictorial or offer images. 
                                                
101 Goodman 1976, Lopes 1996 and 2005. 
102 van Fraassen 2008: Chs. 1 & 2. 
103 van Fraassen 2008: 15-28. 
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§1.1 Overview on representations  
Both Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art and Dominic Lopes’s Understanding Pictures are at 
the heart of van Fraassen’s analysis of representations: this section will pay particular 
attention on Goodman, leaving Lopes’s pictorial account for the following section. 
Goodman’s theory may be at times controversial, but his description of the two-fold aspect 
of representation is mostly uncontested. In effect, representations have a relation to what 
they represent in two ways: by being of that thing and by depicting it in such and such a 
way. For example, a pencil drawing of my son walking with a donkey is both a 
representation of him (and a donkey) and depicts him as being friends with a donkey.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Gaspar with donkey, Ines de Asis, Dec 2012. 
 
Still, neither of the two faces had by representations determines any given representation 
entirely. Van Fraassen’s strategy is to consider success and failure conditions of 
representations to form a cluster concept. Within this scheme, one principle is recurrent: 
that representations, whatever they are, are guided by “criteria of adequacy.” 105 By this he 
means that the success of any given representation at representing some particular thing 
depends on whether it achieves some special variety of likeness to the thing represented. That 
is to say that not all likenesses are preserved, only a particular set of them, for too much 
likeness is actually to the detriment of a successful representation. Thus, Goodman can be 
                                                                                                                                                  
104 van Fraassen 2008: Chs. 6 & 7. 
105 van Fraassen 2008: 1. 
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credited with this significant contribution: the notion of highlighting with respect to 
representations, because certain information should stand out and often at the expense of 
other information.  
 
It is not uncommon to suggest that what kind of representation a thing is will be 
determined by what it is used to represent.106  For example, compare an Ordinance Survey 
map with a treasure map one might get in a pirate costume kit: they may bear an apparent 
similarity but are made to accomplish two very different goals. The former is used to 
represent the terrain of a particular area for the purpose of navigation, and is in that sense 
a proper map. But the latter only pretends to be a map, and doesn’t offer any real 
navigational cues. That ‘X’ mark that is meant to show where the treasure is, does not 
really locate anything and none of the other points are specified. It is but a prop for the 
purpose of play. Likewise, some paintings and drawings may be created to suit scientific 
purpose like biological illustrations in pen and watercolour, and others depict fantastical 
scenery. Photographs can be used in various ways too and depending on whether it is 
meant to be a journalistic or artistic picture, is relevant to their individual success 
conditions. This praxis criterion helps to illuminate the success conditions of particular 
kinds of representations and also, to make further distinctions between different sorts 
according to the kinds of practices in which they must excel. 
  
Now, the notion of likeness or resemblance is neither a new nor an unpopular basis for 
theories of representation and there is significant controversy on the role of resemblance in 
representations.107 However, the following should not be taken to mean that resemblance 
is the basis for a theory of representation, or at the core of representation in some 
significant way, or that it is somehow an essential property had by all representations, etc.  
I want to point out that van Fraassen only acknowledges that a resemblance criterion is 
necessary for determining what kind of representation something is, and can be a useful 
tool for analysis: 
                                                
106 Block 1983, Goodman 1976, et al, and van Fraassen 2008. 
107 A kind of resemblance theory is discussed in Christopher Peacocke 1987 and Robert 
Hopkins 1998; a revised account of the role of resemblance in representation is offered in 
Lopes 1996 and 2005. 
 87 
[T]here is no strong argument, as far as I can see, based on any clear asymmetry to 
banish resemblance from our topic, nor one to make it relevant to representation in 
general. What does remain, as needs to be emphasized, is that certain modes or 
forms of representation (but not all) do trade on selective (and not arbitrary) 
resemblances for their effect, efficacy, and usefulness…108 
 
Whatever resemblances are preserved offers a clue into what kind of representation it is. 
Representations must be discriminating about what resemblances are preserved because if 
a representation duplicated every aspect, it would be a replica, not a representation. Hence, 
not only would the notion of resemblance be null (as identity goes far beyond mere 
resemblance), but also, too much information would be available, which is at cross-
purposes with whatever the representation is meant to highlight.109 Resemblances 
maintained in a representation highlight specific aspects of what it represents and does so 
at the expense of other aspects. Furthermore, those preserved resemblances are not 
necessarily found in shared properties but could also be by, say, an isomorphism or some 
other relation.  
 
Consider, for example, the fact that resemblance to terrain can be achieved in a number of 
different ways –e.g., by aerial view, or three-dimensional models and paintings of the 
landscape are among them. However, the success conditions are further determined by 
whether the representation desired is a map, as opposed to a topographical model or an 
artistic view of the horizon. Trading on resemblance with the three-dimensional aspects of 
the terrain, or of the view from a particular mountaintop, are not the resemblances that 
will help to make a successful map of that terrain. Additionally, the third dimension must 
also be collapsed into two for the sake of convenience (at least). The particular 
resemblances maintained on a map depend on what it is meant to show, and this means a 
different set of success conditions from, say, a representation of the view as in a landscape 
painting. Map markers might indicate an isomorphic relation to the scale of the terrain like 
a topographical model, but must do away with certain aspects of the terrain’s visual 
appearance if it is to act as a guide for navigation. But even then, particular resemblances 
distinguish one kind of map from another.  
                                                
108 van Fraassen 2008: 18. 
109 Ibid. 
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For example, Ordinance Survey maps are true to scale so as to guide a rambler through 
the terrain, but the markers on the current London Tube map are not isomorphic with the 
placement of rail lines in London. In fact, the lines of the tube have been reshaped in such 
a way that one could read the map better, as the geographically scaled map was too 
cluttered. (See figures 3.2 & 3.3) 
 
Figure 3.2: London Underground Map 1930, where the rail lines represent (roughly)  
where they are in London. 
 
Figure 3.3 it London Underground 1933, after Harry Beck redesigned for ease of use.  
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These resemblance conditions are aspects of maps that we need not consciously attend to 
when we read maps (provided we already have the basic understanding required for 
reading maps). And the role selective resemblance plays to help achieve that particular 
function is part of what distinguishes maps from other kinds of representation. Likewise, a 
painting of the same terrain will resemble the view from a particular perspective and 
achieve its goal in virtue of yet another kind of resemblance. 
 
However, in addition to a resemblance criterion, representations only succeed at representing 
when they are identifiable as representations of a particular kind, or even, identified as 
being a representation to begin with. Ned Block and Nelson Goodman, to name but two, 
provide accounts of representations operating within a system of representations in this 
respect.110 Knowing that we are looking at a map and not, say, an abstract drawing, makes 
all the difference in determining whether we come to read it properly, and without 
knowing what a map is, that piece of paper would not be a navigational guide. A 
representation will fail to communicate its purpose without our having some clue as to 
what kind of representation is at hand. This is not to say that we always know what is 
depicted –we might not identify the person in the portrait, but we identify that it is a 
portrait. Call this the identification criterion.  
 
Further to this identification criterion, what any type or token of a type of representation 
represents is determined by its use. A representation is not defined in terms of a singular 
use, though there may be occasions for this, but by regular practices of using it in a 
particular way over time. Often representations only appear to belong to a particular kind, 
but really might be used for something else entirely. Even given knowledge of what maps 
are and that one has a map in hand, one considers the use of special case scenarios all the 
time: Maps that are drawn by children playing at finding buried treasure that do not have 
any reference to actual places (not on purpose at least) but only function as props in a 
game of make-believe. Certain indicators, such as a child’s scrawled penmanship, might 
offer up clues for determining whether the object belongs to a map type of representation 
or another. This is a praxis criterion. 
 
                                                
110 Block 1983, Goodman 1976. 
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The criteria of adequacy for any given type of representation are partially determined by 
resemblances. Most significantly, much of the definition of, and distinction between, 
representation types has to do with how a particular kind of representation distorts what it 
represents in order to achieve the right kind of resemblance. Distortions of certain features 
of what is being represented is necessary because without these distortions, the important 
features cannot be enhanced, and this ultimately is the goal. Additionally, different 
representation kinds will have different kinds of distortions. So while resemblance may not 
offer up a theory, it does point to the criteria for the success of a representational type.  
§1.2 Pictorial representations 
Much of the following analysis of pictures is owed to Dominic Lopes’s picture theory, as 
offered in Understanding Pictures, which provides a basis for van Fraassen’s account of 
pictorial representations. 111 A special kind of resemblance plays a role in pictorial 
representations as well, and because of this we can expect a special procedure for distorting 
what is to be represented in a picture. Take for example, that drawings of tables are two-
dimensional flat paper surfaces marked with diagonally angled lines. This distorts the real 
table it represents, which is in fact a three-dimensional object with strictly vertical and 
horizontal planes (required for it to function properly). But what makes any 
representation pictorial is a distinctive set of properties. 112 
 
One distinctive feature of pictorial representations is that the kind of resemblance they 
bear to whatever it is they represent is limited to a visual variety. A picture of a tree 
resembles a real tree by presenting features of the real tree that are observed by seeing the 
tree and represented in a way that can be determined visually. This differs, for example, 
from a verbal description of that tree which is another kind of representation, descriptions 
also being a form of representation in their own right. Pictorial representations are 
beholden to a special way of distorting the objects or events they represent and this way is 
distinct from the distortions of verbal and mathematical representations. 
 
                                                
111 Lopes 1996. 
112 van Fraassen 2008. 
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Resemblances between pictures and what they represent can be found in appearance to 
the eye in a special way. Firstly, pictures have a privileged set of visual properties by 
which they successfully represent their subjects. Some of these might include line, colour, 
and shade, among many others. These may be used to distort certain features of what is 
represented but they are not used to make a copy. In contrast, scale models of objects (or 
events) may copy other aspects such as size, length, and so forth. Another significant 
feature of pictorial representations, as opposed to other kinds of representations, is that 
pictures always have a perspectival dimension. One might say verbal representations have 
a perspective but this is metaphorical. The features of literal perspectivity are lacking from 
descriptions: Perspectivity manifests in a cluster of features, none of which are individually 
necessary but join in some combination or another, and all of which are distinctly visual. 
Van Fraassen, explains:  
Imagery…is pictorial exactly if it bears hallmarks of perspectivity. Whether or not 
something is aptly called perspectival depends on whether some appropriate subset 
of these hallmarks are present [:]…occlusion, marginal distortion, texture-fading (grain), 
angle and with special importance, explicit non-commitment and the “horizon of 
alternatives”.113 
 
Let us take these in order: for example, that pictures exhibit certain perspectival cues of 
occlusion is somewhat primary. Occlusion is the result of having one point of view onto a 
picture that represents, say for example, a grouping of objects: The scene will naturally 
contain only one angle of this grouping, and because of this some objects will only offer 
one face, as well as partake in blocking other objects. In order for some sides of an object 
to be visible entails that one cannot simultaneously see other sides –their backsides must 
be occluded.114 Perspective is strict in that one can only see part of a thing at once and 
things also block other things. (Let us leave aside cubist and impossible pictures for now.) 
115 
 
Marginal distortion is another feature of perspectivity.  This is, for example, the way a 
picture might look as though depicted parallel lines converge in the distance (at a 
                                                
113 van Fraassen 2008: 59. 
114 More on occlusion in Hyman 1993, 2000, 2009. 
115 van Fraassen 2008: 36-39.  
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vanishing point). If one were to trace a grid over a picture one would find that the angles 
within, despite representing objects with strictly vertical lines, are distorted from this in 
the picture the closer they are to the margins. In the following figure there are two 
projections of the same building, where the first offers an example of marginal distortion 
and the second seems to show a correction of that distortion.116 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Two projections of a building, with different distortions. 
 
It is also natural for objects in the background to appear less sharp, and perhaps even 
appear as vague blurs while the objects in the foreground appear more detailed. This is 
what is meant by texture-fading, and this is another feature of perspective that identifies 
pictorial representations. The figure above also depicts a building from a particular 
vantage point and offers specific angles of the building. We have already touched on how 
angle is distinctively perspectival but it is perhaps the most obvious feature of a picture 
when we are looking at it. When we look at pictures, we see a scene from a point of view 
and the number of angles and distances in representing that scene is limited. There is a 
                                                
116 Ibid. 
 93 
limit to the angles that, for example, a map can represent its terrain and in that particular 
case, an aerial angle is the ideal angle for the representation to do its work. There is a limit 
to the angles and distances by which this building can be depicted.117  
 
Finally, for the purposes of providing the distinctive features of perspectivity, Lopes 
introduced an important feature: that of explicit non-commitment. For a representation to be 
non-committal in some respect to its subject, it must be neutral on whether its subject 
bears some property A, which is to say, that the representation does not commit to the 
subject having or not having A. Representations can be neutral on a number of properties 
had by its subject. In the case of explicit non-commitment then, the representation has 
depicted the subject as having a property or properties that preclude commitment to 
property A, that is to say, that those properties render it impossible to determine the 
presence or absence of A. For example, a portrait painting of a veiled woman might not 
commit to the subject having red hair or no hair at all under her veil. In this example, the 
veil prohibits commitment to the colour of the hair being one way or another or even its 
presence. Even cubist or impossible pictures can possess this feature.118  
 
Explicit non-commitment has some significance in the analysis of perspectivity. As Lopes 
states: 
Pictures, I maintain, are essentially selective, because every picture is explicitly non-
committal in some respect. That is, every picture represents its subject as having 
some property that precludes it from making commitments about some other 
property.119  
This is a feature that all pictures will bear in one way or another while other hallmarks 
may not be present. But what about in Escher-style pictures or abstract pictures that do 
not choose one angle to depict its subject, but many and show them simultaneously? 
Cubist pictures for example, as already suggested above, may seem at first to be a 
deviation from that rule but actually, many aspects of their subjects might be occluded, 
many choices about how it is represented (as having some properties) will render other 
properties impossible. That same portrait of a veiled woman could be done in a cubist style 
                                                
117van Fraassen 2008: 38. 
118 Lopes 1996: 118. 
119 Lopes 1996: 125. 
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and in its being so might show different angles of her head at once and yet, it in all angles, 
certain choices could be made to preclude any commitment to properties regarding her 
hair, or lack thereof.  
 
But explicit non-commitment and also other perspectival features like occlusion depend on 
our being able to engage with pictures in such a way that we can hypothesize about a 
variation on what is depicted. Had there not been a veil for example, would she be bald? 
Had this picture been painted from a different angle would the profile be more prominent? 
In contrast however, there are some limitations on the kind of hypotheses one can make: 
for example, one cannot perhaps guess that the veil should be a fox-fur cap. These are 
questions regarding the alternatives that belong to limited amount of possibilia for this 
depiction and this is what is meant by a ‘horizon of alternatives.’  
§1.3 Photographs 
Photographs certainly resemble what they are photographs of but perhaps in what sense 
isn’t immediately obvious. One might be inclined to say that they resemble the view of x or 
one might suggest something stronger: they replicate a view of x at time slice t. In any case 
there are some ways in which a photograph succeeds at representing objects by virtue of 
certain resemblances. While this is similar to the resemblances preserved in handmade 
pictures, photographs maintain resemblances independent of beliefs: Photographs 
preserve resemblance to the sight one would have if one had been at that place and at that 
time. In fact, they have a particular penchant for veridical depiction. A photograph also 
highlights what can be described as v-information about a scene, as well as allocentric 
information (relative to the camera), and the state of affairs of objects within the scene. 
But a photograph does this at the expense of other information one would have in seeing 
the scene first-hand: photographs do not preserve the 3-dimensionality of their subjects, 
nor do they preserve information about one’s egocentric spatial relations to them.  
 
Now when we look at a photograph there is an expectation that we understand what we 
are looking at. We are not, for example, inclined to exorcise spirits when we can see 
photographs of our deceased loved ones. Part of getting information properly by 
photograph is in identifying what it is: that it is a picture borne from cameras, that it is an 
image of a thing in the past, and that they are usually pretty good at offering a depiction of 
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that scene from the past. Simply put, we expect certain things to be in place when we 
identify a picture to be photographic.  
 
We also expect that, provided it is a real photograph, what we are looking at is veridical. 
However, depending on the function of a particular photograph, the facts may be 
represented in a variety of ways. We can often gauge whether a photograph is meant to 
offer facts about the world or simply meant to engage celebrity gossip (usually by looking 
at the publications in which they are printed). One can also distinguish between 
journalistic, artistic, and fashion photography, which all have different goals; and in virtue 
of those goals, the people represented might look especially distressed, surreal or beautiful. 
Now, the practice of taking photographs to capture real moments is a norm, but it is easily 
deviated from. One can expect abuses of the value of photographs to mislead its viewers. 
One example of this is illustrated by the notorious paparazzi style of photography, in 
which the goal is not to provide the truth per se, but instead to suggest a juicy nugget of 
gossip.   
 
So, insofar as photographs meet the criteria of adequacy, they are representational in van 
Fraassen’s account. Now that tension I mentioned from the outset should be apparent: 
Like Walton, I believe photographs are transparent and furthermore, (unlike Walton) I 
believe that to be the basis for their epistemic value. Since transparent devices are 
supposed to give visual experiences of objects without representing beliefs, but as neutral 
windows of observation, then we have a problem. However, keep in mind that by van 
Fraassen’s account microscopes and telescopes are also representational of beliefs and 
thus, there is room to suggest that photographs are still more like microscopes than 
paintings. (More on this later.) 
 
Photographs belong in the more specific category of pictorial representations. Photographs 
are pictorial at least insofar as they are composed of line, shade colour and other visual 
properties unique to pictures, and most significantly, photographs also bear the hallmarks 
of perspectivity. They can exhibit this by virtue of occlusion –i.e., the visible surfaces of 
the objects of a photograph usually appear at the expense of the other sides of those 
objects. Those objects are also subject to constraints in angle and distance as the point of 
view framed by the photograph can only be depicted from a certain amount of camera 
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angles. Focusing on some objects may render other parts of the picture blurry, fade other 
objects into the background and the list goes on.  
 
But most significantly, photographs bear the especially pictorial feature of explicit non-
commitment in that, for example, a photograph of a veiled woman just as readily precludes 
commitment to the quality of her hair just as the painting example above.  Now, there 
might appear to be a small difficulty with explicit non-commitment when it comes to 
photographs in that there is indeed some fact of the matter as to the contents of the veil. 
After all, when it comes to photographic depictions, a photograph of the above subject 
entails her existence. The subject might in fact have brown hair hidden under her veil at 
the time the photograph was taken, but nonetheless, that fact does not partake in the 
depiction. Regardless, one can still maintain that photographs are pictorial, as pictures are 
defined according to a cluster concept, and there is no shortfall on the ways a photograph 
can bear some combination of the hallmarks of perspectivity. However, that is not to say 
that photographs are in all ways like other pictures either. (More on this later.) 
§2 The tension  
One goal of this chapter is to distinguish photographs from paintings but particularly, 
make this distinction in a specific area: between photographs and handmade pictures used 
for scientific purposes. I will show that van Fraassen’s account lumps all pictures into one 
category, which in turn fails to offer important distinctions between them. One analysis 
that can be made with respect to that goal is by epistemic import; whether photographs are 
used for information in a different way than (scientific) drawings and paintings. If so, is 
the use of photographs more like the function of microscopes and telescopes or more like 
the function of maps and schematics? Later in this section I will offer various comparisons 
to show that the distinctions transparency can offer remain useful even if one accepts van 
Fraassen’s theory. But before I do that and also, in order to resolve the apparent tension 
between van Fraassen’s scheme and my thesis, it will help to describe the categorization of 
representations van Fraassen offers. 
§2.1 Public hallucinations  
As I mentioned earlier, van Fraassen describes scientific instruments as representational 
by virtue of their being engineered, because engineering involves theoretical commitments. 
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Microscopes, mirrors and such are artificial imitations of natural phenomena like curved 
ice formations or still water which provide magnification or reflection. Engineering takes 
these natural phenomena as an inspiration for designing devices, and uses theories of 
lenses or electromagnetism to produce more dependable instruments. However, a more 
startling feature of his view is that these instruments (and their natural counterparts) are 
described as producing a sort of publically accessible hallucinatory phenomena.  
 
Now, this is not to be confused with the standard definition of hallucination, which is a 
nonveridical visual experience that often comes from psychedelic drugs, psychosis or high 
fevers –van Fraassen specifies those kinds of experiences to be private images, as opposed to 
those everyone else can see.  Instead, he suggests that looking through devices like 
microscopes and mirrors, or their natural counterparts, has a certain kind of hallucinatory 
effect that we would all be able to observe. To illustrate, the images from microscopes are 
a magnification of microorganisms we normally could not see, but the microscope offers an 
image of objects as bigger than they actually are. Thus, these devices and natural 
phenomena change the way things actually look, just as a curved ice sheet may magnify 
the objects frozen within.120 We might think these phenomena to be more like illusory 
images, but set that aside.  
  
So, microscopes and mirrors are among those that are described as public hallucinations: 
they are visual phenomena of things that everyone can see, but what one actually sees is 
not any thing. Other members this category include rainbows and reflections in water: 
There is actually something to see when one sees rainbows and reflections in water but 
what one sees is not a thing itself. Some of these public hallucinations are caused by the 
things that they bear a resemblance to, or copy: For example, the appearance of a tree in a 
reflection is not itself a tree but is caused, in part, by a tree and copies the appearance of 
that tree.  Other public hallucinations do not copy other things, –e.g., rainbows are not 
copies of anything. Despite the great variety of images that fit into this category, they all 
share in common that they can be photographed and that has a special significance. 
 
                                                
120 van Fraassen 2008: 93. 
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Figure 3.5: Diagram of van Fraassen’s “Image Categories.” 
 
All pictorial representations, inclusive of drawings, paintings, maps and so on, are 
categorized as graven images. Graven images are visual experiences that come from 
secondary objects that are themselves objects to see, that is, they are images of things but 
are also things themselves. Graven images vary significantly, inclusive of pictures like oil 
paintings, drawings, and schematics, but also include of a variety of 3-dimensional 
depictions –e.g., marble sculptures of the human form, or scaled models of buildings. Since 
they are a kind of picture, photographs are listed as graven images. Initially this may seem 
plausible, but since the photograph is the image borne from a camera, and the camera itself 
a lens-based device like a microscope, why is it not a public hallucination? I concede that 
they are images but secondary objects, that is, an image but also a piece of paper, like 
other graven images. However, as far as I can tell, other graven images bear no such 
relation to a device that offers public hallucinations and that difference seems more 
significant than the similarity of secondarity.  (More on this later.)  
 
The last category has already been mentioned above, and these are what van Fraassen 
calls private images. Those private images are what we normally think of when we think of 
hallucinations. These are usually privately experienced visual phenomena including 
psychedelic events, dreams, and so on. Van Fraassen calls them private hallucinations 
because one could not share them with others, point them out in the distance, nor take 
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produce a ‘stand alone’ image that is under some viewing conditions as
‘real’ as a hologram.18 It took more than a thousand years before this art
of imitating nature provided the resources for a systematic exploration of
nature.
That is how I suggest we should understand the microscope as well. Van
Leeuwenhoek did with his lenses essentially the very same sort of thing
as Newton did with his prisms—namely, imitate the ability of nature to
create public hallucinations. There are objections to this, especially for the
simplest cases, such as van Leeuwenhoek’s magnifying glass or the optical
microscopes we remember from high school biology classes. I will take
those up below; let’s try for a systematic overview first. For images I want
to display a division into several kinds and sub-kinds. For mnemonic ease
I’ll supply a diagram, with an elaboration on its labels.
Graven
Images
painting
photo
sculpture
‘‘COPY’’-
QUALIFIED
reflection
shadow
〈microscope
image〉
NOT
‘‘COPY’’-
QUALIFIED
rainbow
mirage
fata morgana
after-image
dream
hallucination
Public
Hallucinations
Private
Images
Figure 4.2. Image Categories
(Graven Images) On one side are the images which are in fact things, such
as paintings and photos.
(Private Images) On the other extreme are the purely subjective ones
like after-images, dreams, and private hallucinations. These are personal,
not s ared, not publicly accessible. Ind d, we are pretty clearly dealing
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photographs of them.121 Again, it is significant that photographs are part of the test van 
Fraassen uses because, as we will later see, these private hallucinations can be represented 
by other kinds of pictures, but not photographs.  
 
Again, his analysis is meant as a basis to challenge the belief that when we use microscopes 
and similar devices, we are looking through ‘a window’ of some sort in order to pursue 
scientific data. Because devices, particularly scientific ones, are designed under such a 
protocol and their information is determined by those conventions, one has to wonder 
whether the theories that help to determine their construction can produce a belief-neutral 
observational tool. Intuitively, we are content with the traditional description of the 
phenomena but he does not think we should accept this prima facie. As van Fraassen points 
out,  
 
[M]easurements occur only as special elements of the experimental procedure by 
which objects are deliberately placed in unusual, artificially designed conditions –
conditions in which they are made to respond to the questions put to them.122  
 
Theoretical frameworks then partially constitute the information we get from these so-
called ‘neutral instruments,’ van Fraassen suggests. While theorising is part of how we 
understand the world of experience, there is an expectation that the instruments we use to 
understand the world are theory neutral. But if they are not, then perhaps our notion of 
objective tools needs revision. Therein lies the tension with the transparency of any 
instrument, not just photographs, as transparency appears to be exemplary of a ‘window of 
observation’ theory. 
§2.2 A counterintuitive implication of this view 
One feature I want to take away from this is van Fraassen’s description of technological 
devices being information-specified –that is to say, part of their design process does 
involve deciding on what specific information should be made available, and often at the 
expense of other information. Thus the range of distortion of artificial images is subject to 
                                                
121 van Fraassen 2008: 104-105. 
122 van Fraassen 2008: 93-94. 
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those pre-sets mentioned earlier –per their technological history. This is valuable to 
maintain but there are other aspects that need to be sorted first.  
 
One interesting consequence of van Fraassen’s view is that the devices with the strictest 
process of design contrive the information most, bearing the strongest representational 
features in virtue of being the outcrop of theoretical commitments. This generates a 
paradox of sorts: on one hand, scientific instrumentation is held to the highest standard for 
producing a sort of “window” to the world because of their systematic production, –that 
systemization being an effort to preserve objectivity no less– and on the other hand, this 
very stricture is what forces the information through a system that undermines the 
objectivity of the data. 
 
Accepting this account has further counterintuitive implications. The more natural 
occurrences of such phenomena are less belief-relative because they are theory neutral, 
while the artificial reproductions of those processes are not. Fossils and naturally 
occurring photograms do not represent theoretical systems (on purpose); rather, they rank 
more closely to windows of observation than photographs and microscopes. That ranking 
is perhaps in itself acceptable. Because no instrument of science, per van Fraassen’s 
diagnosis, is belief independent, it seems that devices commonly accepted as enhancements 
for seeing cannot be transparent either (since, belief independence is one of the necessary 
criteria for transparency). That will require attention. 
 
However, in practice we find manufactured lenses more reliable than naturally occurring 
lens-type phenomena (taking for granted the lenses in our eyes), and we expect continuity 
in the reflections in our mirrors over reflective surfaces in nature. Not that everyday 
practice always aligns with the truth of things but in this case, it seems, we find the 
artificial devices more reliable because they offer a level of uniformity and consistency that 
their natural counterparts cannot. Quite often, that is the very reason they were designed 
in the first place–to replace the rather flakey natural phenomena we once relied upon. 
Thus, technological artifacts have more epistemic credibility over the naturally occurring 
phenomena on which they might be based. That is to say, we take these artificial devices to 
be dependable sources of the information they are made to furnish. While we might even 
on occasion use the natural inspiration for them, –e.g., look into a puddle to check one’s 
teeth in lieu of a compact, – the mirror is tried and true for that purpose.   
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When we look at a mirror, we expect an objectively formed reflection of ourselves 
(notwithstanding self image issues that may skew how we see the reflection) or, in other 
words, we do not expect to see ourselves through someone else’s eyes. But somehow, by 
van Fraassen’s account we supposedly have it backwards: seeing through a mirror means 
we see through a device that has been modified according to what we are supposed to see, 
and that is according to the theoretical commitments of those who produced the mirror. 
So, mirrors cannot be belief independent. But then why do we rely on mirrors over puddles 
even though we might not know that? 
 
Photographs can also be analyzed accordingly: Being the product of the camera, which is 
itself an instrument of documenting information that undergoes strict technological 
protocol, means the photograph gives only a view based on a theoretical basis of 
engineering. Consequently, photographs represent their depicta according to the design 
specifications. However, naturally occurring phenomena of the same ilk, such as the 
naturally occurring photograms mentioned in previous chapters, offer something closer to 
a neutral window of observation than photographs because they are not made with 
cameras. Even if both are considered representations on van Fraassen’s view, it is 
nonetheless odd that a theory-relative device bears more contrived information than 
naturally occurring phenomena. Consequently, on van Fraassen’s view, we should resist 
accepting the neutrality of technological devices, though it may apply to their naturally 
occurring counterparts. 
 
We appear to have a rather counterintuitive epistemic implication (which, is not 
encompassed in van Fraassen’s theory). We normally trust the instrumentation that has 
undergone the more regulated protocol (and because of that very systemization) over the 
naturally occurring phenomena, because we cannot predict whether the latter types will 
always align with nature to produce the image we are looking for. We can expect some 
regularity and reliability of information and uniformity across instruments of the same 
kind. (Of course, defective instruments may occur, but in general, a microscope will do 
what we think it does.) We find this design history to be confirmation of the product’s 
being able to produce the information we use it to search out. So when we transfer the 
matter into principles of trust, we have the opposite of the results we would expect. 
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§2.3 Comparing devices 
We want to maintain that instruments like microscopes and telescopes are transparent or 
‘windows of observation’, but since the technological protocol they undergo does in some 
sense impose a theory, we have to decide at what point theory-relativity is to be 
distinguished from belief dependence. One reason for that distinction is that our epistemic 
attitudes differ between these and we trust the images from a systematically produced 
device over handmade representations of the same images –e.g., microscopic images over 
hand drawn paramecium, sonogram images of internal organs over charcoal renderings, 
and so on. Here I provide comparisons to illustrate where a distinction is needed between 
kinds of pictures and devices that ex hypothesi are all representational of beliefs.  
These comparisons include: 
1) a hand drawn map versus a standardized map 
2) a hand made drawing of x versus a microscopic slide of x. 
3) a photograph of x versus a painting of x 
 
I offer the first comparison to illustrate differences in epistemic attitudes towards the same 
thing, namely a map, but whose histories of production differ. Do we give more credence 
to a handmade map drawn by someone on the street or to one that has been standardized?  
Even though both maps have the function of pictorially representing orientation in the 
same way, there is a level of added credibility given to the map that has undergone some 
testing and checking beyond the scribbles of the individual mapmaker on the street. 
Sometimes the scribbler even has more knowledge of details and landmarks to guide you 
but in general we hold the standard map to have been through some regulatory practices. 
We might use both maps too.  
 
Maps are special epistemic objects because they are like drawings and have a history of 
being handmade (as cartography is and was a craft) but they are nonetheless subject to 
some conventions that regulate their information. One can imagine a number of cases 
where a map can even be belief independent in the way photographs are, especially if they 
have been made in a process like for example, the following – a map could be made by 
taking a satellite photograph, where the image is then transposed into a simplified version 
with bare lines and contours, all by computer. The hand-drawn map from the 
acquaintance on the street is belief dependent in an obvious way: it represents whatever 
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that person believes of the terrain he is illustrating for you. But the mass produced map is 
subject to some regulations and are made with a number of checks along the way even if it 
had been handmade at some point. These latter sort, have a certain credibility in virtue of 
having been through a tribunal of some sort to verify the data. 
 
But while the machine made maps are subject to conventions that hope to limit any 
imprint of personal belief, they wouldn’t be transparent because they do not meet the 
similarity preservation criterion. In fact, a previous section showed that a certain kind of 
distortion had to occur to make these kinds of representations function properly: this 
involved a change in perspective and flattening of space and so on. Distortion of the 
appearance of the terrain to favour isomorphism with the spatial aspects of the land or of 
the appearance of the components in order to highlight the parts that need attention, 
means these kinds of representations deviate from looking like what one would see if one 
saw what they represented first-hand. Even the satellite photograph would undergo a 
significant change in order to transform into a readable map. However, one can imagine 
that putting the satellite photograph through a different algorithm might yield an impartial 
map. 
 
Bringing back the topic of handmade pictures, I would like to compare a different device. 
As we know, microscopes are in Walton’s view transparent but in van Fraassen’s view 
representational. Because of the counterintuitive implications for the epistemology of 
scientific instruments, we need to look at whether we give the same credence to what a 
microscope shows us as to a hand made drawing of that same image. If someone were to 
draw the very same paramecia in the very same way, would we treat it the same as what 
the microscope shows us? We would likely give the microscopic image a certain epistemic 
value that is different from the drawing, even if the drawing shows more about the 
paramecia’s various parts and so on. This is because while the drawing might preserve 
some similarity (in fact, it may even be better at highlighting certain features that would be 
overlooked on the microscopic slide), the microscope preserves that similarity condition 
without dependence on what someone else has seen.  
 
These comparisons are just introductory, but the most relevant comparison to be made 
here is between two kinds of graven images van Fraassen noted: photographs and 
handmade pictures. Both offer visual information about objects and are objects 
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themselves, that is, paper with images on them. While microscopic images can be seen at 
the time the slide is in place and one looks through it, graven images freeze the image to be 
looked at any time afterwards and are distinct objects themselves. But how handmade 
pictures and photographs do that are also very different. When we compare our epistemic 
attitudes about a hand drawn picture of paramecia, and the view through the microscope, 
we found they were different. Handmade pictures of something will also be treated 
differently from photographed image of that same thing.  
 
While the division being attributed to transparency may be controversial, we do in fact 
trust photographs of crime scenes over paintings of them, even though we use all sorts of 
drawings for evidence as well. An important condition for this trust is that the device that 
produces them is meant to create an impartial representation. Cameras are built to take 
pictures of things that are really there. Photographs cannot represent things that aren’t 
there. (At least, not without some creative tweaking, which I will discuss in the next 
chapter). This point may not necessarily sidestep any issues for philosophers of science 
because skepticism about the purity of observation had by these devices cannot be undone, 
but this is sufficient for an epistemic analysis. Whatever the relationship to beliefs had by 
the variety of instruments here, there are still differences between how we regard some 
representations over others.  
 
We know that photographic pictures are not the only kind used as scientific tools. 
However, there are differences in the ranges of distortion determined by their methods of 
generation. This tells us something about their differences in kind. The direct correlation 
between their respective ranges of distortion and the resulting pictures are not all limited 
by the tools themselves. Some pictures are made by hand with pencils and paper to 
document, say, the parts of a flower. That hand can do a whole range of other kinds of 
drawings with that pencil and paper: e.g., they can draw Tolkien characters, portraits or 
even abstract pictures.  
 
While both kinds of tools are limited –and limiting in what one can achieve with them– the 
limits of cameras define the limits of the photographs they can make.  So, how picture 
makers of both photographic and handmade pictures distort reality is subject to different 
kinds of limitations for distortion. Different handmade pictures have techniques for 
depiction: maps scale terrain; schematics highlight crucial parts, etc. They all succeed and 
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fail according to what kind of representation it is supposed to be. As discussed in a 
previous section, those depictive techniques have certain goal-oriented distortions. 
Photographs, meanwhile, have a different interaction with the medium: there are a variety 
of photographic techniques one can use to achieve what one wants but knowledge of how 
to operate the camera and use a variety of peripheral equipment is crucial. The distortion 
scope of a photograph can only be stretched by experimenting with peripheral equipment. 
 
We also discussed the aspects of technological invention in a previous section.  
Technological devices are subject to a committee of designers (formally or not), and this 
committee decides how the devices will function properly. For the camera, the resulting 
picture and the kind of information it can provide depends on this. In other words, 
technology, both then and now, is regulated in a way that one cannot regulate techniques 
of artists. (Photographic artists are distinctive in that they work within the limitations of 
their medium –that is their special brand of creativity.) Paintings and handmade pictures 
of all kinds are created according to techniques, not technology, and techniques are had by 
artists, not devices. They are crafted and while sometimes objects of design, made to a 
specification (as a handcrafted chair is designed to function as something to sit upon as 
well as a decorative object) they do not undergo the process of technological devices.  
 
Current day digital cameras can provide a library of styles and effects that were once 
specific to individual analogue cameras. They can achieve more than the entire repertoire 
of effects that an arsenal of novelty cameras could. However, the photographs that come 
from even today’s digital camera are still limited in that they cannot surpass the limits of 
the camera. Unless, of course, one manipulates the digital image in a photograph-editing 
program, in which case, we have a handmade digital picture rather than a photograph. 
(We will look at that distinction in the next chapter.)  
 
Paintings and drawings and other handmade pictures are workable media. They are not 
limited by their generative methods as those methods are generated according to 
techniques, not subject to the same limits as a technological device is. The technique of 
painting, versus that of drawing, has limitations of its own kind but this is not determined 
by the limitations of a device that produces them. One should not confuse this distinction 
with the limitations of different media: it is true, for example, that one can accomplish 
some layering with oil painting that one cannot with watercolors and so on. Rather, one 
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can distort reality in ways with handmade pictures that one cannot do with 
(unmanipulated) photographs. Drawing or painting impossible pictures, Escher-style 
images, and cubist depictions are within the range of their techniques. Drawing or 
painting from fantasy, dreams and so on, are within the range of possible depictions in 
these media.  
  
Handmade pictures are crafted by people, and that is to say that the picture-maker is a 
person. It is true that both photographic and handmade pictures are produced by a 
picture-maker in conjunction with his or her tools, whether that is a camera or a pencil. 
However, this is compatible with the former tool being a complex machine that has a 
delimited set of possibilities. The distinction between these picture types goes back to 
Roger Scruton again: handmade pictures are intentional representations whereas 
photographs are not. That is to say, that crafted pictures that are meant to represent visual 
events necessarily depend on the intentional states of the picture makers. This means the 
contents of handmade pictures can represent non-veridical visual experiences like mirages, 
dreams or hallucinations. We already know this because handmade pictures proved 
vulnerable to representing hallucinations, per the hallucination test in Chapter 1. 
 
But one cannot represent one’s hallucinations with a photograph (unless one manipulates 
it somehow). Scruton describes photographs as having a causal relation to their objects.123  
The photographic image of x entails that x existed to be photographed. It is in this way 
that photographs depend on their objects in a way that paintings and drawings do not. 
And it is also because of their limited range of distortion that they are different from 
handmade pictures, as with the handmade pictures the opportunities for distortion are far 
more extensive.  
 
Now there is something more significant about photographic pictures that differentiate 
them from handmade pictures. Recall for the moment the test van Fraassen offered in 
order to show what counts as a public hallucination. In this test, if one can photograph a 
hallucination it is a public one rather than a private one, which can only be seen by the 
person hallucinating. The photographable hallucinations can be seen by anyone who is 
there to see it –rainbows and microscopes belong to this group. Could one carry out this 
                                                
123 Scruton 1981: 579. 
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test with hand drawn pictures? Would we call a drawing of a rainbow a necessary 
indication of that rainbow having existed? Perhaps in general we trust that no 
hallucination has occurred there but the fact remains that a drawing is vulnerable to that 
possibility and a photograph is not. One can privately hallucinate a rainbow that isn’t 
there and draw it accordingly. One could not however photograph the hallucination of a 
rainbow. In a nutshell, some devices can be used to represent hallucinations and some 
cannot. 
 
Now, one can only use van Fraassen’s camera test for public hallucinations if one gives the 
apparatus credibility to produce an honest picture and that credibility is withheld from 
paintings. So there is some implication that photographs are particularly trustworthy form 
of picture making, or they would not be able to act as confirmation of the public 
phenomena. Why not paintings though? It seems obvious to me, as a devotee of 
transparency that this can be explained by the fact that a painting’s content 
counterfactually depends on the painter’s beliefs and his beliefs could be wrong. Belief 
dependence is supposed to be across the board but it is clear that photographs do not have 
the kind of belief dependence that paintings do. Photographs are not belief dependent in 
the sense that they would be able to represent the content of hallucinations, whereas 
paintings are belief dependent in that way. So, while devices used for scientific inquiry are 
representational on van Fraassen’s view, which makes them suspicious because they bear 
the stains of beliefs through theories, we can already see that the kind of belief dependence 
relation had by scientific instruments is probably not the same as that of handmade 
drawings.  
§2.4 Belief dependence: differentiated and revised 
I have argued thus far that engineered instruments are representational alongside 
handmade pictures, as both depend on beliefs in some way. Those more commonly trusted 
scientific devices like telescopes and microscopes, which we trust partially because of their 
engineered production, are representational because of the very belief systems that guide 
their design. But there remains the fact that in practice we typically trust the images from 
instruments of science, and photographs too, over handmade pictures. So here we must 
find a way to differentiate the kinds of belief dependence attached to them. But first, I 
want to explain that the notion of belief dependence is slightly misleading because beliefs 
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are a kind of intentional state, among which there are many others, including perceptions 
and recollections. It will be helpful to understand belief dependence as a kind of exemplary 
of the more accurate description intentional dependence. 
 
Now, let us look at how a microscopic image is representational on this view. A 
microscope is designed to make very small matter visible to us. It magnifies some of the 
smallest particles we know of and it does so, for the most part, with the use of lenses. From 
early forms to mass production of a variety of microscopes, lens theories were used in 
order to design a variety of microscopes. For example, optic lens theories were used in the 
design of microscopes where refraction of light was the mechanism for their images, and 
similarly, while different mechanisms, electromagnetic lens theory was used for electron 
microscopes. Thus the use of lenses in different ways became integral to various 
conceptions of the microscope. Being based on theories (of lenses, electromagnetism, 
optics, and so on) is what makes a microscope representational, for theories depend on 
beliefs even if those beliefs have been substantiated and so on.  
  
Yet, even if one only sees that image because the microscope was designed to the tune of a 
number of beliefs, those beliefs are not producing the image. The microscope produces the 
image and the device itself is only belief dependent insofar as theories were integral to its 
design. But the device does not represent the beliefs that helped form the theories, nor the 
theories themselves. The microscopic image is itself belief-neutral, however the process of 
designing a microscope might otherwise be. So, on the one hand, we have the kind of 
belief dependence that is required in the forming of theories, but theories are themselves 
more robust than beliefs.  
 
So, I want to suggest that scientific instruments are dependent on belief insofar as they are 
theory relative. Theory relativity is then to be distinguished from dependence on intentional 
states (of which, perceptions and personal beliefs are a part) as there are also devices that 
can represent intentional states and in fact, require some sort of intentional state to depict. 
Microscopes and telescopes cannot represent intentional states. When we look through 
theory-relative devices, the image we see not only fails to represent intentions, but also 
their images do not counterfactually depend on intentional states either. This is a crucial 
difference from handmade pictures, as the kind of belief dependence handmade pictures 
have is a necessary dependence relation to intentions. Handmade pictures depend on the 
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intentional states of the illustrator, who in turn can represent a variety of intentional states 
including beliefs, dreams, memories and fantasies. (This is not to say that all mental states 
are intentional, but rather at most, that all mental states that may be engaged for seeing 
and drawing, at the very least require proto-beliefs.)  
 
Now, whether or not beliefs are engaged in drawing might seem to be debateable as there 
is some way one might think that drawings can circumvent belief states. One example of 
this can be sourced to a commonly used guidebook for budding artists called Drawing on the 
Right Side of the Brain. This book offers a method of drawing that requires one to more or 
less behave like a tracing machine: one is to look onto the object one is drawing and not 
the paper, following the lines with the eye and coordinate that with the movement of the 
hand, in such a way that one detaches from what he or she is drawing and is merely 
following lines.124 Another reason to consider the possibility that drawing can bypass belief 
states is offered by Lopes. He has suggested that it is possible for many kinds of drawings 
to be drawn without engaging a conceptual state, and that without concepts there can be 
no beliefs. 125   
 
However, I do not think either of these states is adequately distanced from, or insensitive 
to, at least a proto-belief that one has seen some object. I thus want to reinforce the 
intentional description here, as beliefs belong to that category alongside a number of other 
mental states (again, not to claim that all mental states are encompassed). Belief 
dependence is only one of many intentional states that can be engaged in hand-making 
pictures. Yet some intentional state is required for drawing, for at the very least (whether 
one calls seeing intentional or proto-intentional) drawings depend on the illustrator’s 
perception.  
  
To illustrate, whether engaging concepts or not, even a-conceptual drawing is vulnerable 
to hallucinations because they still require the use of the perceptual apparatus of the 
illustrator. Even the state prescribed by Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain is vulnerable to 
representing hallucinations for the same reason.126 As such, both kinds of drawing methods 
                                                
124 Edwards 1979. 
125 Lopes 1996: 184-87. 
126 Edwards 1979. 
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are sensitive to any combination of intentional states just by requiring perception at the 
very least. Whether attentive to concepts while drawing objects or not, the illustrator 
represents (and misrepresents) according to what he sees, which is itself sensitive to 
engaging other intentions. And there is always the possibility that strictest disciple of 
realism is hallucinating.  Handmade pictures are far more intimate with intentions that 
include personal beliefs than microscopes and so on, and they thus bear a necessary 
dependence on states that allow those beliefs to be represented in the depiction. 
 
As we have touched upon at various points thus far, the particular kind of belief 
dependence or intentional dependence had by handmade pictures can be identified by 
their vulnerability to the hallucination test I mentioned in Chapter 1. This test checked 
whether information provided by any given picture-making technique or device was 
vulnerable to someone else’s private hallucinations. It seems appropriate that a test that 
will show the vulnerability to private hallucination problem will help offer the distinction 
between counterfactual dependence on private beliefs over those that may depend on 
belief systems. The test again is as follows: 
Private hallucination test: 
If a device or tool (used in science or other environments for the purposes of 
offering information) generates a kind of representation that is vulnerable to the 
possibility of regularly representing private hallucinations, it is not transparent. 
 
This means that if a representation can represent false perceptions such as hallucinations 
from psychoactive drugs or psychological conditions, it is vulnerable. It also means that 
devices that require states that are vulnerable to hallucination, even if that is not engaged, 
still belong to the category that is vulnerable to this test.  
 
Per van Fraassen’s account, photographs are graven images, –that is, secondary objects 
that bear an image of what they represent– and as such they will go with other pictures. 
But it doesn’t seem quite right that photographs are lumped in with handmade drawings. 
There is still some fundamental difference between the relationship to belief had by 
scientific instruments and photographs on the one hand, and that had by handmade 
drawings on the other. Whether one admits to this difference per the transparency thesis, 
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or per Currie’s natural versus intentional distinction, or even per Scruton’s causal versus 
intentional distinction, one still wants to draw a line between photographs and paintings. 
 
One significant difference in belief dependence between photographic and handmade 
pictures can be sourced to how their respective images are produced. The handmade 
picture is obviously made by someone, but even though someone takes a photograph, the 
image is still owed to the camera. We have already shown how handmade drawings by 
virtue of requiring the involvement of an illustrator, are sensitive to representing 
hallucinations. But on the other hand, photographs are not sensitive in this way. 
Photographic images cannot represent hallucinatory content because they are borne from 
cameras, and cameras have certain limitations. While people often operate cameras, 
cameras can only photograph what there is to photograph. What the photographer 
believes will not have direct impact on the image. So, we bear different attitudes towards 
the information these respective device types provide because of the process by which they 
are made, and a difference in belief dependence as illustrated by the hallucination test.  
 
Microscopes, telescopes, binoculars, etcetera are invulnerable to the hallucination test and 
thus, for Currie and Walton these devices are transparent. While van Fraassen wants to 
convince us that treating microscopes and the rest like windows of observation is wrong, 
and I am sympathetic to his view, it remains to be seen whether Fraassen’s account can 
make transparency redundant. Meanwhile the transparency of photographs is still to be 
determined. The above analysis, I believe, was able to show that the distinctions of belief 
dependence, reinforced by the hallucination test, not only separates microscopes and 
telescopes from handmade pictures, but also separates photographs from handmade 
pictures. Now some additional work needs to be done to find a suitable home for 
photographs. 
§3 Coordination  
The private hallucination test demarcates a line between kinds of representation by 
distinguishing one kind of belief dependence from another. Being vulnerable to 
hallucinations is the hallmark of representations that are dependent on intentional states 
like personal beliefs, whereas not being vulnerable to hallucinations indicates the device is 
representational of belief only insofar that it is theory-relative, but it will not itself produce 
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an image according to what someone else sees. Currie and Walton can probably agree to 
this distinction and I believe van Fraassen would take no issue either. 
 
Now, I want to offer a coordinated view of these accounts of representation for, as I 
mentioned earlier, I believe there is some conceptual isomorphism between them, and also 
a place we can all agree to put photographs in. First, let us review the scope of their 
analyses of representation: 
 
Van Fraassen considers everything we have discussed to be representational of beliefs; 
from microscopes and other scientific instrumentation on the one hand, to handmade 
pictures on the other. Let us call this broad sweeping view (R1). (R1) recognizes that 
there are private hallucinations, –i.e., those from dreams and psychedelic drugs and so on, 
– but that many scientific instruments are a kind of public hallucination, in that they can 
be seen by others but are somewhat illusory. A distinction was made between two kinds of 
hallucinations on his view, per the (private) hallucination test, which separates handmade 
intention-dependent representations from those devices that are theory-relative 
representations. One can surmise that between graven images too, one can distinguish 
those that are vulnerable and invulnerable to private hallucination. Van Fraassen at the 
very least cites the photographability of some phenomena to indicate that they are not 
private hallucinations.   
 
The hallucination test also demarcates the representation types in Currie’s analysis, which 
we can call (R2). Intentional representations are vulnerable to representing hallucinations, 
whereas natural representations, like photographs, are not. Transparent devices like 
microscopes and telescopes are also invulnerable to the hallucination test but on this view, 
photographs are not transparent. Thus, this differs from (R1) in that there are transparent 
devices, which are thus not representations. 
 
Walton’s view would be in agreement with Currie and van Fraassen, that handmade 
drawings are vulnerable to the hallucination test, and that photographs are not: we already 
know that photographs can only represent what there was to see, and will offer images in 
accordance with that, even despite what the photographer sees. They are, along with a host 
of other instruments of observation, transparent. Walton’s account differs from (R1) and 
(R2) because of this transparency thesis in that he does not think any of these devices are 
 113 
representational of beliefs, even if they are representations of some kind. That is, of course, 
except for those vulnerable to the hallucination test. Call this (T1). 
 
Now on both (R1) and (R2) there will be some special place for photographs for they are 
neither of the microscopic variety because they are secondary images, aka, pictures. Yet, 
despite being a kind of picture, they are not vulnerable to hallucinations like other 
pictures, particularly handmade ones. Currie and van Fraassen can probably both agree 
that photographs are natural representations for those reasons.127 
 
But, for (T1) photographs belong with microscopes and telescopes as photographs belong 
with the devices that are invulnerable to hallucination. That in-between place that (R1) 
and (R2) forced photographs into, is ignoring the force of the hallucination test, which 
puts photographs in with transparent devices. And one should also wonder whether 
photographs easily fit into a category with graven images: photographs are images borne 
from cameras, which are a kind of scopic technology (in that they are built on lens 
theories). As cameras are a kind of scope and photographs are the images they bear, one 
might argue that this is not unlike the relationship of microscopes to their microscopic 
images. That is to say, that the fact that photographs are secondary objects may be 
inconsequential as there is no stipulation against scopes producing pictures externally. It is 
not entirely clear, but I am happy at this point for that to remain ambiguous.  
 
I do think that van Fraassen is right to say all of these things are representational in their 
own way, but what does that say about my loyalty to the transparency thesis? I say that 
subscribing to (R1) is not to the detriment of transparency (nor perhaps even to Currie’s 
view). This is because I do not find transparency to be incompatible with representation, if 
the belief dependent element of representation is to be construed as (R1). Even if all 
devices are representational of beliefs, there are some that are more like windows of 
observation (even if they aren’t quite) and some that are more like looking through 
someone else’s windows so to speak.  The hallucination test distinguishes them. Thus all 
these instruments being representational is compatible with holding that photographs are 
transparent.  
 
                                                
127 Coordination based on Currie 1995, Walton 1984, van Fraassen 2008. 
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Now cameras belong to the former, and by extension, as the image the camera produces I 
think the photograph offers a window too. However, in seeing through a photograph as it 
were a window, what a photograph represents is a particular and specific view at some 
time in the past. Thus, what we see through photographs is a visual representation of a 
time slice. That is not incompatible with saying that we literally see through photographs 
either. Whatever object we see at present has of course taken time to bounce light rays to 
travel from object to eye, and then from the eye through the mind to recognition. That 
object we see is in the past but the event of seeing the image is present. Thus even what 
you see now, –and I mean literally, these words in the thesis in front of you, – is also a 
representation of a past timeslice. 
§4 Scopes, pictures and the technological dimension of photographs 
One of the goals of this chapter was to distinguish photographs from paintings in a specific 
commensurable area: both photographs and paintings are types of pictures that can be 
used for scientific purposes. But in analyzing that we found the success and failure 
conditions by which the respective picture types are held, are very different indeed. Van 
Fraassen’s account did not offer another important distinction between them, which 
considers what kind of information these respective device types are meant to offer. 
Photographs are used for information in a different way than (scientific) drawings and 
paintings and their use is more closely aligned with the function of microscopes and 
telescopes than the function of maps and schematics.  
 
But this technological dimension also offers something extra to the epistemology of 
photography: without the rigid design process, and without what van Fraassen considers 
to be an artificial and forced perspective on objects, there would be no relevant difference 
between natural phenomena and artificial imitations of those phenomena. Reflections in 
the water and mirrors do share a basic phenomenal quality in common but are different in 
that the latter can be expected to produce a reflection under a variety of conditions that 
the former cannot. Sometimes, it is too dark or rippled or dirty to see reflections in water 
and while certain things can make a mirror lose its reflection, these are both a different set 
of conditions and they are continuous possible counter conditions for all mirrors.   
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This matters because one can expect certain results in an artificial setting or rather, a 
normal range of functionality that is different from the natural setting. A crucial element of 
photographs is that their informational scope is limited and defined by the design of the 
camera. Technological specifications determine what information is present and not 
present systematically. That protocol includes a step where crucial information is 
determined and thus, the information present (and not present) in a device has been 
carefully decided. As we discussed in Chapter 2, microscopes and telescopes enhance 
information at the expense of other kinds of information that is within the natural 
repertoire of vision but they do this by virtue of the technological protocol that cameras 
are also subject to.  
 
Microscopes and telescopes (as well as a variety of pictures) are used to show us what 
something looks like. Their particular successes depend on providing a view to the very 
small and very far but generally, they are scopes and scopes need to bear an image of what 
something would look like given a different scale of vision. Yet their virtues depend on 
specifying one information cluster at the expense of other information normally available 
to seeing. And, as I have previously mentioned, that this is the very reason photographs do 
not carry egocentric spatial information – to preserve e-information is at cross purposes 
with their function of providing a timeslice of what something looked like, without the 
constraints of time.  
 
Microscopes and telescopes, as discussed in previous chapters, provide us with 
enhancements of our ordinary vision by virtue of being transparent devices even if they 
are representational (per R1). They are transparent because they offer a belief-
independent, counterfactual link to the objects seen through them, which is to say their 
image is not vulnerable to the hallucination test. Furthermore, these devices preserve 
similarity to what they represent, and one can also analyze the kind of similarity they bear 
in terms of v-information, which is information about the visual properties of objects they 
furnish, a representation of which can only be had visually –and that is by virtue of being 
pictorial. But again, to do this properly, they must be choosy about what v-information is 
represented.  
 
The technological dimension of a device also adds an aspect of continuity between devices 
of the same kind so that we can expect that any microscope (whether ours or our 
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neighbours) will do the same thing.  That dimension sets the normal range of information 
and offers a further level of reliability. The epistemic value of technological devices thus, in 
part, must acknowledge the fact that the information begat from a device is within a pre-
specified range of information. Cameras are technological devices and they are subject to 
that same protocol. Hence the scope of information they carry is predetermined by their 
design.  
 
Meanwhile, photographs are pictures but unlike the handmade variety, precisely because 
of their scopic lineage. What makes a photograph unique in this particular case is that it is 
both the image offered by a scopic device, but also a secondary object like a picture. 
Unlike the images in other scopic devices, the photographic image is external to the 
camera. Unlike many other pictures, its range of distortion is limited by the camera that 
produces it –just as in the images produced by microscopes and telescopes. A 
photographic image is thus beholden to the technological constraints of its lineage. But this 
is perhaps why, as Patrick Maynard was right to point out, photographs can facilitate the 
combination of depiction and detection.128 In Laura Perini’s analysis of Maynard, she 
proposes that this coordination of depiction and detection in photographs is more graceful 
than other devices and pictures, because they facilitate both without the information kinds 
being in conflict. That in turn highlights the epistemic value of photographs: other pictures 
and scopic instruments can, respectively, facilitate either depiction or detection. However, 
to coordinate them is usually to their detriment and requires substantial supplementation 
or expertise, to make their information such that one can understand it.129 
 
Furthermore, with its technological lineage, a photograph is going to be quite different 
from naturally occurring photograms and fossils, for the natural counterparts provide the 
information they do by an accident of nature. Recall the problem in Chapter 1 about fossils 
meeting the criteria for transparency: fossils, which are imprinted with visual information 
about their objects in a belief independent manner, do not seem to hold the same epistemic 
authority as a photograph. Fossils are certainly informative and provide invaluable 
information about the organism, but it seems odd to claim we see through fossils, even if 
Walton concedes this. Regardless, it seems one good reason for this difference in attitude 
                                                
128 Maynard 1997: Ch. 5. 
129 Perini 2012. 
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between the two is that fossils are not artefacts. They occur naturally, and however richly 
they detail some anatomical features of long-gone fauna and flora, the information they 
provide has not undergone technological regulation. While the transparency thesis Walton 
offers does not differentiate between these naturally occurring phenomena, artificial copies 
of these phenomena, nor the technological development of devices that mimic these, there 
are still important epistemic differences between them. Those technological artefacts that 
imitate natural phenomena have undergone a process to make the most efficient 
instrument. Their defined informational scope is part of what determines their epistemic 
value, since the information we get from an instrument is exactly the kind of information 
defined by its design.   
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IV 
 
o 
 
THAT DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH PROBLEM  
 
Recall that in Chapter 1, we mentioned Scruton’s main motivation in “Photography and 
Representation,” which was to challenge the place of photography in the category of 
representational art by offering an account of the way photographs are made that is 
significantly different from other pictures.130 In the first phase, he offered an account of 
representations in general, stipulating that all of them stand in an intentional relation to 
their subjects. In virtue of this, representations are competent at expressing the thoughts 
of the image-maker. Paintings and drawings are representational because their contents 
depend on (and thereby express) the thoughts of their makers. But photographs do not 
have this capacity because they undergo a non-intentional process so that their 
relationship to their subject is a causal one. What this means is that whatever the 
photographer believes he sees will not affect the outcome of the picture, where such beliefs 
do present themselves in other pictorial representations. Needless to say, Scruton finds 
photographs to be poor at expressing the photographer’s thoughts – a virtue that 
representational art is obliged to exploit. And consequently, according to Scruton, it would 
be false to call photographs representations at all. But we know better at this point. 
 
If we ever bought Scruton’s line to begin with, so it was the case before the advent of 
digital photographs because it is with far greater ease that photographs, of the digital 
variety, can be expressive by virtue of their being manipulated to accord with the thoughts 
of their makers. So there’s an answer to Scruton. However, this shift in photographic 
technology not only comes with a promise of expanding artistic possibility, but also with a 
threat of epistemic difficulty. These days, film-photography is fast becoming a rarity and 
the use of digital photography has become more conventional than film for even the 
everyday casual user. Scruton will surely find irony in the fact that the use of film cameras 
is now reserved for more artistic endeavours.  
                                                
130 Scruton 1981: 579. 
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Thus far, we have primarily explicitly explored film photographs –that is, photographs 
from film cameras– but digital photographs may or may not belong in the remit of previous 
chapters, and we will explore some of the reasons why the technology of the digital 
photograph poses such problems. I want to maintain that the claims made about the 
epistemic value of photographs in the previous chapters obtain and that those chapters 
have been considerate of both kinds of photographs all along. In short, I have treated them 
as the same kind of device, which is arguable, and so this chapter is dedicated to the 
question of whether their differences make them different in kind and some other 
problems specific to digital photography.  
 
For example, perhaps we should find it troubling that the widespread use of digital 
photography, and the ease of image manipulation that comes with this technology, means 
the tweaked photograph is more commonplace than in the former film variety. 
Acknowledging the fact that digital pictures are easier to manipulate, and quite often, 
some manipulation happens without a second thought, on what basis do we continue to 
trust photographs? We do so, perhaps, on the basis that digital photographs are more 
likely to be genuine articles than not, or preserve a significant amount of the information 
honestly, or by some nostalgic connection to the film photographs. Nonetheless, the 
frequency and acceptability of tweaked digital photographs undermine the general 
reliability of photographs.  
 
As a consequence of these new practices, we now give a second thought to a photograph 
that is digitally produced and yet, we don’t want to distrust digital photographs on 
principle either. There are several ways to compare digital and film photographs but the 
bulk of the issues can be herded into three problems: The first problem comes from 
comparing the two technologies, in that the ease of manipulation of digitals threatens the 
credibility of film photography. In short, we cannot tell the genuine digital photographs 
from those which have been manipulated, henceforth let us call this the genuine article 
problem. W.J. Mitchell offered a solution in his book, The Reconfigured Eye.  There he 
proposes to divorce digital photographs so-called, from the category of genuine bona fide 
photography. Digital photographs may perform the same function as their film 
counterparts, but the fact of the matter is that they are as technologically different as 
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automobiles are from carriages, even though these perform the same function.131 It remains 
to be seen however, whether the distinctions between digital and film photographs he 
offers are the relevant ones.  
 
But if we reject Mitchell’s view and consider digital photographs to be bona fide 
photographs we are still left with the genuine article problem as well as with another 
epistemic problem for the very category of photographs. As Barbara Savedoff has 
suggested, the ease of manipulation of digital photographs threatens to undermine the 
trustworthiness of photographs in general and from this, one can predict a shift in 
attitudes about the authority of photographs.132 “[T]hose who grow up in an age where the 
photographic image is seen as fluid and manipulable may have trouble appreciating the 
aura of evidential authority surrounding traditional photographs.”133 With photo-doctoring 
becoming commonplace, we should perhaps wonder why we would continue to trust 
photographs these days. As Scott Walden sums up the issue, “How can the grounds for 
confidence apparently be so radically undermined, and yet the confidence itself remain?”134 
Call this the trustworthiness problem.  
 
However, perhaps knowledge of the fact that digital images are often manipulated does 
little harm to our general trust in them because, as Berys Gaut has noted, manipulation 
potential is not what is as stake here: even traditional photographs can be manipulated but 
we continue to trust them, and several of the manipulations photographs undergo are 
acceptable. 135  For example, red-eye reduction is undergone without loss to the 
photograph’s integrity. However, to continue in this fashion highlights the third problem, 
the distortion slope problem: where does one brake on the slippery slope between red-eye 
reduction and Photoshopping a crack pipe into the Pope’s hand? Clearly, with the latter 
some line in epistemic propriety has been crossed. Let us take these problems in order. 
 
                                                
131 Mitchell 1992: 4. 
132 Savedoff 1997, 2008. 
133 Savedoff 1997: 213. 
134 Walden 2008: 108.  
135 Gaut 2010: 69-71. 
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§1 Mitchell  
W.J. Mitchell makes a startling proposal in The Reconfigured Eye where he claims that what 
we call digital photographs are not photographs at all. Digital photographs are, as it were, 
only nominally photographs, sharing little in common with the film or analogue 
photograph. While they play the same functional role, they are different technologies that 
we will in time recognize as different picture types. As radical as this claim might sound, 
he provides a compelling analogy to horse drawn carriages left in the wake of automobiles: 
Both modes of transport achieved the same purpose, but automobiles are vastly different 
from horse-drawn carriages. Yet we’ve called automobiles ‘cars,’ in short for ‘carriage’ (or 
in Spanish ‘coche,’ which literally means ‘coach’) even though it is clear to us that cars are 
not the same as their predecessors. So it is obvious now that it is a mistake to think that 
cars and coaches are the same even though their names are connected, and on Mitchell’s 
view, this line follows for analogue and digital photographs.136   
  
Mitchell supports his thesis by describing the differences between digital and analogue 
picture technologies. One difference is that they are produced differently:  For example, 
digital ‘photographs’ are not always from digital cameras whereas film photographs are. 
Mitchell explains that this is only one of several ways in which a digital picture can be 
made. In fact, digital images can be generated non-photographically, which is to say, 
without a camera-to-object relation. Two main forms of digital picture making can be done 
entirely by computer: One of these is by use of editing software like Photoshop™ or 
Aviary™, which not only allow for easy manipulation of photographic images, but also 
allow one to digitally create an image from the ground up, that is, without a photographic 
base. This ground-up digital image making may otherwise be known as digital painting.  
 
Another way to produce a digital image is by another kind of software type that reads 3-
dimensional information from objects and translates this into a mathematical 
representation which can then be represented 2-dimensionally. These kinds of images are 
found in videogames, movie special effects and animation, to name a few. They vary in 
complexity and intelligence so that, for example, they can represent movement 
computationally without needing to record movement photographically. Several examples 
                                                
136 Mitchell 1992: 4. 
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of this technology are found in the Lord of the Rings 2001-2003 films. In one example, the 
computer generated character Gollum is created in part by motion capture, where the 
movements of the actor Andy Serkis are recorded and overlaid with digital animation 
techniques in order to produce the character that we see. In another example, the vast 
landscape of orcs standing for battle often appearing in the films, were also digitally 
created employing a combination of digital animation, motion capture, and even some 
artificial intelligence so that individual orcs in the picture reacted to the orcs that 
surrounded them. Both of these examples combine digital painting techniques and 
(allegedly) digital photography.  
 
However, I want to note that neither of these computer-constructed pictures require the 
traditional camera-to-object relationship that analogue photography and film require, and 
so we might want to say that what they produce are not photographs after all. The former 
has no object basis and the latter has only a 3rd generation relation to that object after 
scanning it, if even that. This means, it seems a stretch to consider these amongst the 
candidates for digital photographs to begin with and so should hardly count as examples of 
digital photographs gone rogue. There are of course what Gaut calls mélange images, which 
combine this technology with others.137 While Mitchell’s diagnosis is compelling, it does 
seem as though he has conflated digital pictures and digital photographs, the latter being 
of the sort that preserves the camera-to-object relationship that analogue photographs 
require. And not all analogue pictures are analogue photographs so why should what 
appears to be digital illustration be confused with photography just because they are both 
made digitally? 
 
Now, in Mitchell’s favour, even when the typical digital camera maintains the camera-to-
object relationship, it produces a much more easily manipulable photographic image. 
While the analogue photograph can also be manipulated by editing software, this is only 
possible after it has been digitized, that is to say, indirectly. The digital ‘photograph’ is 
directly manipulable. Digital pictures, including those that may or may not be 
photographic, also differ from analogue ones because they have a fixed amount of 
information that is determined by their bitmap. Information in analogue photographs 
however, is indefinite, as it is not fixed by determinable units. Digital pictures are cleaner 
                                                
137 Gaut 2010: 45. 
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when they are modified and have the capacity to undergo manipulation without any decay 
in image quality, whereas analogue photographs have a certain grain and their 
manipulation quickly leads to a degradation of quality.   
 
So, according to Mitchell, since digital pictures, including those that may or may not be 
photographic, can be produced by a variety of digital picture making techniques that can 
avoid the camera-to-object relation entirely, they are not like analogue photographs. And 
since these digital technologies are often combined to produce an image, they render a sort 
of ‘mélange image’ as coined by Berys Gaut in his Philosophy of Cinematic Art.138 Mélange 
images, according to Mitchell, are not photographic. Finally, since even when the camera-
to-object relation is maintained there is still a vast difference in the resulting pictures, a 
digital ‘photograph’ is not a photograph at all.  
 
There are merits to Mitchell’s distinctions and indeed the differences between analogue 
photographs and digital ones are significant, but they are not distinct enough to render 
digital photographs into non-photographic pictures. Gaut points out that these distinctions 
only show that there is a difference in kinds of photographs, namely digital and analogue 
ones. They will vary in manipulability, quality over time, quality over changes and 
reproductions, overall noise, and processing, but these are not differences that distinguish 
them in species. It is true that not all digital images are photographs because some digital 
pictures are produced in non-photographic ways. But there is no reason why all digital 
pictures should be produced photographically.  
 
So what does it mean for an image to be produced photographically? According to Gaut, 
what is an important feature to look for when we try to determine whether any digital 
pictures are candidates for being photographs, is whether they have the same generative 
method, that is, whether they are produced in the same way.139 I believe a necessary 
feature of a photograph is that it comes from some kind of camera and both analogue and 
digital photographs do in fact come from cameras. One might want to argue that there are 
possible scenarios where a photograph can be made without a camera, such as with 
photograms, a primitive form of photography.  Photograms can range from very simple 
                                                
138 Gaut 2010: 45. 
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techniques, such as placing objects on light sensitive paper, or more complex arrangements 
that reproduce the conditions of a camera, such as rayograms. Indeed, there are quite a 
number of photograph-based techniques that do not involve a proper camera; even some 
print-making techniques involve using photo-emulsion fluid in order to copy images onto a 
screen that can then be used to print the copied image onto paper or fabric. But these are 
in effect produced by simplified versions of a camera process and thus, produced by a 
primitive camera of sorts.   
 
As Gaut has argued, digital photographs (from cameras) are generated in the same way as 
analogue ones. The only difference between the camera-based digital photographs and 
analogue photographs is that in the former, the light information from objects is recorded 
digitally rather than onto photochemical film. I contend that the fact that digital pictures 
undergo the same process of being produced, in that they come from cameras, is a relevant 
feature as well. These facts trump the differences provided by Mitchell. Gaut further 
contends that even if modification of digital pictures is easily undergone, the mere 
possibility of modification cannot alone undermine their casual link because, analogously, 
opportunities for modification are available to traditional photographs too. So, the 
vulnerability to modification extends to both kinds of photographs, not just digital ones. 
This means unaltered digital photographs may remain bona fide photographs. 140 
§2 Epistemic authority under threat 
Without taking Mitchell’s advice to segregate the two types of photography, we are left 
with the problem of how to regard the entire category of photography, when it is occupied 
by less than reliable varieties and forgeries are increasing in number. In her essay, 
“Escaping Reality: Digital Imagery and the Resource of Photography,” Barbara Savedoff 
ponders the question of whether the psychology of looking at photographs will be altered 
when we come to terms with the regular use of modified digital imagery. The appreciation 
one has for photographs after all, as having been captured in a decisive and rare moment, 
is less relevant in the digital counterpart due to the possibility of its being fabricated. 
Likewise, in Transforming Images, she gives an analysis of what is special about 
photography, and in the final chapter, shows that the territory of photography is blurred 
                                                
140 Gaut 2010: 47. 
 125 
by the increase of digital photography and their manipulation by editing software. While 
digital photography provides more occasions for creatively interacting with photographs, 
this room for creativity challenges the status photographs have as a reliable documentary 
technology.  
 
Her prediction is that, as the digital image becomes more commonplace, so too will 
manipulated photographs and as a result our very attitude towards the category of 
photographs will begin to change. We will grow cautious in proclaiming that what lies 
before us is reliable when faced with a photograph because of the likelihood of its having 
undergone some alteration. “If we reach a point where photographs are as commonly 
digitized and altered as not, our faith in the credibility of photographs will inevitably, if 
slowly and painfully, weaken, and one of the major differences in our conceptions of 
paintings and photographs could all but disappear.”141  
 
In his essay, “Truth in Photography,” Scott Walden looks at this same problem, “How can 
we reconcile the obvious utility of photographs in helping us learn about the world with 
their equally obvious ability to deceive?” He offers an explanation for our willingness to 
forgive photography for its possible sins. Walden’s first step is to make a distinction 
between truth and objectivity, explaining that truth has little to do with the photographic 
image itself. Rather, talk of truth-value is with respect to the thoughts of the viewers of 
photographs. Objectivity on the other hand, is not a feature of the viewer’s thoughts and 
instead has to do with the process by which photographs are generated: The image of a 
photograph, for example, is produced objectively by the process of the camera in contrast 
with the process of hand-drawn images. 142 
  
Looking at objectively generated images may provoke true thoughts and may also provoke 
false ones, but if these thoughts are true, then the confidence one has in the photograph 
was warranted. It is not warranted when coming from subjectively produced images. That 
is to say, that when we form beliefs from looking at photographs and these beliefs are true, 
there is still the matter of whether there was good reason to form these beliefs. A good 
reason for trusting photographic images is that the process by which they are produced is 
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reliable. Because we have background beliefs in place that press us to trust objectively 
produced data over the subjective sort, we are confident in forming beliefs based on what 
we see in photographs.  
  
But digital images seem to shake the confidence we once had when dealing with the once 
objectively produced photographic image. The photographs we look at may not in fact be 
produced in the objective manner we expect of them and the ease of their manipulation in 
this format generates scepticism about whether the image is produced objectively or not. 
Walden’s strategy for handling this is to import Jerry Fodor’s two-stage analysis of the 
process of visually perceiving. 
 
Fodor describes the visual process as having a proto-belief state, followed by a full-fledged 
belief that considers other basic background beliefs. The proto-beliefs are formed by a 
combination of visual stimuli, filtered by an ordering principle in the mind and a fixed set 
of general background beliefs that together help to form representations of one’s 
environment. This provides the information for the belief forming stage of the visual 
process, which then evaluates the character of the environment according to an indefinite 
number of background beliefs that are specific to the situation. For example, one does not 
immediately believe one sees a snake in the grass when one comes across what appears to 
be just that, because of a number of other bits of information that are at play, such as 
knowledge that there aren’t any snakes in that area.  
 
Now usually when one looks at a picture, the proto-beliefs phase about its content is 
blocked because one knows he or she is looking at a picture, and this is a matter specific to 
picture-based perceiving. Walden wants to say that looking at photographs activates the 
first phase of seeing but that this does not necessarily offer an account that makes them 
truer than handmade pictures. What differentiates photographs from handmade pictures is 
that their image is produced through an objective process, and a subjective process 
produces handmade pictures. Meanwhile, we have second order beliefs about beliefs 
gathered from objectively-formed (versus subjectively-formed) content, where we have 
more confidence that we can form true beliefs when they are based in the former. 
 
When looking at pictures, people bring their second-stage background beliefs about 
objectivity –giving objectively produced pictures more weight than the subjective kind– 
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into viewing pictures and this informs whether they are confident beliefs formed about the 
contents of the pictures are true or false. But should they revise these beliefs because 
photographs can sometimes engender false beliefs? The answer is that we don’t expect our 
perceptual capacities to be infallible so why should we expect photographs to be? “[B]oth 
subjectively formed and objectively formed images remain mere extensions of our 
perceptual capacities and, given that our perceptual capacities are never infallible, mere 
extensions of them are never fallible either – beliefs formed as a result of looking at 
pictures will sometimes be true and sometimes false.”143 
 
So as far as photographs go, their potential for deception is not an issue that we don’t face 
with ordinary seeing and despite the possibility of deception, we trust seeing and seeing 
through photographs categorically. Now, with the increased use of digital photographs 
and the ease of their modification, that categorical trust in photographs should be shaken. 
According to Walden, we can either revise our background beliefs to accord with these 
new conventions in photography or deny these conventions have radically changed, 
trusting that there is enough policing of photographic authenticity to protect their status.  
It is the case that when photographs are used for journalistic and documentary purposes, 
there are regulations that police whether the photograph is genuine and if not, one can 
expect reprimand for doctoring the image. Walden shows that institutions want to 
preserve photography’s epistemic integrity and this is good reason to maintain our 
confidence in it.  
 
But while there is some appeal to this heuristic account, there are perhaps better reasons 
for trusting photography in the wake of digital photographs. Perhaps their credibility has 
something to do with to the design of photographic equipment in contrast with the 
variability of techniques involved in drawing and this includes digital drawing. (More on 
this later.)  
§3 Strategies for dealing with the problems 
Now, let us recall the two problems mentioned at the outset. The first problem is that we 
don’t know how we will continue to trust photographs knowing that fraudulent digital 
                                                
143 Walden 2008: 108. 
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photographs are out in the world among the credible ones.  So, the first problem seems to 
be whether when one looks at a photograph one can believe it to be a genuine photograph 
because one has reason to doubt it is genuine. We called this epistemic issue the genuine 
article problem. The second problem, the trustworthiness problem, resulted from accepting that 
forgeries exist because in light of that fact, the basis for insisting on the integrity of 
photographs has been undermined. The third problem was whether any photograph that 
undergoes modification is still trustworthy and if it is, how then to give a principled 
account of what the parameters are for doctoring. We called this slippery slope issue the 
distortion slope problem. 
 
The genuine article problem about photography should remind us to its familiar cousins: 
For example, the case of the false barns in epistemology. In this case, there is some story 
about driving down a country road where there is a barn in the distance. Perceptual 
experience gives credence to the belief that we are before a barn but in fact we have been 
driving in False Barn Territory and so our belief is false. The genuine article problem, 
therefore, manifests in a variety of sceptical thought experiments often challenging 
whether we have formed justified beliefs based on what we’ve seen. It should be of no 
surprise then, that photographs are subject to their own kind of genuine article problem, 
especially (though not necessarily) if we concede that they are prostheses for seeing.  
 
Now, here we should reconsider the issue with respect to other devices we use to gather 
visual information about the world. Suppose one learns that there is a batch of 
microscopes that have been modified in such a way that make objects look as though they 
are moving, even if they are not. This threatens to undermine the data collected by 
scientists who use microscopes to study the movement of microorganisms. However, 
despite the potential for having collected data from the faulty equipment, one maintains 
some confidence in the technology of microscopes to furnish certain information. This 
analogy, then, also has a remedy for the trustworthiness problem. 
 
If a trend in tweaking of microscopic imagery became common, one might wonder 
whether this would challenge the credibility of microscopes and even discredit the 
microscope for scientific uses. But it seems strange to wonder about such a thing in a way. 
Whether or not we know how a microscope works, we have some trust in the fact that it 
has been designed in such a way that the information it provides is objective. (There might 
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be reason to doubt the objectivity of any technological devices but we will attend to that in 
Ch. 5.) Even if there is a chance that the device has been tampered with, one tends to 
expect the best. We do the same for seeing. We expect that our eyes have not deceived us, 
nor has there been a deception of large proportion. Why then, should the possibility of a 
photographic forgery really change our attitude towards them? 
 
Consider this analogy to counterfeiting money: if monies were easily counterfeited because 
new technology provides the tools for it, would genuine currency be devalued? Scepticism 
about whether the money in your hand is a genuine article may arise and with more 
counterfeiting, more occasions to doubt, but it doesn’t seem like the growing rate of fraud 
would devalue genuine money entirely. In fact, the act of forgery is dependent on the value 
of genuine money being what it is, for a counterfeit pretends to have the value of genuine 
money and that value has to be worthwhile.  
 
The doctoring slope problem is much more difficult to handle. At what point does a 
doctored photograph lose credibility? One must come up with a principled account of 
where a digital photograph has crossed a line and become a digital painting in disguise, 
and this depends on what amount and kind of doctoring we determine to be acceptable. To 
illustrate the difficulty of this matter, let as look at different levels of strictness with 
doctoring. 
 
One strategy is to maintain that no manipulation whatsoever is acceptable. One might 
want to say that once a digital photograph has been manipulated in any way it becomes a 
digital painting and this view benefits from avoiding the slippery slope altogether. 
However, this view is too demanding, as even rather benign occasions of doctoring, such 
as red-eye reduction, would render photographs into non-photographs. The fact of the 
matter is, however, that we still trust photographs that have been modified to some extent, 
such as with red-eye reduction. We even accept enlarged and cropped photographs when 
it is believed to be to the benefit of their overall function, that is, for example, when it 
enhances the evidence they provide. And even taking the strictest position fails to handle 
the problem in a way because it fails to show why people would still trust a photograph 
that has undergone some of the more benign forms of alteration. When a crime scene 
photograph has edited out the red-eye or lens flare, cropped or magnified part of the 
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image, or made some other modification to the picture that comes from the camera, we 
might not think that these edits corrupt the information.  
 
So perhaps we want to maintain that some manipulation is acceptable and in this vein we 
will find different ways to draw the line. First, suppose we draw the line at degrees of 
manipulation: that is, no more that 10% of the content of the photograph has been 
modified. This allows for some minor percentage of photographic doctoring to go without 
reprimand, such as cleaning up of lens flare and red-eye reduction. However, a principle 
based on percentages would be ignorant of the quality of information that is altered and 
may overlook drastic changes to the content depicted by simply altering a small fraction of 
the image. Since this is important, one can only assume that certain kinds of modification 
are permissible without undermining the epistemic integrity of a photograph, whereas 
others are directly detrimental.  
 
We could also say that an appeal to the limitations of what might be modified in ordinary 
seeing should be considered but only to find a sort of rule for conduct. There are many 
false beliefs that can be engendered by photographs, even genuine ones, because one could 
create a deceptive scene for the camera. Unwritten rules against digitally drawing a crack 
pipe into the Pope’s hand, and such fabrications are improper but not strictly because it is 
a weakness of digital photography or photographs in general – it would be equally possible 
for someone to impersonate the Pope with a pipe and stage it for a film photograph, or 
even to carry out this performance in person. If this is something that would be considered 
deceptive, then something that performs the same function but done with editing software 
is also deceptive. Some line has been crossed if it is done post-development (in print) or by 
theatrics, whether it is photographic or not.  It would then not be the fault of photography 
per se. Still we are at a loss for offering a principle for drawing the line in the distortion 
slope problem.  
 
We might consider that the photographing equipment, that is, the cameras, provide their 
own limitations and modifications that can be made in the camera, can be acceptably 
performed post-camera if they are the same kind. That means, since we can reduce red-
eyes in photographs while taking the picture, then it is acceptable to remove red-eye 
occurrences via photo editing platforms. It seems fair that the source that we find reliable, 
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that is the technology of the camera, should determine the limitations of what can be done 
to what it produces.  
 
So, before we continue, I think it would be helpful to categorize some of the techniques 
available for modification. This way one can also try to draw a line according to how one 
classifies the kinds of modification available to photography, differentiating them 
according to the level of corruption of information.  
 
Here is a list of some kinds of modification grouped with similar techniques: 
a. Modifications available at the camera-point such as shutter speed, lens 
choices, and in digital cameras, a range of effects too.  
b. Size alteration, cropping, orientation. 
c. Noise reduction, sharpening or softening, contrast, colour adjustments. 
d. Red-eye reduction, removal of lens flare, inpainting (some). 
e. Adding and digitally drawing via Photoshop™ and the like, merging 
images, selective colour alterations, inpainting (removal of objects). 
 
The modifications in (a) are more or less effects, distortions and other techniques available 
from the point of the camera. Some can be modified before a photograph is taken, some 
after, and both before and after a photograph has been printed. One can, for example, 
create a fish-eye lens effect in a photo-editing program. Group (a) type modifications are 
available to both digital and film cameras. The second grouping (b), are adjustments to the 
image that can also take place at the point of the camera and with digital cameras, the 
image can be easily cropped and reoriented from within. These sorts of adjustments can 
easily be made when developing film from film cameras. These, then, are also not a strictly 
digital problem, if they are a problem at all.   
 
Group (c) and (d) are more readily available in digital cameras, –though some of these 
effects are also possible in the film variety– and seem to be more or less harmless even 
when done in a post-camera stage. Using editing software to make these kinds of 
modifications is not so much the problem. One can do this with film pictures with the right 
techniques and so the problem there is not strictly a digital one either.  
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Group (e) contains the most problematic type of modification perhaps because it can 
manifest the beliefs of the photographer more readily than the other kinds (even though, 
with some creativity, other kinds of effects can be used to illustrate false beliefs too).  
 
This list already offers some clues as to what is sacred and what is negotiable in the 
spectrum of modification. Already, it suggests that editing that is undertaken on post-
camera platforms, such as with editing software or in the darkroom, is the more 
questionable sort even if some kinds are not especially troubling. Group (e) type 
modifications stand out as particularly sensitive to this, and prove to be where the most 
insidious kinds of modification types are. It is with the techniques in (e) that one can 
digitally paint x as being next to y, and claim that the two parties were together. This is the 
kind of modification we need to focus on. 
 
However, this kind of modification is not exclusively a digital one. One could place objects 
into a film-based photograph by, for example, double exposing the film so that the first 
exposure has some figure x and the second exposure figure y, thereby falsely depicting 
that x is near y. Consider the example provided by Paloma Atencia-Linares, in her paper 
“Fiction, Nonfiction, and Deceptive Photographic Representation.” She describes the 
technique of overlaying negatives of two different images onto a single photographic paper 
in order to create a fiction. In her example, an image of a cat and an image of a woman 
were combined to create a cat woman. Atencia-Linares claims that the cat-woman is an 
exemplar of one amongst many techniques that can be used to represent fictions in 
photographs without contravening the photographic method, as it employs normal 
darkroom techniques.144 Not only are modifications possible with analogue photographs as 
well, but they can even be type (e)-modified, which is the most suspect of all. Needless to 
say, type (e) modifications are not a problem for digital cameras only and thus, this is not a 
digital problem.  
 
Now that we know where the problematic modifications are, what kind of principle can 
we employ to justify their schism from the acceptable kinds? I think the answer here will 
once again require an appeal to the hallucination test. Is the modification in question such 
that it can be used to represent hallucinations? The Atencia-Linares case does employ a 
                                                
144 Atencia-Linares 2012. 
 133 
method that can then represent the artist’s hallucinations and a Photoshopped equivalent 
would too. The artist can use the layered negatives process or digital illustration to achieve 
a picture of the gnomes in her hallucination. Since these prove vulnerable to the 
hallucination test, then they are not photographs. Of course there are many ways to 
creatively tweak using the benign kinds of modification in order to get a result that 
accords with one’s beliefs. But the suggestion here is not to test whether a photographer 
can falsify a photograph, because we already know he can, but whether the type of process 
he uses is vulnerable to representing hallucinations. And type (e) modifications can be 
used to represent hallucinations.  
 
Consider that photographer hallucinating a gnome in her garden; would other kinds of 
modifications be susceptible to representing the gnome as well? Type (a) modifications 
like shutter speed adjustments and special lenses will not be enough to put a gnome in the 
picture. We won't get that gnome in the picture by cropping or reorienting the image, per 
type (b). Noise-reduction or colour and shade adjustments cannot produce a gnome either, 
so type (c) is fine. Removing lens flare, or fixing red-eyed subjects cannot be used to make 
that hallucinated gnome a feature of the picture, (even though red-eyes might be indication 
of the gnome’s presence). But type (e) has proven vulnerable, so there is where we should 
draw a line between them. 
 
In previous chapters I argued that the epistemology of photography is grounded in the fact 
that photographs are transparent. The division remains, then, that genuine photographs 
are transparent if they preserve a belief-independent and similarity preserving 
counterfactual link to their objects. And their epistemic virtue is such that it carries 
information that is credible in virtue of that transparency. Genuine photographs are 
transparent, and nongenuine ones are opaque. But, now the question is which distortions 
allow transparency to be preserved? Which classes are acceptable and which not? 
Photographs from group (e), those that have been imaginatively inpainted or enhanced, 
are clearly not transparent anymore and as a consequence, their epistemic integrity is lost. 
One might want to say that some partially tweaked photographs, using any one from types 
(a)-(d), are also opaque if they have been manipulated according to the beliefs of the 
photographer. But I would like to resist that. Again, the type (e) modifications are the 
ones that prove vulnerable to the hallucination test, and thus, those photographs that have 
been (e)-type modified are no longer transparent. The other kinds of modifications from 
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(a)-(d) were not vulnerable to the hallucination test so photographs that have been 
modified by these techniques remain transparent. That holds, even if those modifications 
are used to represent the photographer’s beliefs because they have already been 
established to be immune to representing hallucinations. 
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o 
 
FORMING BELIEFS THROUGH PHOTOGRAPHS 
Two Skeptical Hypotheses for Two Picture Types  
 
Two questions about the epistemic value of photographs motivate this chapter: the first 
question is concerned with providing an analysis of the kind of information photographs 
furnish, while the second is concerned with, perhaps in virtue of the first question, what 
kind of knowledge photographs provide. Regarding the first, I propose that photographs 
and other kinds of pictures provide visual information and do so in a visual way (rather 
than by description) but photographs are special because they provide this information in 
a belief independent manner, making them more like microscopes and telescopes.  
 
I left Chapter 2 with the answer to the second question: the claim that the epistemic value 
of photographs is in their furnishing perceptual knowledge. I will reinforce that claim here by 
offering an exercise that illustrates the kind of knowledge photographs offer by virtue of 
what kind of scepticism they are susceptible to. I will contrast the sceptical problems 
photographs are susceptible to with problems met by other sources of belief, in particular, 
with sceptical problems met by testimony and later, with that of handmade pictures: I 
show that handmade pictures, are more like testimonial artefacts because of a difference in 
points on which the belief conditions rest when looking at them. This analysis will show 
that photographs are subject to a distinct kind of sceptical hypothesis from those faced by 
testimony and handmade pictures: They are subject to the same sceptical hypotheses as 
perception and consequently, photographs are a different kind of knowledge source. Thus, 
to answer the second question, scepticism about photographic information is akin to 
scepticism had by perceptual experiences and not otherwise, thereby showing that 
photographs furnish experiential knowledge about their objects. 
§1 Beliefs formed by testimony 
Testimony is one of a handful of sources of knowledge, besides perception, memory and 
introspection and it stands out from this crowd because it bears some distinctive 
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hallmarks. As we have not yet discussed any literature on testimony, I will dedicate this 
section to the topic. We will need to begin with a basic definition of what testimony is but 
before proceeding, it will be of use to explain the limits of this endeavour. Firstly, I do not 
wish to offer a definition that is synonymous with formal testimony here. What may first 
come to mind at the mention of ‘testimony,’ is a scene from Law and Order set in a 
courtroom scene where a witness offers an account of what she saw. But this is only a 
small part of what counts as testimony in epistemology and ultimately, not what concerns 
me most. Testimony happens in more casual circumstances everyday, and it is this broader 
category of testimony, termed by C.A.J. Coady as natural testimony,145 that will be our 
topic. This includes those everyday occasions where we learn from what others tell us. 
This includes such things as, to name but a few examples, directions to our destination, 
what one should expect the weather to be like, that there are weird statues on Easter 
Island, and so on.  
 
Most of the current literature on the philosophy of testimony congregates around the 
epistemological problems of testimony, the bulk of which can be expressed in the following 
dilemma:  how do we reconcile the fact that much of our knowledge depends on what we 
are told with the fact that tellings can be unreliable for various reasons?146 I will not take 
this dilemma on; any possible solutions will be concerned with giving principles to defend 
that we are warranted in believing what we are told and I only seek to characterize the 
problem. What is needed for our purposes is an account of what testimony is. So a second 
limitation is that in defining testimony, I only want the most basic and uncontroversial 
definition, and not a definition that will stand as a theory about testimony.  
 
Consequently, I will not argue on behalf of any particular theory of testimony or 
framework underlying the debates in the epistemology of testimony. Take for example, the 
debate between reductionism and non-reductionism about testimony that concerns where 
warrant for testimonial-based beliefs rest. The debate consists of, on the one hand, 
reductionists claiming that the warrant on the basis of testimony for one’s belief that P, 
depends on whether the testimonial chain eventuates in a reliable belief source such as 
perception, memory or reason. Then, on the other hand, non-reductionists consider 
                                                
145 Coady 1991: 38. 
146 For more on the epistemology of testimony, see Lackey and Sosa 2006. 
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testimony to be a reliable belief source on its own. Now, whether or not testimony is 
reliable in virtue of reducing to a reliable belief source or not deals with the source of 
reliability of testimony and these projects are generally concerned with how testimonial-
based beliefs can be warranted or whether the testimonial track is knowledge-bearing. 147   
 
We needn’t pursue that inquiry to define what testimony is since the definition precedes 
the warrant question, and we needn’t pursue the possible solutions or endeavour to offer 
any, in order to understand the problems. On the contrary, these live problems provide a 
better environment for this analysis as one can characterize testimony in virtue of these 
problems. We will now look at several definitions of testimony in order to extract the key 
features of testimony. Then, I make a minimalist analysis by giving an account that 
preserves the distinctive features of testimony proper while allowing for a wide view that 
includes events that may be considered testimonial for bearing those features.  
§1.1 What is testimony? 
There is some consensus on the fact that testimony typically amounts to, as Audi puts it, 
“people telling us things”148 or to put it even more broadly, testimonies are “tellings 
generally.”149 However, this alone is in a sense too broad since people can tell us things like 
stories, jokes and suppositions without bearing any testimonial features, which is to say, 
that only some tellings are testimonial. In this section I will look at several accounts of 
testimony that I will divide into three categories: the narrow, moderate and wide views, to 
be discussed in that order.  
 
The narrow view, in part, can be sourced to Testimony, C.A.J. Coady’s seminal text on the 
epistemology of testimony in which he describes a testimonial act as the following: 
 
C1) someone stating that P, as evidence that P is the case, and with the intent to 
offer this statement as evidence.  
                                                
147 For more on reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimony see, for example, 
Coady 1992, Fricker 1987, Goldberg 2001, Lackey 2006b, Lehrer 2006. 
148 Audi 1997: 406.  
149 Fricker 1995: 396-7. 
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C2) this person is competent or in a superior epistemic standing to attest to P  
C3) this person does so in response to a relevant and open question. 
 
This account is appealing because it can exclude scenarios where a telling has been offered 
but was only meant to be taken as a supposition or joke by (C1), do away with cases 
where we are told something by a madman on a rant by (C2) and eliminates the situation 
where an overheard and unrelated statement is taken to be testimony that P is the case 
(C3).  
  
Coady’s account is clearly modelled on formal testimony but while formal testimony can 
inform a general characterization, this account doesn’t substantially distinguish itself from 
it: In (C2), the condition that the testifier is competent and reliable in his testimony that P 
is something that can be regulated in formal testimony. While it is true that we do not 
value the babbling of a madman as evidence for whatever they say, these incidents still 
count as testimony in a casual sense. (In this particular instance, as bad testimony.) 
According to Miranda Fricker, and this is generally accepted, the criteria for testimonials 
should have “no restrictions on subject matter or [the speaker’s] epistemic relation to it,” 
but should instead have a less stringent requirement –simply that the participants are 
competent language users.150 
 
Coady’s view consequently fails to include a wide scope of casual testimony that requires 
accommodation if one hopes to address the epistemic problems of testimony. For example, 
if the account of testimony includes a testifier who is deemed honest and reliable, then the 
possibility of intentionally giving false testimony falls out of the picture but for the sceptic 
of testimony it remains a problem in need of address. As aforementioned, a basic dilemma 
that preoccupies epistemology of testimony is how to reconcile that much of what we 
know has been acquired by testimony of the casual variety and yet, without much 
discrimination regarding the reliability of those who tell us these things. As Jennifer 
Lackey points out, Coady conflates two investigations in the testimony circuit: one is 
offering a definition of what testimony is and the other is offering criteria for the kind that 
warrants belief.151 
                                                
150 Fricker 1995: 396-7. 
151 Lackey 2006b: 180. 
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In P.J. Graham’s criticism of Coady’s view, he contends that the narrow scope of the 
account can be attributed to wanting to preserve testimony as potential evidence, and yet 
not all testimony is potentially evidence for something. Nor is it potentially knowledge 
bearing, and it needn’t be. Most testimony preserves the conditions of being offered up as 
a declaration that something is the case without actually being evidence for that. Since 
Coady’s account is too narrow, Graham offers a moderate alternative: a testifier is  
 
G1) Someone stating that P, as evidence that P  
G2) This person intends his audience to believe he is a reliable source of that 
information  
G3) That P is directed to an audience that poses the question. (Note: this last 
condition does not necessarily require that the question be posed explicitly.)  
 
Unlike Coady’s view, this account does not limit the domain of testimony to formal or 
near-formal testimonials, or ideal testimonies, and instead allows for everyday cases of 
testimony that in fact, do vary in quality and levels of formality, that is to say, the 
commonplace scenario of being told things by people whose epistemic standings remain 
ambiguous.152 But while Graham’s own view is less demanding than Coady’s, it is still 
considered too narrow by others because it fails to accommodate, to name one significant 
example, written testimony that is found posthumously.153 
 
In the book Knowledge in Perspective, Ernest Sosa attempts to provide a view that is broad 
enough to allow for posthumous documents as testimonial artefacts. In his account, it 
suffices if there is a communication of someone’s thoughts or beliefs and it is directed 
publicly so that it at least carries the intention to be heard. 154 Similarly, Robert Audi claims 
that an account of testimony should… 
 
…[capture] the idea of saying something to someone. Testimony is always given to 
one or more persons (to oneself perhaps, in the limiting case), but the audience may 
                                                
152 Graham 1997. 
153 Hence, Lackey calls it the moderate view in 2006b: 184-185. 
154 Sosa 1991: 219. 
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be hypothetical: a diarist describing atrocities for posterity may not know whether 
anyone will read the testimony.155  
 
Also in favour of a narrow view, Elizabeth Fricker suggested that testimony involves  
F1) a speaker S believes that P and wishes to communicate that P  
F2) S asserts that P to another party Q (where Q can be real or imagined) where Q 
is a competent language user and shares common-sense semantics. 
F3) So that Q then comes to believe that P in virtue of understanding the utterance 
of S.156   
These accounts have in common less constraint on the epistemic standing of the speaker 
and preservation of an informational link in the conditions for testimony (although they 
differ in what constitutes this preservation).  
 
However, Jennifer Lackey points out that not all communicative links are testimonial and 
“[a]n adequate account of testimony should recognize the distinction between entirely non-
informational expressions of thought and testimony.” 157 She not only argues that distinctions 
need to be made between utterances that are not informational nor meant to be, and 
utterances that are meant to be informational. Lackey’s distinction allows for non-linguistic 
acts of testimony that preserve this informational link, such as gestures.  
 
Something needs to be said then about the domain of testimonials. Graham and Coady 
have characterized testimony as a statement and the standard account of testimony is that it 
is a speaker-made public assertion of a declarative sentence.158 Audi’s proposal of attesting 
is, “a broad rubric for the oral or written statements that concern us.”159 Fricker’s account 
more explicitly states that testimonials involve utterances that generate beliefs in other 
language users.160 The statements can be spoken or written but testimony is typified as a 
                                                
155 Audi 1997. 
156 Fricker 1987: 68. 
157 Lackey 2006a: 3. 
158 Such as, but not exhausted by, the accounts of Audi 1997, Coady 1992, Fricker 1995, 
Graham 1997, and Sosa 1991.  
159 Audi 1997: 406. 
160 Fricker 1987: 70-72. 
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speech-act. However, Lackey gives examples of informative gestures that, if they are 
performed with the intention of conferring information, should be considered testimonial 
as well. One might consider whether an affirmative nod to a question or pointing to a 
location when asked where something is can be testimonial acts.161  
 
She subsequently offers an account of testimony that can accommodate gestures and 
ostensive behaviour that may be testimonial. In her view,  
Sarah testifies that p, by performing an act of communication a, if and only if, in 
virtue of a’s communicable content, either of the following obtains:  
1) Sarah (should have) reasonably intended to convey that information or  
2) a can be reasonably taken as conveying that information.162  
 
The upshot here is that, so long as an act communicates some information, and does so in a 
way that can be taken to be intentionally informative, it is testimonial. This of course 
sidesteps the non-informational scenario, on one hand, by putting emphasis on the fact 
that testimony is offered by someone, that information is given. On the other hand, this 
remains broad enough to preserve a variety of testimonials, such as documents and 
recordings, as well as gestures, all of which confer information in a testimonial fashion. It 
is not difficult to imagine a place for pictures here but more on that in a later section.  
§1.2 Extracting a minimalist account 
Despite the variation found among the above accounts, and even variation in where we 
might place ourselves among these views, we can still pick out key features of testimony in 
order to form a minimalist account. We will only extract the barest set of features because 
that is all that is needed for my goal in this section, and by being bare, one will not be 
beholden to any particular theory of testimony. So, to begin, I think one can say that an 
uncontroversial feature of testimony is that it is an act of communication. That testimonials 
have a communicative feature is hardly contentious, albeit, it is a mistake to render 
testimony and communication identical. Even Lackey’s liberal view (as mentioned at the 
end of the last section) posits that an act of communication is only testimonial if there is 
                                                
161 Lackey 2006b: 186. 
162 Lackey 2006a: 19, n. 5. 
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good reason to believe it can be taken to be informative, as not all acts of communication 
are intended as such.163 So what differentiates testimony from other forms of 
communication? To be testimonial is to communicate information in a special way and I 
will here show how, by implication, testimony is thereby 1) reportive and 2) belief 
dependent. Let us take these in order. 
a) Reportive  
Testimony, like all communication, is a public act, as opposed to a private one, which 
simply means that a testimony has an audience of any number. This should be held in 
contrast with information obtained, for example, by overhearing a soliloquy performed by 
someone who thinks they are alone in a closed room. Overhearing someone talking to 
himself is not testimony because that soliloquy was not a public report. Furthermore, the 
scope of publicity is not limited to situations involving the testifier’s presence or oratory 
practice. Testimony can, as previously mentioned, be read or heard posthumously, as 
offered by recordings, publications or scripts, of the assertions held by the testifier.164 It 
can be communicated non-verbally in some cases. The key feature here is that information 
is being conveyed to someone else, for someone else, and this makes it public. What is 
more significant is that this piece of information is meant to be understood. Insane rants 
made on the street may appear to be directed publically but in fact, may not be intended 
for anyone.  
 
Communication can take a variety of shapes and media. Telegrams, Morse code, street 
signs, and facial expressions are but a few examples that show this variety. These are all 
means of communicating information, they all tell us of something, but they do not all offer 
testimony. It is odd to say that a street sign testifies that one should stop or that a raised 
eyebrow testifies that one is surprised. While these instances are informative (of how to 
behave in one’s vehicle or of someone’s reaction to a situation) one expects testimonial acts 
to answer a question that has been posed, even if it was not intended for whoever 
overhears it. To be reportive is to intend the information for someone else.  
 
                                                
163 Not exhausted by Audi 1997, Coady 1992, Fricker 1995, Graham 1997, Lackey 2006b, 
Sosa 1991, etc. 
164 Sosa 1991. 
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While I side with Lackey in wanting to avoid characterizing testimony as a speech act, 
even the liberal view might preserve the requirement that testimonials require the platform 
of a language game. After all, it is not unreasonable to expect the participants of the 
communicative act to have certain basic things in common in order to carry it out. One can 
expect a failure of communication between two people speaking different languages. 
When a message is transmitted in a secret code, the person sending this code expects that 
it can be deciphered by the right people, and so on. And the communication between a dog 
to his master that there is danger might be successful. But perhaps this is not to be 
considered an occasion of the dog’s having offered testimony because some basic language 
criterion is missing. (I am neutral on this debate.) So some constraints may be needed to 
distinguish the kinds of creatures from which we can obtain and give testimony –e.g., they 
must be our epistemic and linguistic peers or be in a position to convey information in a 
manner that can be understood by the testifier.  
 
Anyhow, such parameters do not need to be drawn here. After all, a minimalist account 
only serves to extract hallmarks of testimony, and not work out exclusion principles. 
Nonetheless, one should acknowledge that the communication link succeeds with the help 
of at least a common platform. Testimonies are generally intended by the speaker to be 
believed and being reportive encapsulates this feature of testimony. It is enough to say 
that, in other words, testimonies report something in a variety of ways that include speech 
acts and gestures.  
b) Belief dependent 
As an act of communication, it is necessary that testimonials link a speaker and hearer in a 
particular way (the nuance of this to be explained shortly). While there is in fact 
disagreement over how the link between two parties might be obtained properly, –such as 
whether that information is explicitly publicly directed, whether the speaker has a special 
standing or competence with respect to his information, or whether the speaker has made 
an informal declaration of one fact or another, are a few examples, – the fact that this link 
is a necessary feature of testimony is agreed upon.   
 
Furthermore, the communication of information between the two parties is a one-way 
relation in testimony. It suffices that person A offers information to person B without 
reciprocation, even if reciprocity is often the case (in which case, we have another instance 
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of testimony offered by B to A). Because of this feature of testimony, one party (B) is 
always dependent on the other (A) as a source of information, and as described by 
Sherrilyn Rousch, testimony is a “species of everyday knowledge, [of] the kind we acquire 
by believing what others attest to[.]”165 What B in the end comes to believe must in turn 
depend on the beliefs of A, even if eventually B decides not to believe it.  
 
Because testimony is characterized by this one-way information track, the testifier offers 
some information, that P is the case, for the benefit of others, and that audience 
subsequently forms a belief on the basis of this testimony. There one finds a special 
dependence relation that is not found in other reliable sources of belief, such as, perception 
or reason. In those sources of belief, one does not depend on the beliefs of others. Because 
information had by testimony involves a dependence on what others say, there is also a 
kind of dependence relation on the intentional states of the testifier. So, I believe, all 
accounts can agree that another distinctive feature of testimony is that it is belief 
dependent. This should be obvious when we consider the vulnerability of formal testimony 
to being perjurous because it involves uncertainty about the credibility of a witness who 
may not be telling the truth. We cannot be sure whether what they believe is true or 
whether they believe it to be. This possibility contributes to the epistemological problems 
of testimony as part of its concerns stem from the worry that believing what others say is 
not always reliable. Furthermore, if we consider the sources of testimony, we might be 
struck with the fact that we do not receive testimony from rocks or molluscs, but rather, 
from creatures with belief states. 
 
It is not controversial that a distinctive feature of testimony is that it relies necessarily on 
the fact that it is declared by someone and is mediated by that person’s beliefs. Audi 
remarks: 
 
If we start by focusing on formal testimony, we might conclude that as a source of 
belief testimony is quite unlike perception in that testimony produces only 
inferential beliefs of what is said, whereas perception commonly produces non-
inferential beliefs about what is perceived. The idea that beliefs based on testimony 
                                                
165 Roush 2005: 17.  
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arise by inference from one or more premises is probably natural in relation to 
formal testimony.166 
 
Testimony is reported by way of an agent, which is to say that someone says such and such 
a thing happened and this is in accordance with his or her beliefs. The content of the 
testimony then, has a counterfactual link to the beliefs of the testifier, but not necessarily 
to, say, whatever his belief is based on. In this sense, testimony is belief dependent and our 
beliefs formed by way of testimony are dependent on the beliefs of the testifier. This makes 
testimony vulnerable to failure in two places. Firstly, there is always a possibility of 
dishonesty in the testifier and secondly, even the most honest testifier can make a false 
claim because they do not believe the claim to be false. They may have been deceived, 
innocently mistaken or were hallucinating when they witnessed what they claim to have 
seen. In fact, part of what makes testimony different from other belief sources is that its 
second-handedness gives it this second point of epistemic vulnerability. (More on this 
later.) 
 
Dependence on belief is not to say that the testimonial utterance necessarily corresponds 
with the actual beliefs of the testifier but that it will correspond to some intentions:  For 
example, if the testifier wants to deceive his audience, he will make a claim contrary to 
what he believes to be true but this still depends on his belief that this is a false claim.  
Because of the belief-dependence of testimony, believing the testifier involves both trust 
and reliability conditions. If the testifier believed he saw a crime take place, he will attest 
to this and try to convince you accordingly.  
§1.3 From speech acts, to gestures, to pictures 
I mention in the last section that testimonies are usually expected to be speech acts and 
that I do not believe this is a requirement of testimony, at least not in its narrowest 
construal. A speech act in a broader sense could include a number of non-verbal ways of 
communicating something with the same content as the spoken or written counterparts. 
For example, there are formal languages that are gesture based, such as American Sign 
Language, which uses gestures to communicate what would normally be spoken or 
                                                
166 Audi 1997: 406. 
 146 
written. As a formal language, it would be strange to say ASL does not consist of speech 
acts of some relevant kind but if we accept this, then we accept that gestures can count as 
speech acts. And those who use ASL can certainly offer testimony without literally 
engaging in speech acts. So, it seems sufficient to be able to engage in a common platform 
for the communication to succeed and this can succeed with a formal language based in 
gestures, so why not informal gesturing in lieu of speaking, and even drawing when 
appropriate? 
 
First, let us look at gestures. As mentioned in the last section, Lackey’s view makes 
allowances for this: testimonial conditions may obtain under performed instances of 
testimony, that is to say, gestures may suffice to communicate that some P is the case. It 
seems odd to claim that someone both illiterate and mute could not testify that P is the 
case. One might ask the illiterate mute if they saw someone running down the street with a 
television and in which direction. They could nod positively and point south. What is 
preserved of the language criterion though, is the common language between parties. One 
could not get an answer to these question had the illiterate mute not been able to 
understand the language in which the questions were posed.  
 
So what then about testimony by pictures? There are a number of ways a picture could 
answer a direct question and report something. One could apply the last example of an 
illiterate mute here: The illiterate mute could’ve opened up a map and pointed to where the 
assailant went but also, he could’ve drawn you this map. If you were to ask him what the 
culprit looked like, and by sheer luck he was a rather talented artist that could render an 
accurate picture, then you would be better off than if he had given a description.  
 
Offering a picture might be the best thing to do in some cases. When a child asks what a 
platypus is, showing a drawing in a book is often most effective. Better still, if they ask 
about mythical beasts, one might have to draw a picture for them. With these examples, I 
want to suggest that one can communicate information to others without saying it, and not 
only by gesturing at the right time, but also communicate with the use of props like 
pictures. Again in these cases, we must expect that those we want information from can 
understand the question we pose. There could even be some cases of testimony offered by 
pictures that inform us as to what someone looked like, by depicting those properties (just 
as by posthumous literary reports), for the purpose of communicating that information.  
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So it is on this basis that one might want to consider depictive forms of testimony. Some 
pictures are meant to report on how things are by representing them –e.g., biological 
illustrations report on details about flowers, or documentary paintings report on, say, what 
Henry VIII looked like. Some pictorial representations are generated from verbal 
testimony –e.g., during police investigations, people are often asked to describe, say, their 
attacker to an illustrator who then produces a sketch based on that verbal testimony.   
 
It might be said that paintings are often fictional and this causes problems for their status 
as testimonial. But given the characterization above, there is no reason why testimony 
cannot confer information that is fictionally true, aside from facts about the world.  
 
Figure 5.1: Mark Ryden “Christina.” 
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Consider the Mark Ryden painting, Christina. One can make claims that are true or false 
about it: One can tell a friend that the girl is carrying a bumblebee or that she carries a 
horsefly. Conveying information about fictions can be testimonial if one is, say, asked 
about the details of a book. For example consider a scenario where a student who failed to 
read Jude the Obscure might ask another student about it, and the latter asserts that Jude 
Fawley did not attend Christminster.167 This is testimonial evidence about a fictional 
character’s life, with a truth value. If we can accept that this is a testimonial act even with 
its being a matter of a fictional subject, because there is no real Jude nor Christminster, 
then we can accept fictions represented pictorially are testimony as well. There is no reason 
why the fictional possibility of paintings and drawings would preclude them from being 
testimonial. 
 
Since theories of testimony tend to characterize them as assertions and assertions are 
verbally communicated, one might still resist the move to include pictures and gestures. I 
would like to point to the fact that the standard definition embeds an expectation that 
testimony be a speech-act probably only incidentally because the literature tends to focus 
on the assertive feature of testimony. The philosophical literature on assertions has after 
all, been a linguistic project. This could simply mean there hasn’t been enough 
philosophical inquiry into the epistemic value of pictures along these lines. Regardless of 
this, as mentioned before, not all accounts agree with the speech-act characterization of 
testimony these days. New literature shows interest in other kinds of testimonial 
behaviours and artefacts like pictures can square nicely within the more liberal views and 
we only need a most liberal view for our purposes. One can get testimonial evidence from 
a non-speaker where the act of communication carries the bare and essential distinctive 
features of testimony.  
§1.4 The character of scepticism about testimony   
Now, we have undergone the above stages in order to acquire the tools to analyse the 
character of scepticism about testimony, because this will be compared with scepticism 
about perception in a later section. The scepticism that arises when considering belief in 
                                                
167 Hardy 2000.   
 149 
someone’s testimony is traced to two distinct places where testimony can go wrong. The 
belief sensitivity of the information also makes it susceptible to multiple points of possible 
error. In cases where one is passing along testimony from another person, the passing 
along of p eventually reaches its origin in some first-hand knowledge acquisition that p. In 
this testimonial chain, the points at which testimony can go wrong multiply.  
 
There are two points of vulnerability special to forming beliefs from testimony: one must 
depend on the reliability of 1) the testifier, who may provide false information for a variety 
of reasons, and also 2) the process by which the testifier acquired his belief, which is also 
prone to misinformation by deception or mistakes.168 The first point of vulnerability can be 
traced back to belief dependence because testimony depends on a testifier’s claims, which 
depends on what they believe and also on what they want to tell you. The testifier might be 
upstanding but even a trusted source of information might have been fooled with false 
barns or slipped some LSD. The latter point of vulnerability, which has to do with the 
process by which the testifier obtains information, is a problem is not only met by 
testimony. 
§2 Scepticism about perception 
As a reminder, the goal of this chapter is to contrast the sceptical problems faced by 
testimony with that of perception so that we can analyse photographs according to these 
differences. In this section, we will attend to the character of scepticism about perception. 
We know that perception is not immune to scepticism about its content and is clearly 
subject to its own set of sceptical problems. While scepticism about knowledge needn’t 
particularly be scepticism about the perceptual route (though that is much of it), for our 
purposes we want to look at what role perception plays in knowledge acquisition, what 
doubts we should have about its ability to furnish knowledge in contrast with testimony. 
Again, I will proceed without taking a stand on the appropriate theory for handling the 
problem because the purpose of this chapter is to characterize the problem for the 
comparative analysis with photographs and a solution is not required for that. 
                                                
168 Another point of vulnerability can be found in transmission, as the hearer of testimony 
might misunderstand what was said. But this vulnerability isn’t exclusive to testimony: one 
might misperceive, misremember, and miscalculate first hand experiences as well.  
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As with testimony, much of our knowledge has been and is gained through perceptual 
experiences and we trust perception to be knowledge bearing. Both testimony and 
perception are subject to the same kind of paradox: both are the sources of a significant 
bulk of our knowledge –i.e., so much so that without knowledge borne from these sources, 
we would know very little– and yet, both are vulnerable to various problems that 
challenge and potentially undermine their epistemic worth. Furthermore, like testimony, 
the default attitude towards perceptually obtained knowledge is, as it were, seeing is 
believing, unless of course we are given evidence to the contrary. Despite the possibility of 
defeating information, the possibility of error, and tendency to fail, confuse and delude, we 
still consider perception a main source of knowledge and generally trust it to be a reliable 
information channel.  
 
There are two main problems of perception, one is the business of philosophy of mind and 
the other is epistemological. The former investigation deals with the nature of perception 
and grapples with the paradox of seemingly being in (direct) contact with the world, while 
mistakes in perception give evidence to the contrary. The arguments from hallucination 
and illusion are the usual challenges to the position that perception puts us in contact with 
reality: an illusion has a real object of experience but it is experienced incorrectly by more 
than one person, while hallucinations are private to the person hallucinating.169 The 
illusion of a straight twig protruding from water that appears to bend is available to 
everyone, whereas the hallucination of a bending twig can only be seen by the one 
hallucinating. Both generate a similar problem: if what we see may be skewed or false, 
then perception doesn’t always get us to the facts.  
 
It is more important to attend to the latter because, again, the main concern of this thesis is 
epistemic. The epistemic problem of perception will bear more relevance to the analyses of 
sceptical problems as met by testimony and even the general analysis of photographs. The 
arguments from hallucination and illusion are meant to show how we are not as intimately 
connected with reality as we think, but they can also function as sceptical hypotheses, that 
is, generate doubt about the credibility of perceptually sourced knowledge.  Because 
                                                
169 Not to be confused with van Fraassen’s use of hallucination. 
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perceptual errors are possible, some worry is raised about how perception can be 
knowledge bearing.  
 
We take for granted that perception is reliable because it furnishes much of our 
knowledge. On one hand we have reason to doubt that what we see now is informative, 
because if we were hallucinating we wouldn’t know otherwise, and on the other hand, we 
have reason to doubt perception itself is a knowledge-bearing source. This is because we 
generally would not know the difference between hallucinatory and veridical experiences. 
Now, in cases of hallucination and illusion, the causes for doubt can in principle be 
eliminated so they cause a temporary problem. The more difficult problem emerges with a 
more radical kind of sceptical hypothesis: These sceptical hypotheses target perception of 
the external world and suggest that we cannot have knowledge because they are outside 
the realm of testability and doubt-elimination. The recipe for this sort of sceptical 
hypotheses consists of alternative contra-perceptual explanations for our experience of the 
external world. These examples give sufficient reason to doubt we genuinely perceive the 
world, and in virtue of that doubt, challenge whether we can be said to know anything had 
by perceptually formed beliefs. 
 
Consider Descartes’s experiment: this involved taking the position that all of his beliefs 
were subject to doubt and the most basic beliefs, like having a body, were tested against 
the possibility of an evil demon determined to deceive him about it. 170 When one considers 
whether one can eliminate the possibility of a deceiver with such power over the senses 
and also outside the realm of our knowledge, two unnerving conclusions arise: one must 
accept that one can never discount the possibility and that thereby, one can never know 
even what seems to be obvious. 
 
The brains-in-vats experiment challenges the assumption that our experience affords us 
certain facts –e.g. that we have a body– since it is not impossible that those experiences 
come from direct electro-chemical stimulation to the brain; a brain that might in fact be a 
bodiless mass in vat.171 One might even want to think of the world depicted in The Matrix 
(1999), where people’s experiences and memories are completely fabricated for one reason 
                                                
170 Descartes 1996. 
171 Putnam 1999. 
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or another. These hypotheses challenge what we take for granted to be tried and true 
knowledge by perception. They provide a similar recipe in that by offering a plausible 
alternative explanation for our perceptual experiences, in this case, that they are generated 
by something other than the external world so that what we see is not causally connected 
to the object of our experience. Take for example, how we know that we have hands on 
the basis that we see and use our hands. If we cannot discount the alternatives, such as any 
of the scenarios above, we cannot be sure we have hands after all. We can no longer be 
certain of such a basic thing.  
 
I’ve skewed the attention to the external world problem slightly, as the sceptical 
hypotheses are usually experiments that determine whether we know the most basic things 
are true and whether we can broadly speaking know things when there are plausible 
alternatives to which we must concede there is a lack of certainty. So, this is less than a 
direct challenge to perception. But, since when I consider these more radical sceptical 
hypotheses I have to admit that I cannot discount this possibility, the consequence is that I 
cannot know anything for sure by virtue of perceiving, and thereby, nor can I assume the 
reliability of sense experience on principle.  
 
The milder sceptical hypotheses of hallucination and illusion and the like, target real world 
mistakes made in perception rather than plausible major deceptions like the evil demon, 
brains-in-vats, and The Matrix, etc. These pose a problem for perceptual learning on a 
lesser scale in that they only suggest perception might fail us on a day-to-day basis. 
Sharing the same motivations as the radical sceptic’s hypothesis –cashing in on the 
possibility of mistakes about the kind of visual experience we are having– the former type 
of problem can possibly be handled by an appeal to the frequency of successful perception 
over failure –e.g., the reliability of perception can be established probabilistically. But the 
more radical sceptical hypothesis is more detrimental. This is scepticism about the very 
reliability of perception as a belief source, because if we cannot eliminate the possibility of 
this kind of error then we must operate on faith to some extent in order to believe it 
reliable. And we cannot use the probabilistic method here either, for the very process is 
subject to doubt, and we cannot determine which are the genuine successes.  
 
That is the epistemological problem of perception in a nutshell, and one can see that some 
work is cut out for those who want to solve it. Fortunately, I am not about to handle the 
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problem, nor will I discuss the theories that do. The question now is how this compares to 
scepticism about testimony, what distinguishes the scepticisms, and then, how to treat 
photographs according to that distinction.  
§3 Differentiation between the problems of perception and testimony 
In this section, I will explore how beliefs formed by perceptual experience are vulnerable 
to a different sceptical hypothesis than that faced by testimony. Both sources of knowledge 
have different processes for transmitting information, so it is fitting that differences in 
sceptical vulnerability correlate with this difference and that subsequently, their respective 
conditions for failure also differ. Because of this we should consider what conditions must 
be in place to render testimony unreliable and the same of perception. Finally, by 
attending to the features that distinguish them from each other (and from other sources of 
knowledge), we will see that the vulnerabilities of testimony are dependent on its belief-
dependent hallmark, and consequently its vulnerability to the hallucination test. The 
character of scepticism about perception on the other hand, does not involve the beliefs of 
others and is not vulnerable to the hallucination test. 
§3.1 Where are perception and testimony vulnerable?  
There are tried and true situations that will generate failures both for testimony and for 
perception. For example, in testimony one can be sure that what a pathological liar has 
said is not to be trusted even though there may occasionally be a lucky correlation between 
what he says and what is true –e.g., he may mean to lie about something but accidentally 
tell you something that is in fact true. So, the recipe for undermining the reliability of 
testimony involves undermining the reliability of those that offer it. Meanwhile in 
perception, we know that some things can exacerbate the tendency to make mistakes 
about what one sees (and hears) such as tired eyes, psycho-active drugs, and being 
tricked: these too can occasionally correlate with how things are by dumb luck. 
Undermining the reliability of perception then, involves a malfunction of the process of 
perceiving. We can conclude from this that reliability of testimony is always vulnerable to 
the possibility of dishonest or unreliable people, but that perception is not necessarily 
subject to this vulnerability. Mistakes in perceptions are (in everyday cases) one’s own.  
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Learning from testimony requires the participation of others, participation that is not 
required in learning from perceptual experiences. To illustrate, consider how one can learn 
about the animal skeletons in the National Museum of Natural History in Paris in either 
mode: by testimony, one learns from word of mouth, and by perception, one learns by 
stumbling upon them while wandering the museum. When one learns about the animal 
skeletons from the testimony of others, one expects that they have seen it themselves or 
heard about it from someone else. In any case, your knowledge about the exhibition will 
be based on what you have been told by another person and eventuate at someone who 
has actually seen these skeletons (if, of course, the chain is uncorrupted). Meanwhile, 
stumbling upon it on one’s own does not require someone else’s participation. This 
highlights two differences between learning from testimony and perceptual learning: 1) 
epistemic co-dependency and 2) belief dependence are both necessary features of 
testimony but not necessarily features of perception. 
1) Epistemic co-dependency 
There are several sources of belief: often these are categorized as memories, introspection, 
as well as perception and testimony. Among these, there is some discussion about the 
status of perception as an epistemically basic source of knowledge; that is to say, it does 
not require a previous stage of knowledge from another source, like reason. According to 
Audi, “To call a source of knowledge (or of justification) basic is to say that it yields 
knowledge without positive dependence on the operation of some other source of 
knowledge (or of justification).”172 Testimony, on the other hand, is not considered basic, 
and this is because it necessarily depends on other epistemic sources. For example, 
someone honestly testifying about what they have seen will depend on their having a 
perceptual experience (whatever the quality of that experience might be). While we 
needn’t assess the value of testimony in a reductive fashion, –i.e., in virtue of the 
information channel eventuating at a reliable source– testimony nonetheless depends on 
contact with a basic source. One simply needs experiences to speak of.  
 
Now, there might be confusion regarding other sources of belief that depend on other 
sources, such as memory. For that one must have first-handedly had the experience to 
                                                
172 Audi 2002: 72. 
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begin with, (save the hypotheses of memory being implanted as discussed in Russell).173 
However, the point about basic-ness is really a matter of what one needs as justification 
for one’s beliefs. One can (arguably) justify one’s belief that there is butter in the fridge 
based on having recalled putting it there. It is a matter of fact that perception, memory and 
reason do operate in conjunction with one another, but perception can, in principle, 
operate independently especially as a source of justification. Because it need not depend on 
other sources of belief, perception is considered a basic source of belief. Testimony cannot 
operate without other sources of belief and is thereby, in this sense co-dependent.  
 
Admittedly, the current analysis of the basic sources of knowledge has its problems, but 
that project need not amount to the same thing as what I propose as epistemic co-
dependence. One can acknowledge that testimony is co-dependent as a character of its 
operation without committing to an analysis of the epistemic value of testimony on these 
terms. Regardless of one’s position in that debate, there is a non-technical sense in which 
testimony and perception are different because of their degrees of separation from their 
sources and dependence relations. Co-dependency is a hallmark that distinguishes 
testimony from the rest. 
2) Belief dependence  
Other sources of belief can be co-dependent on each other to operate, but testimony is 
further distinguished from them in being belief dependent. We have described how it is 
always dependent on the intentions of the testifier in previous sections. While this might be 
true of perception on occasion, all testimony is belief dependent and the beliefs of others 
necessarily play a role in testimony.  
 
To further understand the belief-dependence of testimony consider how being told by an 
honest friend about the Natural History Museum in Paris depends on their belief that 
there is such a place. If they were deluded about the location and believed the museum 
was instead in Las Palmas, they would convey information according to their mistaken 
beliefs. They would attest to the museum being in Las Palmas. What they believe is what 
they would recount to you. Though it can be susceptible to mistaken beliefs, perception is 
not belief dependent in this way.  
                                                
173 Russell 1927: Lecture IX. 
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Beliefs formed from perceptual experiences are generally considered to furnish first-hand 
knowledge. Perception is not necessarily dependent on the beliefs of others even though, 
on occasion, some sceptical cases may suggest otherwise (more on this later). That one’s 
perception does not counterfactually depend on the beliefs of others does not automatically 
amount to being directly or immediately in contact with the objects of perception, and is 
not to be confused with a naïve realism-like claim about the nature of that experience, but 
is rather a description of the kind of source it is. Whatever the character of perceptual 
experience, having perceived something amounts to being in direct or immediate epistemic 
standing to that information, no matter what theory of perception one is beholden to. 
When one sees the animal skeletons in the museum, one does not depend on the beliefs of 
others for that information. To put it simply, it is just the closest people get to objects.  
 
What causes testimony to fail often depends on what other people believe and because of 
this dependence, testimony has a vulnerable spot that perception does not. By being 
dependent on others, and depending on the beliefs of the testifier, it is a belief dependent 
source of knowledge. And because the testifier can fail to convey truth either by making a 
mistake or by purposeful deception, scepticism about testimony is vulnerable at this point. 
But there is no equivalent in perception.  
 
What will make perception unreliable depends on the failing of one’s own senses or large 
scale deceptions, like evil geniuses and brain-in-vat situations. But testimony would also be 
vulnerable to this point of uncertainty. If it is the case that those large scale deceptions are 
a fact of our reality, the beliefs of others would still be a point of vulnerability to be 
factored in addition to that. And while the sceptical case offers the possibility of one’s 
sense being manipulated there remains no necessary role for beliefs of others in perception 
like there is in testimony.  
 
To conclude, there is clearly a matter of a difference of components between perceptually 
based knowledge and the testimony-based knowledge. That one can testify only if one has 
had a previous experience to offer, misrepresent, or fabricate completely from one’s 
imagination, is hardly a contentious affair. Testimony’s passage requires someone to offer 
it (even if this someone’s thoughts are offered posthumously in a diary).  
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In previous chapters, I have used the hallucination test to see whether certain devices or 
instruments of observation were belief dependent by testing whether they were vulnerable 
to representing hallucinations or not. In this case, we do not have an instrument per se, but 
we do have a means of transmitting information that can be held accountable to this test. If 
the testimonial belongs to someone who has been hallucinating, their testimony can convey 
the details of the hallucination. While this is not always the case, testimony is vulnerable to 
representing the hallucinations of others. Knowledge acquired through perceptual 
experience does not bear this connection to other people's beliefs, and it is not vulnerable 
to the hallucinations of others. 
§4 Photographs and other pictures 
We look to photographs to furnish information about objects and we regularly trust them 
as sources of visual evidence. Because photographs are a kind of picture, their evidence 
type is sometimes lumped in with other pictures like paintings and drawings, which also 
furnish visual evidence about objects. But in this section I will show that there are features 
of photography that undermine this assumption and that photographs are distinct from 
handmade pictures in a significant way. Insofar as perception is generally agreed upon as a 
reliable source of belief (barring sceptical cases, in which case the point about photographs 
is moot anyway) here I will show that the sceptical issues that arise for photographs are of 
the same kind that arise for perception.  
§4.1 Forming beliefs (and doubts) through photographs  
This section will be dedicated to analysing what kind of sceptical problems photographs 
are subject to. We know there are certain conditions that make us distrust photographs, 
particularly the heavy use of Photoshop™ we may come across every day. And we have 
begun to address how handmade pictures are also subject to distrust. However, here I will 
show that they are not both subject to the same sceptical conditions. As already discussed 
in previous chapters, handmade pictures are belief dependent whereas photographs are 
not.  
 
I defend the claim that photographs are transparent, and they are transparent because when 
we look at a genuine photograph, our visual experience of the objects photographed is 
such that a belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual link is preserved. 
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This does not mean we get accurate or perfect or true information, –as we might not get 
that from mirrors, microscopes or telescopes either– but that photographs are like these 
other enhancements for seeing. Now, in §1 we concluded that testimonies are subject to 
scepticism about the testifier and that this is because testimony is belief dependent, which 
is to say that the content will always counterfactually depend on the beliefs of the testifier. 
This means that even honest testifiers are subject to giving false testimony if their beliefs 
do not correspond to reality, and also that the knowledge we gain from others is 
vulnerable to that fact of the matter. We’ve also established that handmade pictures are 
also belief dependent and by sharing a hallmark of testimony, are cousins of testimony. 
One now needs to consider if it is possible for photographs to be testimonial in some way. 
 
Consider the following pictures of a gallery in the National Museum of Natural History, 
Paris, as two potential candidates for testimonial evidence. The first picture (figure 5.2) is 
a photograph taken of a specimen in the museum and the second picture (figure 5.3) is a 
drawing that same specimen. (Both by the same person.) These pictures are presented as 
evidence of the content of this gallery being inclusive of a vast assortment of animal 
skeletons. One can accept or deny this claim for a variety of reasons. One might wonder of 
both pictures whether these are really from the National Museum of Natural History and 
other such questions about the claims made about what the pictures are of. We can ignore 
these for our purposes because they apply to both kinds of pictures and we are looking for 
distinctive ones. One distinctive question concerns whether the content of the drawing can 
be trusted: one might wonder whether the drawing was made by a reliable source, whether 
the artist was free of psychedelic drugs or psychotic episodes at the time, and so on. But 
note that those questions do not apply to the photograph.  
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Figure 5.2: Photograph from Galerie de Paléontologie et d’Anatomie Comparée, Muséum national 
d'Histoire Naturelle (Gallery of Palaeontology and Comparative Anatomy, National Museum of 
Natural History, Paris, France), Gillian Reid, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Drawing from Galerie de Paleiontologie, Gillian Reid 2013. 
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Testimonies are vulnerable because they can be false claims about their content but 
photographs cannot claim anything other than is the case. Unlike with testimonial 
evidence, we do not depend on the beliefs of an intermediary when viewing photographs. 
There is of course an intermediary when looking at things through photographs (namely, 
the camera) but it does not have beliefs. One might even want to say that we are looking 
through the photographer’s eyes but strictly speaking, this is a simile, and photographs do 
not necessarily correlate with photographers’ intentions. It is impressive when art 
photography succeeds in showing us something as if through the eyes of a photographer, 
but not all photography is this successful. Photographs need not have had photographers 
at all. Speed cameras for example, take snapshots of vehicles as triggered by their 
exceeding the legal speed limits and needn’t be operated by a photographer.  Regardless, 
the photographer’s beliefs do not necessarily correspond with the content of his 
photographs –e.g., his doing LSD and forming the belief that there are fairies in his yard 
will not translate into the photograph he takes.  
 
The belief relation is necessary for testimony and is thereby required of testimonial 
artefacts but while it is possible for photographic content to match photographers’ beliefs, 
it is not a necessary correlation. Paintings and drawings on the other hand, are testimonial 
because if a painter were to paint a scene for you based on what he believes he sees, the 
depiction would be susceptible to the same sceptical issue as a testimony, that is, it would 
convey whatever beliefs he has about what he saw –e.g., if he thinks the car was brown 
because he is colour blind and did not see red, he will draw or describe it as brown. There 
are of course doubts one might raise about a photograph, such as whether its content is 
genuine or if the photograph is a counterfeit of some sort, but the belief state of the picture 
maker is not a concern.  
 
Does it make sense to doubt the honesty of any of the claims this photograph might make 
in some sense? Let's consider other ways a photographer who wanted to pass along a 
falsehood could make the photograph convey something false. First, we might not accept 
that the photograph above is in fact of genuine animal skeletons in the museum but of 
something else entirely. Second, there is a pretty common concern with photographs that 
we have already mentioned: whether they have been doctored in some way to, for 
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example, make a false claim as it were. And thirdly, perhaps we have reason to doubt that 
it is a photograph to begin with and not a counterfeit of one. We will take these one by one 
in order. 
 
Regarding the first worry: A photograph may be asserted to be something other than it is 
because of its resemblance to other things. The picture that is allegedly of animal skeletons 
in a museum in Paris may actually be miniature candy figures in a miniature museum 
setting in a shoebox in my flat in London. In other words, what the picture is actually of 
may differ from what the photographer asserts it to be.  
 
Recall the famous “Surgeon’s Photograph” of the Loch Ness monster that was more or less 
discredited as a hoax since its appearance in 1934. 
 
Figure 5.4: Surgeon’s photograph of the Loch Ness Monster, 1934. 
 
This photograph was presented as evidence of the existence of Nessie, and as a 
photograph, it was convincing. Did this photograph offer false information? No. First of 
all, we would have the same relationship to the photographic content as we would have 
had if we first-handedly saw this scene: A stick protruding from the water that resembles 
Nessie, could be misread as Nessie under certain conditions if were pointed out in situ. 
Secondly, to believe this photograph is of the Loch Ness monster is a matter of relying on 
the proper testimony of the photographer or whoever has captioned it as Nessie. So this is 
not a testimonial by photograph. The photograph only presents what was there to see and 
indeed, that stick or elephant trunk did resemble Nessie. The testimony is in that one has 
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made a claim about what the photograph is of and so the picture was misrepresented or 
misread. Again, these are mistakes one could make seeing them first-hand.  
 
Alternatively, suppose the events that are captured by the photograph were staged –e.g., 
an elaborate performance of people coordinating their movements in a Nessie-like suit 
emerging from Loch Ness. False beliefs would then be generated about the photographic 
content based on the fact that it shows something and that something was a deception. But 
false beliefs would be generated through first-hand seeing this very same staged scenario. 
Consider the false barn cases. So, as far as this worry is concerned, the problem is 
reducible to perceptual scepticism rather than that of testimony. 
 
The next two worries are related and come from the fact that photographs can be 
modified. Now, there is a certain amount of modification to photographs that we might 
consider more or less acceptable, such as removing red-eye or lens flare but there are cases 
of photographs being modified to deceive its viewers. (The different classes of 
modifications were described in the last chapter.) The photograph from the National 
Museum of Natural History above may have been Photoshopped to look as though there 
were many kinds of skeletons, where in fact there was only one family of animals on 
display. How can we be sure that when we look at a photograph that it has not been 
modified to make a claim that is distinctly false?  
 
Now one answer to this is that a photographic picture that has been doctored to make a 
false claim is entering the domain of handmade pictures. As argued in Chapter 4, 
modifications that are of the type that can represent hallucinations render a photograph 
opaque. Once a photograph has been modified to this extent it becomes a digital painting, 
by virtue of someone having employed digital techniques for creative enterprise, and 
creative enterprises require intentional states. Because the content depends on the picture 
maker, it is of course subject to the same sceptical hypothesis as other handmade pictures. 
But the important thing to take away is that this is no longer the photograph, but its 
counterfeit, and counterfeits only pretend to be photographs.  
 
The question about whether the photograph is doctored or not remains open. Our doubt 
that what we are looking at is in fact a photograph is not out of the picture because we 
don't always know if the photograph is genuine. There is no simple answer to this 
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question. However, one’s doubt about the genuineness of the photograph is not unlike 
one’s scepticism about perception. From the standpoint of hallucinating or brains-in-vats, 
we cannot tell that perception has gone wrong or whether a deception of some scale has 
taken place, and that is the very basis for sceptical hypotheses about perception.  
 
Photographs follow suit: if we knew the photograph to be genuine –that is, not 
manipulated to show false information or making claims about something being other than 
it is– then we would not have reason to doubt its content, but likewise, we cannot tell from 
looking at a photograph whether it is genuine or an artefact of deception. We can be 
misled about what we see in photographs or misread their content, but these mistakes are 
equivalent to those we make seeing first-hand. We might be deceived on a grand scale by 
photographs as well and doubt that we are looking at genuine articles, but this is precisely 
the kind of scepticism we face with perception.  
§4.2 Possible objections 
Here I will take a moment to pre-empt two possible responses to the account I’ve offered. 
I have already hinted at this problem in a previous section, but the first regards the 
possibility of a grand scale deception like that offered by Descartes but in which case, all 
of our beliefs are dependent on God’s. The second possible objection is that there may be 
non-photographic pictures that are not belief dependent, making my distinction dubious. 
Let us take these in order.  
1) What if everything is belief dependent? (The Malebranche problem.) 
Malebranche thought God mediated our perception of the world with his own beliefs. In 
this case, we cannot talk about perception being belief independent because it depends on 
the beliefs of Malebranche’s god. If this is a possibility, it seems to pose a problem for the 
belief dependence/independence condition that is the cornerstone for my claims about 
photographs. Without belief dependence distinguishing photographs from paintings, one 
cannot claim that photographs are transparent or epistemically distinct from handmade 
pictures.174 
                                                
174 Discussed in Currie 1995, Gaut 2008 and Lopes 1996 regarding the transparency of 
photographs, for example. 
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It seems that the Malebranche-style hypothesis has the same range of the other sceptical 
hypotheses: it gives a plausible explanation for our experiences outside the realm of 
verification and challenges the credibility of perceptual learning. If there is a god that 
manipulates our thoughts according to his or her own beliefs, then we have cause to doubt 
the content. But does this mean we are committed to claiming perception is belief 
dependent? Not necessarily.  
 
I will describe some strategies offered by Gaut (though he used these to prove a different 
point): The first is to admit that seeing can be belief dependent in such worlds as 
Malebranche’s but that Malebranchians do not mean the same thing by ‘see’ as we do. 175 
Our world does not build theories of seeing on God-mediated vision and the kind of seeing 
we talk about involves belief independence. Gaut’s second suggestion is that we accept 
that we may be talking about the same thing as the Malebranchians but deny that God 
mediated beliefs are the kind that amounts to undermining the belief independence 
condition. The Malebranche God mediates vision in a way that preserves the important 
parts of the belief independence condition because God’s beliefs always represent how 
things really are. 176 In a sense, I want to say, God doesn’t even have beliefs, just 
knowledge straight-up.  
 
In some sense, as with the evil demon, brain-in-vat and Matrix situations, perceptual 
experiences will be structured according to the beliefs of the deceiver. But, even if 
perception works in these ways, there would still be worries about what other people tell 
us, but not what gods do. We can still find testimony dubious or believable based on 
evaluation of the person testifying and depend differently on their beliefs. If 
Malebranche’s god intervenes on our first-hand knowledge, it will carry over to the 
second-hand kind which means testimony will be dependent on the beliefs of a god, and 
also that of a person. Testimony itself, may be divine (in which case the worry might be 
placed on the beliefs and honesty of the god) but one might ask what epistemic standing 
divine testimony has based on whether there are beliefs involved at all.  
 
                                                
175 Gaut 2008: 385-386; 2010: 82-88. 
176 Gaut 2008; 2010: 82-88. 
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Yet, there is some sense in which we regard perceptual experience as primary. We learn 
from perceptual experiences at the most basic stages of our development. Babies come to 
grasp concepts by some combination of their senses and so on. That operation is the basis 
of knowledge henceforth. So, despite any debate regarding realism or anti-realism about 
perception, or whether we have immediate contact with reality versus access in virtue of 
representational content and so on, perceptions remain more basic than other sources of 
belief. The epistemic question underlying the undertaking of the philosophy of mind, 
measures the space between the world and our experience obtaining information: Perhaps 
it is a matter of degrees but even if Malebranche was right about the world, perception 
remains one degree closer than testimony. 
 
But this is not unlike the sceptical hypotheses analysed in §2 in that, whatever problem it 
poses for perception will carry over into testimony. What this ultimately means is that 
human beliefs are not easily conveyed by perceptual experiences or by devices that 
provide perceptual knowledge. If that were the case though, then ex hypothesi, testimony 
about what one has seen, heard, etc. would be doubly questionable.  
 
And finally, there is some sense in which the kinds of belief dependence we are discussing 
are different but all too often conflated. In Chapter 3, I made distinctions between kinds of 
belief dependence, including identification of belief dependence through theory relativity, 
because theories are based in part on beliefs, and also dependence on personal beliefs or 
beliefs formed from perceptual experiences. The ancients thought natural phenomena like 
magnifying ice sheets and reflections were divine designs and thus, we can gather that that 
is a kind of theory relativity too (and very Malebranchian indeed). However, the belief 
dependence that distinguishes perceptions from testimonies, and photographs from 
handmade pictures, is a different sort. This kind of belief dependence can be determined 
by the hallucination test I have mentioned in the previous chapters. And that test was also 
used to show how seeing in a Malebranchian world would not be belief dependent (in 
Chapter 1), because god would not fail the hallucination test.  
 
Meanwhile, this chapter is ultimately about where photographs fit into the categories of 
evidence. The hypothesis for this chapter is that photographs are susceptible to epistemic 
problems met by perception rather than testimonial ones and thereby informative in a 
perceptual way. In the event we entertain the Malebranche cosmology, photographs will 
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not need to sidestep the problem but rather remain subject to the same sceptical conditions 
as perception. 
2) What if handmade pictures aren’t belief dependent either? 
Perhaps the more problematic case is the inverted version, which has already been 
mentioned in Chapter 3, and can be found in Dominic Lopes’s Understanding Pictures. 
Lopes holds that photographs are not dependent on beliefs, but it is not necessarily the 
case that all handmade pictures are belief dependent either. This is not to say that no 
drawings and paintings are belief dependent, but rather, it is not a necessary condition that 
handmade pictures counterfactually depend on the beliefs of their illustrators. This is 
because the mental process involved in drawing what one sees can often bypass the part of 
the brain that identifies concepts, and without concepts one cannot form a belief –that is to 
say, recognition engaged for drawing is independent of belief. Lopes’s resulting theory 
stipulates broader conditions for the informational role of pictures.177 If some handmade 
pictures can be belief independent, then what differentiates photographs from them? And 
thus, can handmade pictures offer perceptual knowledge too? If belief dependence is not a 
necessary feature of handmade pictures, then some handmade pictures can readily perform 
the same epistemic task that photographs perform.  
 
I think that in practice this is true: we do trust some handmade pictures over others. For 
example, architectural blueprints are drafted to scale and use a variety of prefabricated 
symbols and shapes from stencils. Once upon a time, this was done by hand (sadly, now 
mostly in AutoCAD™) and these drawings were trusted to represent dimensions so 
accurately to the extent that the engineers often trusted those dimensions. But in the case 
of blueprints, the other condition of transparency, namely preservation of similarity, is 
moot. For one, it is a design of something that doesn’t exist yet so can bear no resemblance 
to it. And it is after all, a kind of symbol-rich aerial map of what a building will look like.  
 
But what about handmade pictures that are supposed to be realistic depictions of people, 
or places? To begin to answer this, it is important to remember that Walton’s condition 
only picks out belief among other intentional states to illustrate an exemplary kind of 
                                                
177 Lopes 1996: Ch. 3; 184-85. 
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vulnerability. Beliefs are only one of several kinds of intentional states that may alter the 
perception of what is to be depicted.178 As Gaut points out in his response to Lopes, one 
need not stop at beliefs: we should not only explain the belief independence condition 
more broadly to include independence from all intentional states, not just beliefs, but also 
independence from the visual experience of others.179 This means that even if one can show 
that handmade pictures can be belief independent, they may still be dependent on other 
states that photographs are not and one thereby preserves the condition that the 
counterfactual link of photographs differs from that of handmade pictures. 
 
What Walton rightfully points out is a certain kind of susceptibility to error is present in 
drawings, and this can be sourced to the illustrator’s process of seeing.180 Because cameras 
do not see, they do not have this susceptibility. But illustrators and painters need to see 
what they are attempting to depict (whether or not they recognize it) and they are 
susceptible to mis-perceiving objects. Colour-blind painters may represent poppies in 
brown, severely astigmatic illustrators may over-arch the horizon, and drug-experimenting 
artists might include objects that aren’t there. So perceptual dependence is part of the 
difference between photographs and paintings, because photographs do not have that 
dependence and paintings do.  
 
Now, Lopes claims that, “drawings might be described as perceiver-dependent pictures. 
But once what it is to perceive so as to draw has been distanced from having beliefs, the 
camera-perceiver distinction carries little weight. To perceive is to gather and convey 
information, much as a camera does.”181  
 
However, I would like to assert that the value of that “camera-perceiver distinction” can 
again be clarified by the hallucination test we have used in previous chapters. A 
hallucinating illustrator can draw what he believes he sees (even if this might only be 
considered a proto-belief) but a photographer cannot photograph his hallucination. 
Whatever mental state or proto-intention is engaged or has the potential for being engaged 
                                                
178 Walton 1984: 264, 276 fn. 22. 
179 Gaut 2008: 85-86. 
180 Walton 1984: 264. 
181 Lopes 1996: 187. 
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when one perceives in order to draw, that is sufficiently distinct from what is involved in 
making photographs. Because handmade pictures are susceptible to representations of 
hallucinated content –even if this is not normally the case, even if one might not represent 
the content of one's hallucination in particular cases, and even if hallucinations aren’t even 
beliefs– this marks its difference from photographic pictures. 
 
I am aware that there is some mystery about how conceptual a hallucination is and 
although I am not equipped to answer this question, we can analyse some possibilities: if 
one is having a hallucinatory experience, is it possible for the belief-forming process to be 
bypassed? There is something intuitive about the claim that when one hallucinates, one 
does not form beliefs. However, if this kind of bypass is possible, the hallucinatory 
experience is still a mental and perceptual event, moreover, one that can be represented in 
handmade pictures. If it is not possible to bypass the belief-forming part of the brain when 
having a hallucination, then of course pictures made while hallucinating are belief-
dependent anyway.  
 
When photographs reflect the beliefs of photographers, they accomplish something rare 
and artistically significant. This is because the matching of content between the 
photographer’s beliefs and the photograph, when they do manage to correlate, is a de facto 
correlation but not one operating from principle. When the content of a painting matches 
the belief of a painter, this is no surprise. But as I mentioned in Chapter 3, I do not hold 
that paintings and drawings can be belief-independent, because even if they could be 
produced with a conceptual bypass of sorts, they still require engagement of the perceptual 
states of others. Whether the perceptions are intentional states or proto-beliefs, the fact 
remains that handmade pictures, aconceptually drawn or not, are susceptible to 
representing hallucinated content.   
§5 Epistemology of photography  
Photographs and handmade pictures furnish visual information visually and yet, these 
kinds of pictures differ in epistemic value because of how photographs are to be 
categorized with perception and paintings with testimony. Now, don’t we defer to external 
knowledge about the photograph to ascertain credibility like we do testimony? Yes, we do: 
there is a huge portion of viewing a photograph that involves second order knowledge 
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which is inclusive of the fact that it is a photograph and we believe photographs are in 
principle trustworthy sources of information. If one attends to the character of perceptual 
experiences though, one will find that there is second order knowledge of the fact that we 
are actually seeing and that seeing is in principle reliable. Photographs though, do retain 
the possibility of being forgeries, a possibility that has increased with the everyday use and 
manipulation of digital photography, but so does perception.  
 
So, back to the big-picture questions about the epistemic value of photographs:  
1) What kind of information does a photograph furnish?  
Answer: visual information about objects, in virtue of a belief independent and 
similarity preserving counterfactual link.  
2) What kind of knowledge do they provide?   
Answer: Perceptual knowledge by virtue of being in visual contact with the objects 
photographed. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
o 
 
The Epistemic Province of Photographs 
 
The questions of this thesis’s chapters have been motivated in different ways by finding 
out what photographs do that is unique, in contrast to other kinds of pictures, particularly 
when it comes to knowledge had by photographs. Transparency was laid as the foundation 
for my theory, and used to reinforce the distinction between photographs and other 
pictures many times over. I described an equivalent test for determining whether 
something is transparent or not, called the hallucination test, to distinguish devices that are 
susceptible to representing hallucinations from those that are not, the latter being belief 
independent. First transparency was what set apart photographs from paintings, because 
of their belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual link. Next, I replied to 
the current epistemology of photographs that claimed that photographs were not 
transparent, but were a spatially agnostic source of v-information. My suggestion was to 
accept that missing e-information is compatible with the transparency of photographs, 
because there is a way in which e-information would be at cross-purposes with 
photographic virtues. The technological dimension of photographs gives further 
explanation for the limits of photographic information as the design of instruments sets 
those limits for photographs. The problem of digital pictures challenges the epistemic value 
of photographs: in response I offered strategies that include comparing whether the digital 
problem of modification did not also apply to analogue photographs, and offered a 
suggestion for where to draw the line between benign forms of modification and the more 
deceptive variety. Last, I offered an exercise to see what sceptical hypotheses could be put 
to photographs and paintings. They were susceptible to different kinds, and that suggests 
that how we form beliefs by looking at photographs is different from handmade pictures. 
In sum, these chapters support my hypothesis that knowledge gained by looking at 
photographs is perceptual knowledge.     
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AFTERWORD 
 
o 
 
Implications for the Aesthetics of Photography 
 
 
The chapters of this thesis have been dedicated to understanding the knowledge provided 
by photographs. Because the questions I focused on concerned the epistemology of 
photography, I did not discuss the aesthetics of photography in the core of this thesis. And 
yet, whether or not photographs can be artworks is a heavily discussed topic in the 
philosophy of photography, sometimes pitted against the epistemic value of photographs. 
The aesthetics of photography will therefore receive some attention here if for no other 
reason than to show how my theory can be coordinated with the aesthetics of 
photography.  
 
As mentioned above, some attention has been paid to the difference between photographs 
and paintings in the previous chapters and consequently we can surmise that this has some 
effect on, in virtue of the ontologies of these respective media, what artistic possibilities 
photographs may lend themselves to. Different kinds of devices have limits attached to 
their kind that include the kinds of distortion and resemblance they have from reality, and 
the kinds of information they furnish. I will show that while the kinds of artistic 
opportunities with the respective media differ, this does not undermine the aesthetics of 
photography, but only differentiates photographs further from paintings. 
§6.1 Scruton and critics 
To illustrate this point, I will start with a more detailed account of an article that has 
already been mentioned briefly in various chapters of this thesis: the question of whether 
photographs can be artworks can be sourced to Roger Scruton’s article, “Photography and 
Representation.” There he argues that photographs are not representational art because 
they simply present objects for us to look at and consequently, photographs offer no room 
for aesthetic interest in them qua photographs. Thus whatever aesthetic interest the 
photograph has should be attributed to a quality in the object photographed. This is a 
controversial view that has garnered significant attention and offers a fruitful starting 
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point for this discussion, especially because his notion of presentation can be construed as 
equivalent to transparency. I will discuss his argument in more detail, and also discuss 
some of the responses to Scruton’s thesis to show that whether one wants to adopt his view 
or not, my epistemology of photography is not beholden to his thesis.182  
 
Scruton believes that the causal, rather than intentional relation photographs have to their 
subjects, prohibits them from being artworks: 
 
The ideal photograph also stands in a certain relation to a subject…[T]he relation 
is here causal and not intentional. In other words, if a photograph is a photograph 
of a subject, it follows that the subject exists, and if x is a photograph of a man, 
there is a particular man of whom x is the photograph… In characterizing the 
relation between the ideal photograph and its subject, one is characterizing not an 
intention but a causal process, and while there is, as a rule, an intentional act 
involved, this is not an essential part of the photographic relation. 183 
 
This is because genuine representational artworks depend on intentional states in a way 
photographs cannot. Scruton bases this on the claim that the function of representational 
art is to express thoughts: 
 
Now, it would be a simple matter to define "representation" so that "x represents y" 
is true only if x expresses a thought about y, or if x is designed to remind one of y, 
or whatever, in which case a relation that was merely causal (a relation that was 
not characterized in terms of any thought, intention, or other mental act) would 
never be sufficient for representation.184 
 
Scruton supports his analysis by contrasting ideal paintings with ideal photographs, describing 
the ideal painting to be one that stands in an intentional relation to the maker and thus 
conveys the thoughts of the painter. In other words, ideal paintings directly express the 
thoughts of their painters. To illustrate, this should be contrasted with non-ideal paintings, 
such as paintings generated by computers or made with paint-by-numbers kits, to name 
                                                
182 Scruton 1981. 
183 Scruton 1981: 579. 
184 Ibid. 
 173 
some examples. These do not make use of the virtues of the medium. Meanwhile, ideal 
photographs are meant to be documentary and their documentary capacity is tantamount 
to being intention-neutral. That is the photograph’s virtue. This means that ideal 
photographs ought not express the thoughts of photographers if they are to align with 
their virtues. This in turn renders them inept at representing fictions.  
 
Another feature of paintings is that they have other visible features in virtue of being 
handmade –e.g., brushstrokes, layers of paint, colour choices are among these– and which 
contribute to their aesthetic value, but photographs cannot be evaluated for such features. 
Photographs do not bear surface markings that are indicative of craftsmanship. Finally, 
the quality of a painting is determined by the mastery of the painter, and the control over 
details she has of the medium and such control of details is not available to photography.  
 
Scruton’s claim is obviously a very narrow view to begin with, but it is problematic for a 
variety of reasons, which allows me the opportunity to discuss a variety of avenues for 
artistic photography to be possible. We can also see why his account might be 
misconstrued as tantamount to transparency, as it is certainly compatible with 
transparency, and since I have here argued that photographs stand in causal relation to 
their depicta. But, I will show how the compatibility of Scruton’s causal description with 
Walton’s transparency description does not amount to the same thing for the aesthetics 
register. In the following sections, I will discuss the main criticisms of Scruton’s view and 
later add some of my own.  
§6.2 Control of medium 
Scruton’s last comparison above basically claims that one has more control over details in 
the medium of painting than in photography but clearly, this is a bone for contention. 
There are quite a number of details to attend to in photography as well, but they belong to 
a separate set of techniques from painting. In response to Scruton, William King argues 
that photographs have more aesthetic capacities than Scruton gives them credit for. First 
he points out that Scruton has ignored the diversity of photographic style and content. 
King also provides examples of the variety of general choices a photographer must make to 
produce a photograph, including the kind of paper, lighting, lenses and development 
techniques she might employ. The photographer makes a number of choices in choosing 
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what to photograph and how to do so. A good photographer will pay attention to tones, 
textures, colour and lighting and serious consideration of these features will in fact 
differentiate them from someone who took a drunken Polaroid picture. So, these allow 
many opportunities for artistic interaction with the photograph since these choices 
determine what gets displayed in the end and give the photographer creative leeway.185  
 
While there are limits to what photographs can do and they cannot do what paintings do, 
there are still many opportunities for art photography. One of these limits is that a 
photograph will not necessarily reflect the intentions of the photographer the way a 
painting does and this, in Scruton’s view, suggests a merely causal link with the object 
photographed. But this doesn’t mean there is a lack of artistic opportunities and the merely 
causal notion Scruton offers is itself problematic. 
 
Dawn Phillips has paid overdue attention to the notion of causality in photography that is 
central to Scruton’s scepticism about photography’s aesthetic potential.186 Since Scruton 
believes the major distinction between paintings and photographs is that paintings have an 
intentional link to their objects whereas photographs are causally linked to their objects, 
Phillips has investigated Scruton’s notion of this causal link and argues that it is in fact not 
compatible with what a photograph is.  
 
Upon further analysis of the notion of causality attributed to photography, Phillips points 
out that such a version would render talk of a photographic subject ridiculous. If the so-
called subject of a photograph is what it is a photograph of, then the analogy to the content 
of paintings, which are intentionally linked to their subject matter, is a rather bad one. 
This is because on Scruton’s account of the causal ancestry of photographs, the so-called 
subject has caused the photograph in the same way waves cause patterns in the sand. It 
would be silly to say that the waves are the subject of the sand patterns; rather, they 
simply contribute to generating whatever subject matter may arise from the patterns.187 It 
then makes little sense to call the object that causes the photograph, the subject of it. 
Alternatively, one can hold that in fact photographs do not have subjects but in that case, 
                                                
185 King 1992. 
186 Phillips 2009. 
187 Phillips 2009: 330-331. 
 175 
the comparison Scruton has made is null. Either way it cannot be as Scruton suggests, a 
merely causal link that is such that it precludes artistic possibilities. 
§6.3 Fictional and expressive incompetence 
Similarly, Robert Wicks points out that Scruton’s expression claim, that is, that works of 
art express the thoughts of the artist, is based on one very narrow construal of 
representation which Wicks calls fictive representation. To put it simply, this kind of 
representation amounts to representation of fictional content but there are broader notions 
of representation out there.188189 According to Scruton, photographs that seem to represent 
fictional content –e.g., someone dressed as Don Quixote– just record a performance that 
has fictional content, and thereby cannot be credited with fictive representation.190 
Genuine candidates of representational art should be able to express thoughts in this way, 
so photographs are thereby not representational artworks. According to Wicks, all 
Scruton establishes is that photographs cannot create fictions about the things they are 
photographs of. However, this does not entail they cannot express thoughts. First Wicks 
argues that this is an inappropriate characterization because, for one, the fair comparison 
is between veridical paintings and photographs in which case strong fictive content is not 
what is at stake. 191  
 
Furthermore, Scruton’s expression claim rests on that aforementioned analysis of the 
controllability of the medium. With photographs, allegedly, one cannot control the details 
in order to achieve one’s purposes the way one can with paintings.192 But photographs, as 
already established above in King’s comments, do have elements one can control to affect 
their outcome. While paintings have more opportunities for controlling the medium in a 
particular way, photography is a relatively young technology that may later prove to have 
just as many possibilities, as can be surmised by the opportunities already made available 
by photography’s evolution into digital photography. Wicks proposes that one can control 
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the results in photography in an important and relevant sense, by what he calls artistic 
masking of the subject matter. That is to say, one can hide or enhance certain features of 
the subjects of photographs in a manner comparable to applying cosmetics to hide or 
enhance facial features, –e.g., one can make choices in lighting and exposure to blur out 
the texture of an object and make the surface appear smooth. Masking provides a 
sufficient opportunity for aesthetic and artistic expression through photography, and 
subsequently, redraws the character of fictive representation as simply that where some 
deviation from the natural presentation of the object is made.193 Many such techniques are 
not contra transparency as well.   
 
Gaut has also shown (though in a related defence of the aesthetic possibilities of film) how 
the expression condition of the equivalence thesis is problematic. For one, Scruton’s 
characterization of photographs lacking the capacity to express thoughts is based on what 
he stipulates to be an ideal photograph in contrast to ideal paintings. But just because 
Scruton’s ideal photograph does not express thoughts, one should not infer that 
photographs in general couldn’t do this. For even if the causal and mechanical connection 
between photographs and their subjects precludes their necessarily conveying the intentions 
of the photographer, it does not follow that they necessarily fail to express thoughts. 
Photographs do successfully relay those intentions and are subject to a wide range of other 
intentional involvement in their making.194  
 
There is also reason to doubt Scruton’s assumption that one cannot make fictions with 
photographs. Now it is not possible to get a camera to produce a photograph of 
nonveridical perceptual states: for example, if one hallucinates that one has seen a dwarf 
panda in their garden, taking a photograph will not show that dwarf panda. However, one 
can take extra steps to represent those states and find creative ways to engage with 
photographic media to represent fictions. Gaut discusses a number of ways to engage with 
digital photography and digital cinema to produce fictional representations, as we 
mentioned in the chapter on digital photographs.195  
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Furthermore, if one insists on making the photograph represent what one has not seen, 
one can even take steps to tweak the image with less sophisticated methods, some of which 
are not entirely “unphotographic.” Recall the paper by Atencia-Linares in chapter 4, 
where she argues that there are many techniques for representing fictions in photographs 
that do not contravene the photographic method. She gave the example of overlaying 
negatives of an image of a cat and an image of a woman, to create a cat woman 
photograph.196 This illustrated one means by which one can convey fictions through a 
photograph, within the remit of the medium. Now for this case, the transparency of the 
final image is questionable: the resulting image is the product of a creative enterprise. The 
photographer has taken two photographic negatives and put them together strategically. 
This is not to say that the medium is no longer transparent, but that in this case, the 
picture presented to us after combining negatives is a product of the creative activities of 
the photographer. To engage in a creative activity to make a picture, even when the 
medium used is transparent (as is with the medium of photography), is not unlike hand-
making a picture or collaging photographs. This is because a creative enterprise is an 
activity that requires active (and complex) intentional states and so, while the 
photographic pictures that are collaged into one image may themselves remain 
transparent, the resulting image that comes from the creative enterprise would not be. And 
as I have argued that the final image required creative enterprise, which does require 
engaging the intentions of the photographer, this method is vulnerable to representing his 
hallucinations as well. But the negatives preserve the merely causal relation Scruton 
described of photographs, and combined, are within the means of photographic 
techniques, so the fact remains that one can engage creatively with photographic pictures 
to create fictions.  
§6.4 The defect thesis again 
Scruton’s claim that photographs merely record reality has already been shown to have its 
problems but I will here mention that it is possible for photographs or cameras to be 
defective and for these defects to be put to artistic use.   
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It is important to note that there are normal conditions under which a photographic device 
has functioned properly, and under which it has not.197 In Robert Hopkins’s paper, 
“Factive Pictorial Experience” the photograph is described as being a pictorial document 
of something that has, by necessity, existed. A photograph of x entails that x existed. What 
makes a photograph different from a painting or drawing then, is its factive principle and 
this is why it is the ideal picture for documenting events visually. Now, there are a variety 
of ways a photograph can go wrong: it can be underexposed, the camera can get dropped 
too many times, the same film can be used twice, and so on. But regardless, Hopkins 
explains that under normal conditions, this factive principle obtains.  
 
I have mentioned in previous chapters that a function of a device may go wrong, and 
under such conditions what results is a defect of sorts. Some defects are especially 
detrimental to the information that a device can provide and other defects can change the 
range of information for the better. A defective camera of some kind could produce images 
that are warped in some way, or brightly hued, or fantastically blurry. There is no reason 
why certain defects would not allow for a number of creative enterprises with 
photography. These defects may undermine the epistemic virtues of photography but they 
can still offer opportunities for the aesthetics. 
§6.5 Documentary virtue and implications 
Patrick Maynard brought several interesting facts about photography to attention in his 
book The Engine of Visualization. One of these facts was that photographs are technological 
artefacts that are especially good at offering visual information in special ways: they have a 
twofold allowance for simultaneously functioning for the purposes of detection and 
depiction. In other words, they can reproduce scenes for later observation (detection) and 
at the same offer a kind of representation of a scene (depiction).198  
 
Scruton believed photographs to have documentary virtue but that this precluded the 
depictive capacities of photographs: this special documentary virtue of photography 
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prohibited them from being artworks because to be documentary is incompatible with 
being expressive.  
 
Indeed, the fact that photographs are used for a number of different purposes that depend 
on their documentary virtue, which hinges on their transparency and not only on their 
aesthetic possibilities, sometimes makes it difficult to differentiate one type from the other. 
But one should not assume this makes documentary virtue incompatible with aesthetic 
virtue. In fact, there are a number of assumptions that we should do away with when it 
comes to photographs excelling at documenting reality. There are no principles that 
govern documentary photography that prohibit their being expressive in a variety of 
senses. 
 
Gaut has targeted some of Scruton’s claims that are meant to highlight this documentary 
virtue, namely, the test of aesthetic transformation which is supposed to establish whether 
something has representational capacities or not. On Scruton’s view, the fact that 
paintings can undergo aesthetic transformation, – e.g., that the audience can look at a 
painting with horrifying content and find it graceful– but photographs cannot, is what sets 
them apart. The grim details of a crucifixion in a painting can generate, say, serenity, 
whereas with a photograph, the grotesqueness of a crucifixion will never translate into 
serenity. Since such a transformation is not possible, photographs are not representational 
artworks. However, Gaut contends that this is untrue. One can easily make choices in 
photographing a crucifixion that promote feelings of serenity in the audience. For 
example, the choice to frame the shot “from a great distance, set against a pure blue, 
tranquil sky,”199 would achieve this effect. 
 
Now, there were many ways to document the events in a journalistic capacity, which holds 
a principle of neutrality in high estimation (even if news often fails to accomplish this 
neutrality). When Ernest Hemingway was side-lining as a journalist, one of his 
assignments was to chronicle the events of the Spanish Civil War. His articles were 
published as solid examples of news, beholden to that aforementioned standard of 
neutrality, but he was also praised for his writing.  The way he described the events, even 
keeping with the expectations of good journalism, was considered rather special and 
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particularly literary. So there is room for a writer to be expressive because of that 
intentional relation they preserve, but what then about photojournalism? A few years ago, 
U.S. president Barrack Obama was photographed just as he was given an unexpected 
bear hug by a voter. A number of photojournalists on site offered variations of this 
photograph to document the event, depending on their position in the room. The scene 
itself was indeed a special moment, so Scruton would credit that moment for the aesthetic 
interest of the photographs. However, not all angles and compositions of this shot were 
equally powerful. Compare the following:   
 
Figure 6.1: Obama bear hug, angle 1. 
 
Figure 6.2: Obama bear hug, angle two. 
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One does not get the same effect from the first photograph as from the second. There is 
some ambiguity in the first about how the parties feel and in the second, the moment is 
shown to be more jovial.  
 
In Sherri Irvin’s, “Artwork and Document in the Photography of Louise Lawler” she asks 
what differentiates a documentary photograph of x from an identical artistic photograph of 
x. That photographs have documentary virtue is not a controversial matter but because 
one can use photographs to provide information in a number of ways, they are further 
differentiated from paintings by the fact that their medium does not help to identify them 
as works of art. A painting made with oils on canvas will somewhat automatically belong 
to the artistic medium of painting because there are only rare instances of these materials 
being used for other purposes. But photographs are multifunctional, and not all instances 
of the medium of photography are automatically established as artworks without 
additional criteria. Irvin’s paper gives an account of what constitutes the artistic medium of 
photography, using Louise Lawler’s photographs as exemplary of photographs that are 
simultaneously documentary and artistic.200 
 
Irvin offers a cluster account of art that takes on features of previous theories in order to 
present one that can apply to art photography. Thus, there are a number of different 
routes for a photograph to be a work of art, but no one condition is necessary for this to 
obtain, as per a cluster theory any combination of the conditions would suffice and not all 
need be met.201 Photographs that belong to the artistic portion of the medium are taken to 
make artistic statements, as Irvin cites David Davies as saying. Similarly, the use of the 
photographic medium may realize some artistic values (or merely attempt to), per Gaut’s 
theory of art.202  
 
One way for a photograph to achieve this is to reflect some positive aesthetic value such as 
beauty or formal interest. Scruton acknowledges there is no reason why a documentary 
photograph couldn’t achieve both formal interest and detail of information at the same 
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time.203 But not all art photography is art photography for this reason. Scruton, 
incidentally, could attribute the aesthetic value to the objects photographed in these cases. 
Another condition that Irvin highlights is whether the photograph has an aptness for 
interpretation. In many art forms, the spark of interest in interpreting the work is itself an 
indication that what one is dealing with is an artwork. This does not mean that 
interpretation defines which are artworks and which not, but rather, that engendered 
interpretation is the clue that what one is looking at is an artistic statement, that one might 
be engaging with an artwork, and so on.  
 
A third condition is to be found in the intention of the photographer and his goal for it to 
be a work of art. For this she cites Jerrold Levinson’s intention thesis, which holds that 
the definition of a work of art refers to what the artist intended. But this is not to be 
understood as the artist being fully immersed in and knowledgeable about the world of art. 
It is meant to describe a mental state that might have the most primitive idea of artwork.204 
Where there might often be room for doubt as to the artist’s intentions, or scenarios that 
obscure the matter, this condition would still suffice wherever this fact of the matter is 
available. Furthermore, what if an established artist loses the capacity for this mental 
state? Irvin gives the example of William Utermohlen who painted a number of works 
while suffering from Alzheimer’s, thus perhaps making his later works devoid of artistic 
intention. Yet, this later work would be regarded as art nonetheless because of its 
belonging to a particular artistic history.205   
 
In short, what makes a photograph an art photograph will depend on a separate set of 
criteria rather than a medium-based principle, and the avenues for artistry are not meagre. 
What makes for a non-artistic photograph can be a number of things, but it will not prove 
to be the fault of the medium.  
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§6.6 Transparency and aesthetics 
Finally, even more rigorous accounts about the merely causal feature of photographs do not 
deny they have artistic possibilities. Dominic Lopes for example, has argued for the 
transparency of photographs and while this is a more demanding construal of the causal 
link photographs have to their objects, this compatible with photographs having distinct 
artistic possibilities.206 This is because seeing an object first-hand and seeing it through a 
device are not identical, and this non-identity makes room for artistic possibilities.  
 
Lopes lists a number of differences between seeing first-hand and seeing through a 
photograph: For one, a photograph fixes an image of an object which gives us more time to 
attend to its features and an opportunity to notice things we would’ve missed in seeing it 
first-hand. Similarly, photographs allow us to see objects that are not present and possibly, 
no longer exist, which one ordinarily could not achieve in first-hand seeing. And 
photographs not only remove objects from the time and place where they first met the 
camera, but also isolate the objects from their context, allowing attention to be placed 
squarely on them when they could be overlooked in their natural surroundings. Scruton 
has also overlooked the fact that the camera has a causal force of its own and can affect the 
way the objects in photographs appear, –e.g., the flash might startle birds into flight or 
make the onlookers' eyes widen with surprise. And finally, seeing through photographs (or 
other devices) will always include seeing features of the device one sees through as well: 
this means that looking at a photograph of a horse will amount to a visual experience that 
includes the photographic paper, the actual dimensionality of that paper, the sheen, etc. 
Information that is available in first-hand seeing will be lost in seeing through, –e.g., the 
size of the horse photographed is not identical with the horse’s real size.207   
 
In short, photographs provide opportunities for observing, evaluating and gathering 
information about objects that would be lost in first-hand seeing and some information is 
also lost that would be available in first-hand seeing. This non-identity of photographic 
seeing with first-hand seeing affords photographs ample opportunities to be aesthetically 
interesting, and presents a number of ways an artist can achieve artistic goals with a 
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variety of photographic media.208 So, according to Lopes, even taking on the stronger 
thesis of transparency to explain the causal link between photographs and their objects 
still allows for artistic possibilities.  
 
Since transparency is the foundation of my epistemology of photographs, Lopes’s view 
gives a sufficient account of the aesthetics of photographs in light of my theory. However, 
Lopes hasn’t offered an epistemology of photographs and also, he holds veridical 
handmade pictures to be transparent as well. So, I will need to explain some differences 
between my account and his, especially since my view is in a sense narrower, making it 
possible that the exclusions of my view also exclude the aesthetic possibilities his view has 
offered. Fortunately, this is not the case, so I will spell out how transparency and artistic 
photographs can coordinate and also, how aesthetics is preserved even in my narrower 
thesis.  
 
My theory is as follows: that photographs give perceptual knowledge in virtue of being 
transparent. This means one sees object x through a photograph of x by virtue of a belief-
independent and similarity preserving counterfactual link. One then obtains perceptual 
knowledge of x by virtue of this link. Like Lopes, I agree that this experience is not 
identical with seeing x first-hand and that this leaves room for a host of aesthetic 
possibilities. I also think, however, that being shown x first-hand has aesthetic possibilities, 
which I will describe later. I also think the non-identity of seeing x first-hand and seeing x 
through a photograph offers different information, but that this is nonessential information 
for seeing.    
 
So, when one looks at a photograph one has a perceptual experience of the objects in the 
photograph and this can be either aesthetic or not, just like looking at paintings or looking 
at a particular landscape first hand can either be aesthetically pleasing or not. First hand 
experience of objects could also be either aesthetic or not. In Scruton’s view, the aesthetic 
experience would only obtain in virtue of the qualities of the object photographed, but this 
is not the only way to have an aesthetic experience from seeing-through. As Lopes argues, 
one can get a separate set of experiences in addition to object-seeing because the 
experience is indirect: collapsing the object into two dimensions, distance (in time and 
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space) from the object, framing the object and so on, are but a few differences that offer 
opportunities for aesthetic experiences to come from the photograph and not the object 
photographed. In short, how it is photographed has potential for aesthetic experiences.  
 
I agree that there are aesthetic opportunities in the non-identity between photographs and 
direct seeing. My theory does nothing to deny this crucial difference. In effect, the 
exclusions it makes do not cut from this side. My theory denies handmade pictures can be 
epistemically equivalent to photographs because, contra Lopes, even veridical aconceptual 
handmade pictures cannot be transparent. They cannot be transparent because they can 
be typified as a kind of device that is vulnerable to the hallucination test. They can be 
typified in this way because the image making process depends on what their maker has 
seen, even if the artist is a zombie, whereas cameras make photographs. Yet, this is 
compatible with photographs being transparent devices, belonging to a category of 
instruments that are also transparent, like microscopes and telescopes and which also offer 
indirect visual contact with objects. Thus, they all leave room for the aesthetic possibilities 
Lopes offered in his analysis of non-identity with first-hand seeing.   
§6.7 Conclusions on the aesthetics of photography 
Scruton’s opponents seem to all agree that his expression platitude, and much of what 
qualifies it, is contentious. And since much of his argument rests on this platitude, his 
account is problematic: Gaut and Phillips pick out problematic premises in Scruton’s view 
and show errors; Gaut, King and Wicks further give examples in favour of photograph’s 
aesthetic capacities; and King, Lopes and Wicks basically share the claim that aesthetic 
interest in photographs is found in the non-identity of seeing through a device and seeing 
first-hand. They also share a similar strategy in that they offer a range of examples that 
undercut the claim that one lacks control of the medium, that show expression of thought 
is possible through various methods and that photographs do more than merely record 
reality.  
 
While there might be some truth to the Arnheim-style position, that is, that art is found in 
deviating from a mere recording of reality, there was something to be said about the 
aesthetic possibilities of photography or other art form candidates that does not depend on 
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a deviance-style argument. 209 Lopes, Irvin and I offer views that favour this route, to name 
some examples.210 Despite the documentary virtue of photography, aesthetic avenues are 
still available to the medium for a variety of reasons including the simple fact that seeing 
through a photograph is not the same as first-hand seeing. 
 
But so what if photographs were to merely record reality? One can imagine Scruton’s 
example of framing particular scenes and marking an x on the sidewalk where one should 
stand to look through the frame as an elaborate conceptual art project.211 This project 
would be said to only present objects to be seen. This is what he considers merely an act of 
ostension that is equivalent to pointing out the scene with one’s fingers or with a 
photograph, but in all cases it would be absurd to consider these instances of 
representation. Scruton’s example is meant to establish the claim that using a camera “not 
to represent something but to point to it” as an example of representation would be the 
same as calling the act of pointing out a scene representational.212  
 
Perhaps he is right but whether one concedes this point or not, one can still take the 
position that photographs can be art by some other avenue. There is something about 
showing others what to look at that has its own artistic merits even if the medium is not 
strictly speaking a representational one. This method is used in performance and 
conceptual art for example. There is something that is certainly expressive about the 
project of framing a city scene to put it into a new perspective even if it is not a 
representation of that scene but looking at it directly. Despite lacking the rigid 
representational features Scruton expects, there are other ways to call a photograph an 
artistic object and he does not disagree with this.  
 
So, perhaps one need not do anything to undermine the representational claim that Scruton 
is offering, and some relief should be afforded by pointing out what is really at stake: as 
Gaut and Wicks have pointed out, Scruton’s thesis addresses the candidacy of 
photographs as representational art, but not that photography cannot count as any kind of 
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art. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, the term ‘representation’ varies in extension: in 
some theories it can include ‘merely causal’ devices (per van Fraassen) and can be carved 
up differently as well. However, in the end there is no real need to defend the place of 
photographs in that very narrow Scrutonian sense of representational art. The force of 
Scruton’s claim is in the possible implication that photographs cannot be any kind of art 
and that is the real cause for anxiety. Yet, if that is all that is at stake, we could happily 
carve out another kind of art form, and really, this would be a fitting practice for artistic 
endeavours since innovation with new media is precisely what artistic movements do. 
Photographs, among other things, could simply be presentational art in virtue of being able 
to present objects in interesting ways and some of these ways perhaps even expressing 
thoughts. This should be sufficient for undermining Scruton’s scepticism about the artistic 
and aesthetic capacities of photography since the part of his claim that has the most force 
is the too-narrow account of representational art that threatens the status of many forms of 
art. But if what is at stake turns out to be that photography is not included in but a sliver 
of what constitutes the art world, then really, what’s the matter with that? 
 
To conclude, I will leave these questions with a general remark about what Scruton’s 
critics show – that one cannot analyse the aesthetic merits of photography against the 
paradigm of painting. And this is consistent with the efforts made in this thesis, as there 
has been no denial of the fact that photographs and paintings are vastly different media. 
They require different materials and techniques to be handled for a variety of purposes, 
some of which they share, and others in which they contrast. Furthermore, this thesis has 
shown that there are ontological and epistemic differences that distinguish them in kind, 
such that the individual mediums are subject to salient methods of manipulation, as well as 
variations in production and distortion potential. So, there is no surprise that their 
respective aesthetic opportunities also differ. And yet, those differences do nothing to 
establish which of these is better suited for producing artworks, any more than they render 
one picture epistemically superior to the other. 
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